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This thesis critically analyses the problematization of adaptation to climate 
change that has emerged at the UK Climate Impacts Programme (UKCIP}. It finds 
that its problematization is based on a techno-scientific ontology and 
epistemology that occludes social forms of knowledge and social contingency. Its 
political rationale accounts for adaptation as a planned, pre-emptive decision 
based on existing objectives. This problematization is supplemented by 
conceptual elements that recognize irreducible uncertainty and social capacity to 
change which are related to socio-contextual and socio-emergent accounts of 
adaptation. In articulating these supplementary elements as moments, UKCIP's 
problematization appears to have broadened, but the nature of this articulation 
also functions as a 'lim it point' (Derrida 1976]. Through rendering the 
contingency and constitution of UKCIP's problematization of adaptation visible, 
this research enables critical engagement w ith UKCIP's current discourse and 
practices.
The research builds on existing academic discourses of adaptation and 
the tools of analysis provided by a Foucaultian-based account of discourse. It 
operationalizes these at the level of conceptual and linguistic articulation using
techniques of analysis from critical discourse analysis, discourse analysis and 
discourse theory, including Laclau and Mouffes' taxonomy of discourse as 
constituted by the articulation of elements as moments (Laclau and Mouffe 
2001]. It also utilizes Derrida and Ranciere's conceptions of the supplement 
(Derrida 1976, Ranciere 2001] to analyse the effect of this articulation on 
conceptual inclusion/exclusion. The objectives contributing to this critical 
analysis are: First, to identify the contingency of emergence of UKCIP's discourse 
of adaptation; Second, to provide an account of the problematization at the core 
of this discourse in terms of its content and structure; Third, to explore how the 
problematization relates to other discourses of adaptation established in the 
wider literature and determine if, how, and w ith  what implications, these are 
combined w ith in  UKCIP's problematization.
3
Table of Contents
A critical analysis of the UK Climate Impacts Programme's 
problem atization of adaptation ...................................................................................1
Abstract................................................................................................................................ 2
List o f Tables and Figures...............................................................................................7
Chapter 1: Adaptation to Climate Change and the UK Climate Impacts 
Program m e......................................................................................................................... 8
1.0 From a techno-scientific to socio-emergent account of adaptation to 
climate change..................................................................................................................8
1.1 Introduction....................................................................................................... 8
1.2 Development of the climate change discourse: from mitigation to
adaptation..............................................................................................................10
1.3 From linear certainty to complexity and uncertainty.......................................13
1.4 From hazards to impacts to risk as approaches to adaptation....................16
1.5 The vulnerability and capacity approach to adaptation..............................18
1.6 Critical accounts of adaptation: beyond vulnerability.................................20
1.7 Where next? From different accounts of threat to different political rationales of 
adaptation..............................................................................................................22
1.8 The problematization of adaptation............................................................30
2.0 UKCIP's place in the Adaptation discourse..................................................32
3.0 Summary, aims and objectives.......................................................................37
3.1 Summary of analytical basis of investigation....................................................37
3.2 Aims and objectives......................................................................................... 41
3.3 Summary of thesis structure............................................................................ 42
Chapter 2: Discourse and Theory..............................................................................45
1.0 What is discourse, and why does it matter?....................................................... 45
1.1 Introduction: Why discourse matters for policy analysis................................. 45
1.2 From language to discourse: from closed to open systems.............................. 46
1.3 Discourse and the Political......................................................................... 48
1.4 Discourse and materialities........................................................................ 54
2.0 Ontics and Core Terms of Analysis.......................................................................59
2.1 How to identify a discourse..............................................................................59
2.2 How do discourses create limits and meaning?................................................61
3.0 How does discourse change?................................................................................ 67
3.1 Contextual power/knowledge and discursive change......................................69
3.2 From 'context' to 'content'-based accounts of discursive change and the 
function of the supplement....................................................................................74
3.3 Contingency and the role of critique................................................................84
4.0 Conclusion..........................................................................................................86
Chapter 3: Methodology...............................................................................................89
1.0 From theory to methodology......................................................................... 89
1.1 Introduction.....................................................................................................89
1.2 Selection ofUKCIP............................................................................................90
1.3 Data selection within UKCIP's discourse..........................................................93
2.0 Basic methodologies of research and analysis..................................................97
2.1 'Archival' research and the genealogical method..............................................97
2.2 Observation of UKCIP-stakeholder practices..................................................102
2.3 Interviews with UKCIP staff and report authors............................................ 103
2.4 Combined analysis of data and coding of discourse analysis..........................113
3.0 Linguistics-based discourse analysis................................................................115
4
3.1 Introduction..................................................................................................115
3.2 Power/knowledge context and its relation to linguistic content and structure 
 116
3.3 Macro-level Conceptual Articulation............................................................. 117
3.4 Micro-level articulation................................................................................. 121
3.5 Practical Application..................................................................................... 124
4.0 Conclusion............................................................................................................ 126
Chapter 4: A genealogy of UKCIP's discourse: from  scientific knowledge to 
r is k ...................................................................................................................................128
1.0 Introduction.........................................................................................................128
2.0 'Climate Impacts' and knowing through science, 1997-2003......................130
3.0 Limit points: the inclusion and exclusion of the social.................................136
4.0 The shift from impacts to adaptation.............................................................. 143
5.0 The 2003 'Technical Report' and the 'risk-based approach'  ............... 145
6.0 Ontology and its lim it points: scenarios, space and agency.........................151
7.0 Epistemology: Knowing and Time....................................................................155
8.0 Conclusion............................................................................................................ 156
Chapter 5: The epistemology of the ''risk-fram ew ork” and the 
Problem atization of Adaptation.............................................................................159
1.0 Introduction.........................................................................................................159
2.0 The (re)problematization of adaptation: first steps.................................... 160
2.1 Genre, macro-structure and Policy narrative: the establishment of the 
problematization of adaptation......................................................................... 160
3.0 The risk-based epistemology and its effects on the problematization of 
adaptation...................................................................................................................169
3.1 Overview of the risk-framework process......................................................169
3.2 Risk and Scenarios: the resolution or occlusion of uncertainty?...................171
3.3 The fantasmatic function of risk, and implications for the problematization of 
adaptation..........................................................................................................175
3.4 Always future never now: epistemological time...........................................179
3.5 Epistemology and political rationale: Discrete, pre-emptive decisions and linear 
time?.................................................................................................................. 183
4.0 Supplementary moments: uncertainty and emergence............................... 189
4.1 From scenarios to variability, and outcomes to vulnerability?..................... 189
4.2 Robustness: recognising the limited validity of outcome-oriented knowledge? 
.............................................................................................................................192
4.3 'No regret' decisions..................................................................................... 196
4.4 Adaptive Management and reiterative decision-making...............................199
5.0 Supplementary moments: social knowledges................................................ 202
5.1 Socio-Economic Scenarios............................................................................ 202
5.2 Social-knowledge based "tools” .................................................................... 204
6.0 Conclusion.............................................................................................................209
Chapter 6: Ontology and its supplements: space, actors and agency......... 214
1.0 Introduction......................................................................................................... 214
2.0 The time of adaptation: Future, outcome-based account of threat 215
3.0 The space of adaptation..................................................................................... 217
3.1 Account of the threat in the problematization of adaptation.........................217
3.2 Location of adaptation: at the edge of the internal system............................220
3.3 The social as external threat and condition...................................................223
4.0 The subjects of adaptation or the subjects that adapt?................................ 226
5.0 The means of adaptation: the centralization of agency.......................... 231
5.1 'The decision' and the centralization of agency in time and space..............231
5
List of Tables and Figures
Chapter 1
Figure 1.1, Different accounts of the problem to which adaptation responds p. 21
Table 1.1, Pelling's (2011] Frameworks for the analysis of adaptation p. 23
Figure 1.2, Correlations between the account of threat and solution in the 
changing problematization of adaptation p. 29
Table 1.2, Three problematizations of adaptation to climate change p. 40
Chapter 3
Table 3.1, UKCIP documents and related articles used for Analysis pp. 100-101
Figure 3.1, Data Selection and Analysis flow  chart p. 115
Table 3.2, Macro-level power/knowledge 'context' and relation to core terms of 
analysis pp. 116-197
Table 3.3, Macro-level Conceptual Articulation pp. 119-120
Table 3.4, Micro-level conceptual articulation pp. 122-124
Chapter 7
Table 7.1, The relation of UKCIP's problematization to three theoretical framings 
of adaptation p. 272
Figure 7.1, The emergent problematization of adaptation at UKCIP: the function 
of the supplement and its (re]articulation p. 280
7
Chapter 1: Adaptation to Climate Change and the UK Climate 
Impacts Programme
"Environmental politics is very much about the politics o f discourse, the 
presentation of'problems' and o f who should deal with the concerns so specified."
- Simon Dalby, Environmental Security (2002)
1.0 From a techno-scientific to socio-emergent account of adaptation to 
climate change
1.1 Introduction
The last 10,000 years was one of the most stable climatic periods in the planet’s 
history, and in human history, enabling settled agricultural societies to emerge 
[Clark 2010). As a result, most cultures emerging w ith in  this period, including 
the powerful, industrial societies that emerged from them, inherently assumed 
that climate was stable. Between the 19th and 20th Centuries, western science 
encountered evidence of ice ages and global climatic shifts in geological time of 
hundreds of thousands of years. However, it was not until just over seventy years 
ago that climate change began to be understood as occurring w ith in  the time- 
scale of a human life as the result of that same industrialization. There is little  
reason to be surprised, therefore, that the climate change we now face is almost 
incomprehensible to our worldview. As such adaptation to climate change is also 
an adaptation to a sudden loss of the sense of ecological certainty, making it an 
extremely difficult process to engage with. Even though the graphs and images of 
climate change projections have become familiar sights in the national and 
international press (Olausson 2009) and form the crucial basis of the evidence 
and significance of climate change, we are nonetheless facing a colossal difficulty
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in understanding and responding to the emergent complexity of the threat it 
poses across space and time.
This thesis tracks one attempt to resolve this aporia through the 
discourse of adaptation that has emerged at the United Kingdom Climate Impacts 
Programme (UKCIP). This first chapter w ill begin w ith  a general review of the 
emergence of adaptation to climate change as a discourse, beginning w ith  the 
'discovery' of climate change itself, the shift from the exclusive focus on 
mitigating emissions to the inclusion of adaptation in the policy response. It 
discusses the different ways of accounting for the problem to which adaptation 
responds in terms of hazards, impacts and risks, and vulnerability, and the 
different accounts of adaptation as solution in terms of resilience, transition, and 
transformation. These practitioner and academic discourses are combined to 
establish three conceptual frames for the problematization of adaptation as 
techno-scientific, socio-contextual, and socio-emergent. These w ill be used later 
in the thesis to analyse the specific problematization of adaptation that has 
emerged at the UK Climate Impacts Programme (UKCIP).
Part two of this chapter w ill introduce UKCIP itself and review the 
academic literature that discusses its discourse. The need for a deeper 
investigation of UKCIP's conceptual account of adaptation is established, and the 
significance of this for the wider UK and international discourse of adaptation is 
also signalled. Part three concludes the chapter by developing the literature 
reviewed and the analytical position developed into a series of aims and 
objectives for the thesis in its discussion of UKCIP's problematization of 
adaptation.
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1.2 Development of the climate change discourse: from mitigation to adaptation
Climate change discourse in its current form arose w ith in  the western scientific 
tradition. Its origins lie in 1824 when Jean-Baptiste Joseph Fourier was first able 
to account for the 'greenhouse effect' of gasses in the atmosphere allowing the 
cumulative warming of the planet through trapping thermal energy from the sun. 
In 1859 John Tyndall was able to provide the 'experimental basis' for measuring 
the greenhouse effect (Hulme 2009, p. 45). However, the decisive moment for 
climate change as an anthropogenic phenomenon came w ith  the proposition of 
Svante August Arrhenius in 1896 that increasing concentrations of carbon 
dioxide as a result of industrial activity were causing a warming of the global 
climate. Then, in 1938 Arrhenius' theory was linked to observed changes in 
climate by Guy Stewart Callendar. Callendar's work gradually gained credence, in 
particular through the measurement of atmospheric concentrations of carbon 
dioxide from the late 1950s by Charles David Keeling. Improvements in 
computerized weather models enabled these increases to be linked to weather 
changes in the 1970s, which were brought together in 1975 in the form of 
Syukuro Manabe's General Circulation Model (Hulme 2009), proving the 
connection between weather events and concentrations of greenhouse gasses.
A series of heat waves and floods in Europe and the United States were 
linked to the findings of this model, providing the political incentive for action at 
the international level which resulted in the formation of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) absorbed later under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC). The IPCC was charged w ith 
assessing whether climate change was occurring and to what extent human 
actions were responsible. Whilst their First Assessment Report in 1990 was
10
inconclusive on the latter aspect, their Second Assessment Report in 1996 
judged that there was some human influence, and their 2001 Third Assessment 
Report judged that most of contemporary climate change was due to 
anthropogenic emissions (Hulme 2009). Throughout these discursive 
developments was an increasingly weakening counter-discourse that climate 
change was a natural phenomenon, a position founded on evidence of solar 
flares and the historical concern w ith  global cooling (Demeritt 2001, Shackley 
and Wynne 1995a). The battle over the veracity of climate change itself and 
whether it  was linked to anthropogenic emissions overshadowed the discussion 
of what climate change would actually be like, and what could be done to deal 
w ith  it  (Schipper 2006).
By the time a global consensus was reached, the battle was so hard-won 
that any mention of adaptation appeared as detracting from the recognition of 
climate changes anthropogenic origins and responsibility for the mitigation of 
emissions (Schipper 2006). Thus when adaptation was first defined by the IPCC, 
it was simply as a "tightly defined, technical term" (Pelling 2011, p. 13) rather 
than as an extended concept, strategy or policy. This political context and 
semantic lim itation helped render it subsidiary to mitigation as the solution to a 
climate change defined in terms of human responsibility for emissions.
Furthermore, the history of needing to prove the very existence of climate 
change meant that there was pressure to render adaptation as climate change- 
specific and thus as its own distinct field of study, funding and political 
engagement. This 'narrowing down' of climate change adaptation problems into 
the areas where they could be clearly linked to anthropogenic climate change 
tended to exclude wider socio-political accounts of vulnerability, capacity and
11
complexity (Pelling 2011). Where these concerns were included they were 
lim ited to the context of developing countries, where absence of socio-economic 
capacity was already identifiable as a lim iting adaptation to existing climatic 
conditions (Schipper 2006).
This brie f overview of the scientific and political history of climate change 
demonstrates how it clearly laid out a particular terrain w ith in  which the 
problematization of adaptation could form, embedding it  in a particular scientific 
epistemology, lim iting its political value in relation to mitigation, and focusing on 
specifically biophysical and technical aspects rather than social or political 
capacity and vulnerability, particularly in developed countries. As we shall see, 
both of these discursive positionings of adaptation as climate specific and as 
subsidiary to mitigation also occurred at the UK national level, w ith  dramatic 
implications for the formation of adaptation discourse at UKCIP.
However, the assumptions built into adaptation as a result of the wider 
formation of climate change discourse have begun to be tested. First, the 
experience of severe weather events in Europe and North America, and of 
permanent climatic changes in areas of southern Australia, have revealed the 
difficulty that even developed countries face in dealing w ith  these problems 
(Larsen 2003). Second, the emerging scientific consensus that climate change 
w ill occur even earlier and more severely than previously imagined, has created 
the awareness that even developed countries w ill also have to consider a serious 
adaptation response much sooner than anticipated (The World Bank and 
Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and Climate Analytics 2012, 
Schipper 2006). This drove a gradual discursive shift, at both the international 
and UK domestic level, towards accepting adaptation. This emerged through the
12
argument that: climate change was already occurring and, particularly given the 
intertia of the climate system, adaptation would be necessary regardless of the 
success of the mitigation agenda (Select Bipartisan Committee 2006, Colls et al. 
2005, Fussel 2007, Fussel and Klein 2006, Hulme 2009]. This opened the door 
past the long-standing argument that mitigation and adaptation were 
incompatible to a new understanding that they could in fact be made to be 
complimentary, particularly if  short-term adaptation decisions did not 
contribute to a rise in emissions (Burton et al. 2002, Reusswig 2010]. As part of 
this discursive shift, adaptation entered the UK climate change discourse as a 
real policy object towards the end of the 1990s and early 2000s.
1.3 From linear certainty to complexity and uncertainty
Although no longer excluded per se, adaptation was still very much defined by its 
scientific origins, in particular by the Global Circulation Models whose 
forecasting knowledge had been so central to proving climate change's existence. 
These were capable of processing complex interactive rules and vast data sets 
representing the meteorological and hydrological systems that make up global 
climate patterns. Most epistemic development in this field has been focused on 
developing ever more complex models in order to try  and improve their 
precision and if  possible, also their accuracy (Dessai and Hulme 2004, Hulme and 
Dessai 2008, Dessai et al. 2008].
The colossal volume of data, its increasing precision, and the central 
position of the GCM-based projections in climate change discourse, created the 
sense that adaptation should necessarily be based on this prescient knowledge. 
In other words, this epistemic foundation meant that adaptation was assumed to
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be planned and proactive, particularly in the industrialised 'first' world, [Fussel 
2007, p. 271). In the UK, this planned approach was adopted because of assumed 
governmental capacity (Hulme and Dessai 2008, Hulme and Turnpenny 2004). 
However, it  was also tied into the need to utilize information from the Hadley 
Centre, which was an integral part of the domestic and international climate 
change knowledge-production network, and thereby validate its enormous 
expense (Shackley and Wynne 1995a, Shackley and Wynne 1996, Dessai et al. 
2009, Hulme and Dessai 2008, Hulme and Turnpenny 2004).
More fundamentally however, the assumption at the time was that 
adaptation policy could be based on such scientific knowledge. This was 
grounded in the deeply seated modernist worldview that sees nature and culture 
as “discrete entities” (Head 2010, p. 235), where 'nature' is objectively knowable. 
As such, a crucial relation was established between adaptation and a techno- 
scientific rationality that assumes the human capacity to know nature 
objectively, and therefore to predict and control nature and responses to nature 
sufficiently in order to deal w ith any problems arising from the human relation 
to its environment (Castree and Braun 2001). The UK was part of this techno- 
scientific planning mode, and depended on the production of scientific data to 
enable a technical management response (Pelling 2011, Hulme and Dessai 2008, 
Stevenson 2009, Fussel 2007). This epistemology and its associated 
governmental rationality of pre-planned policies produced an account of 
adaptation that assumed the identification of hazards, and later impacts, would 
be a sufficient basis to understand and enable adaptation. This 'black-box' 
account of adaptation saw climate change as predictable, based on statistical
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averages and derivations generated an image of climate change as steady, 
incremental warming.
However, the techno-scientific account of the epistemology of climate 
change and its related rationality of adaptation was fundamentally challenged by 
several events. The first of these was the discovery of climate change 'tipping 
points' in paleoclimatology which provided evidence of dramatic step-changes in 
the climate occurring in less than one hundred years, suggested to be linked to 
the failure of thermohaline circulation such that ocean temperatures might 
suddenly cool or warm, quickly and dramatically affecting the climate in those 
regions (Fussel 2007, drawing on Hay and Mimura 2006, Shackley and Wynne 
1996, Shackley and Wynne 1995a]. As Hulme notes, these discoveries, 
particularly by Wallace Broekner in 1987, heralded the introduction of non­
linear complexity language into climate science and modelling (Hulme 2009]. 
This rejection of the representation of climate change as a smooth increase in 
global temperatures over time has led to the argument that the real significance 
of climate change adaptation is not the change in average weather but extreme 
events, which are predicted to increase in frequency and severity as climate 
change progresses (Hulme 2009].
Furthermore, recognition of the uncertainties inherent in climate 
modelling has increased in recent years, and new model input parameters and 
output formats have been introduced to better represent known uncertainties 
more clearly (Dessai and Hulme 2004, Hulme and Dessai 2008]. In the UK this 
appeared clearly in the UK Climate Projections 2009 (Jenkins et al. 2009], and 
was linked to a renaming of these model outputs from 'projections' rather than 
'scenarios' (Dessai et al. 2009], what was intended to signify the increased
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difficulty of adopting assumptions of objective, prescient knowledge, and was 
intended to lim it the tendency to interpret the models in a linear fashion. As we 
shall see towards the end of the next section, this move from linearity to a 
complexity and uncertainty-based epistemology of climate change had 
significant effects for the problematization of adaptation.
1.4 From hazards to impacts to risk as approaches to adaptation 
The climate change scenario information was used in itia lly  to create an account 
of the biophysical hazards that would result from increased greenhouse gas 
concentrations, either in a direct form such as temperature, or in a more indirect 
but still biophysical account of impacts, including drought, flood and sea level 
rise. The clear link from scenarios to biophysical hazards meant that the 
hazards-based account of adaptation tended to adopt the gradual increases in 
temperature indicated by the climate scenarios (Fussel 2007]. However, these 
accounts proved to be too generalized to be of use for policy, and as such there 
was pressure to make these more applicable to smaller time-scales and areas, 
through a more detailed representation of impacts. One solution to this problem 
was the downscaling of statistical climate information to local areas. Although 
localized data was helpful, it  still did not automatically make that information 
into a meaningful adaptation assessment or strategy (Burton et al. 2002]. As 
such, various methods for making sense of the data began to be devised, UKCIP's 
amongst them (McKenzie-Hedger, Connell and Bramwell 2006, Hulme and 
Dessai 2008].
The close association of risk w ith hazards and impacts, meant one of the 
ways climate change scenarios were drawn into adaptation policy was through 
various concepts of risk (Sellke and Renn 2010, p. 298], drawing in particular on
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environmental risk management, a connection which w ill be explored further in 
Chapter 4 . Risk usefully opened up the question of the significance of climate 
change hazards, not in terms of their objective biophysical properties, but in 
terms of their relevance for the body trying to adapt. As such, climate impacts 
have relevance here only in so far as they pose a risk to something that is valued: 
"risks describe the potential effects that these hazards are likely to cause on 
specific targets such as buildings, ecosystems or human organisms and their 
related properties" (Sellke and Renn 2010, p. 298).
In this way, risk occupies a dual position between its statistical and 
scientific connection to the hazards approach on the one hand, and its ability to 
connect this into social behaviours, values, and structures on the other. However, 
in this formulation risk still assumes the characterization of adaptation in 
response to "an external threat" (Pelling 2011, p. 67] rather than the problem 
being the internal composition of the social unit or its objectives and their 
relation to the environment. As such, that linking effect does not take the 
'internal' composition of the exposure unit itself as an object of intervention 
directly, and therefore tends to exclude its social constitution in its analysis. This 
also means that it  does not in itself create a strategic account of adaptation, of 
the 'solution' to the problem, but is merely a technology that relates values to an 
account of threats.
Although risk provides a means of talking about uncertainty, it  does still 
assume some principle of probability and calculability. When linked w ith 
modern western assumptions about the right to dominance of man over nature, 
and the distinction between man and nature, this generates the possibility of 
objective knowledge and pre-emptive responses (Hacking 2006, Hacking 1990).
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At a fundamental level, this enables a planning rationale based on a linear 
strategic logic, albeit a more nuanced one. As such, risk still operates w ith in  a 
techno-scientific ontology of the possibility of pre-emptive planning, even if  it 
moderates the concept of prescience this is based on w ith  various forms of 
likelihood.
In sum, the closely connected hazards, impacts and risk accounts of 
adaptation all centre on the foundational principle that prescient knowledge is 
possible, and that therefore a planned, linear approach to managing a threat 
accounted for through risk is a feasible and sufficient solution. This purposive- 
instrumental rationality (Harvey 1990] creates a technical and managerial 
response to adaptation to climate change that combines w ith  a climate science 
focus to produce what we w ill call here a techno-scientific problematization of 
adaptation (Sellke and Renn 2010, O'Brien et al. 2007, Pelling 2011, Pelling et al.
2008].
1.5 The vulnerability and capacity approach to adaptation
Since the early 2000s, there have been several critiques of the basic hazard, 
impacts and risk approaches to climate adaptation. All of these note that the 
preoccupation w ith  applying climate science tends to ignore social, economic 
and political characteristics as contributing factors of the risk in itself (see, for 
example, Rettberg 2010]. Such critics argue that these excluded social 
characteristics are significant for adaptation as they magnify or reduce climate 
impacts, or indeed act as unrelated sources of hazard in their own right. As such, 
they posit that adaptation should take into consideration the vulnerability 
exhibited by the system that is impacted (Adger, Lorenzoni and O'Brien 2009, 
Fussel and Klein 2006, O'Brien et al. 2007, Burton et al. 2002]. The vulnerability
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approach thus widens the ontology of adaptation to include the socio-contextual 
aspects of the problem that adaptation must deal w ith  (Fussel 2007). Making the 
responding system visible has meant that its historical and current experience of 
vulnerability has become part of the account of the object of adaptation.
The spatial focus on the system had a knock-on effect on the temporal 
account of threat, in the sense that it lessened the distinction between existing 
climate variability and climate change, and between average change and extreme 
events, as all of these are combined from the perspective of the system (Fussel 
2007, p. 271). The inclusion of an account of the social constitution of its current 
status shifts the temporal threat from the future to the present. Vulnerability 
thus places a very different onus on the space and time of adaptation as the 
threat becomes understood as here and now, rather than external and later. This 
drastically reduces the v is ib ility  of, and epistemic reliance on, climate-model 
projections. "This approach can produce useful results even in the absence of 
reliable impact projections [for example] by identifying low or no-regret options 
that are robust against a wide range of plausible climate developments” (Fussel 
2007, p. 271). As such a vulnerability-based account of adaptation demonstrates 
a clear epistemological synergy w ith the reduced confidence in scenarios, or 
heightened appreciation of their uncertainty discussed in Section 1.3.
In sum, this different ontological basis recalibrates how the time of 
adaptation is conceptualized, moving it from an abstract future imagined as 
linear and incremental, to work from the basis of the present instead. For 
O'Brien et al. (2007) this shift arises because the marking of time and its relation 
to space is ontologically different, in the sense that it  is a shift from an 'outcome,' 
or 'product' based-account to a 'context' and 'process’ based account of
19
adaptation. In the latter, the specific connections w ith in  the system and their 
potential to respond become the focus. As such, the adaptation rationale shifts to 
improving 'adaptive capacity' of systems, rather than their material or discrete 
values or statuses.
1.6 Critical accounts of adaptation: beyond vulnerability
Later renditions of the vulnerability approach, particularly as human security, 
extend these questions beyond the basic capacities of social systems, to their 
basic values and objectives, to ask whether these themselves not only shape 
adaptation but also lim it it. It is in order to draw out these onto-political aspects 
that Pelling notes that to understand climate change adaptation we need to have 
“a lens that can examine organizational behaviours and governance regimes, as 
well as the feelings, values and actions of individuals" (Pelling 2011, p. 163).
Indeed, rather than just being aware of social systems, a more profound 
take on the vulnerability argument extends the complex connectedness of social 
systems as both the subject and object of adaptation. This awareness of both the 
complexity and contingency of adaptation assumes that any system w ill also 
produce surprises. As such, whether techno-scientific or socio-contextual, a 
planned response w ill always be insufficient. Instead, this critical account of 
adaptation assumes irreducible ignorance (Dessai et al. 2009, Luhmann 1998) to 
be the ontological basis of its problematization of adaptation -  not as something 
to be overcome as w ith the techno-scientific model, or assumed and measured 
against as w ith  the vulnerability model, but rather as the condition w ith in  which 
to operate. Accordingly, this extends the 'socio-contextual' accounts historical 
awareness of capacity and replaces it  w ith a concern for building that capacity 
directly in response to the real time emergence of the threat, such that the
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system is not static but also emerges (Adey and Anderson 2011, McCormack and 
Schwanen 2011] in both time and space. This problematization w ill be 
summarized here as 'socio-emergence.' At its furthest extreme, this account 
deals w ith emergency responses only, both in the practical sense of the term and 
in the sense of existing in the 'state of emergency' as an exception to the existing 
political system or regime. However, where such exceptions or emergencies are 
planned for they become part of the system (Adey and Anderson 2011, Dillon 
2002).
Ontologically and epistemologically, socio-emergence has a close connection 
w ith coevolution, which operates on the principle that "social and socio- 
ecological systems rules of culture and law are mutable" and as such, adaptation 
"is not an end point. It is a transitional and relational episode in history..." 
(Pelling 2011, p. 28) that constantly emerges in the context of irreducible 
uncertainty. Thus a socio-emergent problematization of adaptation is based on 
constant critical engagement w ith "beliefs and capacity" (Pelling 2011, p. 167). 
Figure 1.1 demonstrates the historical emergence of these different accounts of 
adaptation and the increased inclusion of socially based adaptive capacity and 
critique.










Development of discourse(s) over time
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1.7 Where next? From different accounts of threat to different political rationales 
of adaptation
The sections above have discussed how the last decade adaptation has been 
marked by two different accounts of adaptation, one hazards based, and one 
vulnerability based. The latter has more recently been developed further into a 
more forward looking capacity-based account of adaptation. We have briefly 
explored the differences between these different accounts, but the question 
remains as to how these are resolved in practice. Fussel has described this 
process as follows:
"The evolution of [adaptation] assessments is characterized by a shift 
from science-driven assessments to policy-driven assessments, by 
increasing integration of climate change w ith non-climatic stressors to a 
system or sector, by finer spatial resolution, by increasing contributions 
of social scientists, by stronger involvement of stakeholders in the 
assessment, and by improved treatment of uncertainties" [Fussel 2007, p. 
273]
Fussel notes that these approaches have come to be combined in many national 
government programmes, amongst them that of UKCIP. This is represented as 
evidence that these approaches 'should be regarded as complimentary not as 
exclusive alternatives’ [2007, p. 271). As we shall see in the next chapter, at a 
superficial level this account is indeed reflected in UKCIP's own development 
over time. However, how exactly this broader ontological and epistemic 
inclusion is achieved, and what this really means for the kind of adaptation that 
is pursued, is something that needs much more critical attention than the
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assumption that it  is complementary, or that using elements of both is the same 
as giving full presence to the entire rationales of both problematizations.
The discussion of the different ontological and epistemic points that 
populate the problem or threat have given us some pointers, but Pelling adds the 
crucial insight that not only does the account of the problem matter, but so too 
does the “intention and action” (Pelling 2011, p. 170] that drive the form of the 
solution. Together, these ontological and epistemic elements and their 
articulation into rationales of intention and action constitute three 'ideal types' 
of adaptation problematization: resilience, transition and transformation. Each 
draw on overlapping modes of analytical development along a continuum from 
the functional persistence of the system to its emergence w ith  increasing 
v is ib ility  of the social and capacity for critical learning in each subsequent 'type,' 
represented in Table 1.1 below through the dark coloured cells. This table 
replicates that in Pelling (2011, Table 1.1: Frameworks for the analysis of 
adaptation].
Table 1.1: Pelling's (2011) Frameworks for the analysis of adaptation
Functional Persistence
Self-organisation







The different analytical frameworks referred to in the table above operate 
as shorthand for particular ontological and epistemic inclusions and exclusions 
in the problematization of adaptation. Beyond these analytical perspectives,
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Pelling demonstrates intention and action through their practical application in 
terms of 'goals/ 'scope' and 'policy focus'. However, he identifies significant 
tensions between these different types as a result of their fundamental 
intentions.
The first tension is between resilience and both transition and 
transformation, where resilience seeks 'functional persistence' of the social 
system in question, whilst transition and transformation allow this to change. 
Second, w ith  regard to transition and transformation, the former does not seek 
fundamental social change, and as such can tend towards resilience, whereas 
transformation does examine and enable fundamental social change, which are 
brought into its purview by consideration of ‘social contract' and 'human 
security's' consideration of governance systems. Let us go in to each of these 
types of adaptation in more detail now, and see in more detail how their basic 
intentions and actions, which we w ill call 'rationales' for now [this term w ill be 
established theoretically in the following two chapters] mark how each ideal 
type uses their constitutive ontological and epistemic material.
Resilience
Resilience describes a form of adaptation that seeks to ensure or restore an 
existing state. Pelling accounts for this type of adaptation in terms of three key 
characteristics of “functional persistence, self-organisation and social learning" 
(Pelling 2011, p. 55], but it is functional persistence that marks it  out from the 
other forms of adaptation. In effect, this desire for stasis reduces the need for 
socially oriented analytical tools that allow it  change its own institutions. This is 
not to say that this type of adaptation is not aware of its systemic imbrication 
w ith  the environment or other institutions, but that analysis of its own objectives
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is lim ited to that made absolutely necessary by the external threat. As such, a 
common feature of this type of adaptation is adaptive management, which alters 
m inor aspects of its behaviour in order maintain the core functions of the 
system. This unwillingness to change internally places the onus on prophylactic 
security functions (Dillon 1996] that seek to control the threat, or change at the 
interface w ith an external threat, rather than change internally. As such the 
'scope' of actions is lim ited to superficial changes "in technology, management 
practice and organization" such that ‘policy focus’ is exemplified by projects such 
as "resilient building practice [and the] use of new seed varieties" (Pelling 2011, 
p. 23].
'Self-organisation' demonstrates this problematization of securing 
resilience in an adaptive manner, based on the value of flat, non-hierarchical 
structures (Folke et al. 2002, Brockhaus and Kambire 2009, Pelling 2011, Pelling, 
Smith and Dearing 2004). This distinction would seem to pertain to the entry 
point of vulnerability into the overall problematization because it  opens up the 
internal system to examination, as opposed to a prophylactic hazards-based 
approach which would not require this. This increased internal flexib ility as a 
solution to the problem of climate change is what enables a crossover to the 
identification of social structure as the object of adaptation and source of threat 
in the other two rationales of adaptation.
Similarly, the final category of 'social learning' is defined by Pelling as "the 
capacity for new values, ideas or practices to be disseminated, popularized and 
become dominant" in the system in question (Pelling 2011, p. 59). It is easy to 
see that this characteristic must be present to some degree to allow a system's 
core function to be maintained in the context of changing external conditions.
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However, as Pelling points out, at its most developed, it is precisely social- 
learning capacity which provides the possibility of more profound change; 
moving into a transition or even transformation mode through actively changing 
its core values and goals and enabling the shift from one systemic state to 
another. In fact, the case can be made that both social learning and self­
organisation require the ability to communicate effectively with, and trust, other 
nodes in the system, allowing for feedback and acceptance of change. Crucially 
this replaces the understanding of unilateral information and power flows, and 
enables the principle of transformation and the capacity-based socio-emergent 
account of adaptation discussed in the previous section.
The overlap of these ontological and epistemic inclusions between the 
different accounts of adaptation begs the question of what range of fulfilment of 
these criteria exist at what Pelling terms the 'resilience' end of the scale, as it 
might be possible for a system to maintain functional persistence w ith  little  
conscious development of self-organisation or social learning. The link here is an 
understanding of systems thinking that is not emergent, that is, of a complicated 
rather than complex (as emergent) form such as cybernetics, which is often 
linked to a positivist, techno-scientific ontology and epistemology. As Pelling 
notes, this resulted in a "reductive... scope for mathematical modelling of 
behaviour [that was] not able to incorporate the significance of competing values 
and power asymmetries in shaping action” (Pelling 2011, p. 40).
Transition
Peking's second ideal type in the account of different modes of adaptation is 
'transition.' Transition drops functional persistence as an overriding ideal and 
also begins to consider the contingency of some of the external connections of
26
the system and its internal norms of operation, as indicated through the 
'persistence-free' inclusion of self-organization and social learning, and the new 
inclusion of 'regime theory' and 'socio-technical transitions' which open up the 
question of change at an institutional and political level.
The goal of this perspective is to 'realise [the] full potential' of a system 
w ith in  its existing political bounds, that is, w ithout any fundamental change. For 
Pelling this means that the 'scope' of adaptation is lim ited to "change in practices 
of governance to secure procedural justice; this can in turn lead to incremental 
change in the governance system [Pelling 2011, p. 51). In practical terms then, 
the "policy focus" becomes ensuring the fulfilment of extant "legal 
responsibilities" and the "exercise of legal rights by citizens" [Pelling 2011, p. 
51). This has a clear resonance w ith  the vulnerability-based account discussed 
above, in particular w ith its rendition as a socio-contextual account of adaptation 
as lim ited by its social context rather than seeking to 'transgress' it  [Dillon 1996,
p. 6).
Transformation
By contrast, 'transformation' takes on these deeper onto-political questions in 
addition to the more practical aspects covered by transition, and as such offers 
the broadest account of adaptation and the most profound prospect of change. In 
Pelling's typology, these conceptual moves are signified through the analytical 
framework of the social contract, defined as revisiting the "balance of rights and 
responsibilities" and how these are ensured through power, force, culture, 
identity and knowledge [Pelling 2011, p. 172). He also lists human security as 
unique to this type of adaptation; it is significant for introducing to adaptation 
the question of individual rights and basic needs, but also operates conceptually
27
at a discourse, governance and cultural level that transgresses the usual political 
categories of nation-state, city or organization, and the concerns of the economy 
or rational economic man [Barnett and Adger 2007, O'Brien and Leichenko 2007, 
Tadjbaksh and Chenoy 2007).
Thus for Pelling transformation, via human security, has the potential to 
reconfigure fundamental structures. At a policy level, this means creating "new 
political discourses" that "redefine the basis for distributing security and 
opportunity in society and socio-ecological relationships" [Pelling 2011, p. 51). 
Im plicit in this is the intention that these should at least be brought into question 
i f  transformation is to be made possible. This relates to the increased awareness 
of irreducible uncertainty and its related, nascent account of adaptation noted in 
the section 1.6 where capacity to adapt per se rather than specific states 
becomes the objective. As an abstract ideal this allows for constant 
transformation. As such, this problematization as a whole can be termed socio- 
emergent in that it  questions the social system at a fundamental level, w ith 
emergence, or transformation as its continuous solution to the problem of 
climate change threat understood through the social body rather than as 
impacting on it  [Anderson 2010, Anderson 2011).
Summary
The discourse of adaptation over the past decade has seen the emergence of a 
series of different problematizations of adaptation. The different accounts of the 
threat and response discussed above are summarized here and in Figure 1.2 
below. Each problematization was connected to a contested epistemology. The 
first to emerge was based on a modernist scientific worldview in which
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knowledge was accessible, objective, and could be rationalized. This sat well w ith 
a 'black-box' resilience rationale of adaptation where the current social system 
was not questioned, but material products and practices at the interface w ith the 
threat from nature were managed.
This problematization was undermined by the increasing awareness of 
uncertainty, 'tamed' by risk (Hacking 1990], but later combining w ith complexity 
to produce an account of ignorance beyond our techno-scientific capacity to 
know, let alone control. There was a parallel development of the ontology of 
threat, located first in biophysical hazards, then increasing in connection to the 
social through localizing impacts, and finally connected to the social system 
through risk. This began to shift in turn via vulnerability's account of the social 
aspects of the problem. Here a transition-based rationale came into play, 
allowing more technical but politically lim ited changes to secure the systems 
integrity. However, irreducible uncertainty linked w ith the growing awareness of 
capacity to produce a third problematization based on socio-emergence, w ith a 
transformational rationale. These connections between one problematization 
and the next are indicated by the distribution of elements in the diagram below.


















1.8 The problematization of adaptation
The question that arises from these different problematizations of adaptation is: 
why do they take the shape that they do? Pelling argues that the constituent 
academic discourses of adaptation are generally cumulative as they move from 
resilience to transformation and that they develop in the direction of "a lens that 
can examine organizational behaviour and governance regimes, as well as the 
feelings, values and actions of individuals” (Pelling 2011, p. 163]. However, this 
does not explain why or how the move from one account to the next is made, as 
these frameworks do not themselves account for why that discourse is chosen by 
an actor or organization, or how these different academic discourses might be 
combined w ith in  that actor or organisation's specific discourse to produce a 
single rationale of 'intention and action' reflected in its goals, scope, and policy 
focus. It should also be noted that each of these analytical frames has their own 
ontological and epistemological specificities that do not necessarily sit well 
together. As such, although they might be generative of specific 
problematizations, they do not explain the particularity of specific 
problematizations themselves. In this context, Pelling in fact also calls for 
research into the thresholds that divide and ensure these different modes of 
adaptation (Pelling 2011].
There seems to be a need then for a set of analytical tools capable of 
unpicking the contingency of specific discourses of adaptation. The section above 
established the terminology of problematization, set up through the account of 
the problem and its solution, based on its ontological and epistemological 
content and the structure established through its political rationale. This was an 
attempt to account at a more fundamental level for each of the particular
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discourses of adaptation, regardless of the analytical frames they might be 
associated w ith  or influenced by. Chapter 2 grounds this ontics of discourse by 
establishing an analytical frame and terminology able to account for a specific 
problematization of adaptation in both its content and its contingency, and in 
doing so develops a means to explain how and why particular discourses of 
adaptation can move between the ideal types and general analysis frameworks 
outlined above. To do this, it  draws on the linguistic tools of Critical Discourse 
Analysis, tied into a broadly Foucaultian analysis of the problematization of 
security in discourse (Dillon 1996, Campbell 1998, Foucault 1998, Hall 2001, 
Hansen 2006].
In sum then, this research recognizes the extant discourses of adaptation 
arising from hazards-, vulnerability- and capacity- based accounts of the threat 
of climate change, and being shaped into a particular problematization of 
security through an account of threat and the object and subject that adapts, 
linked together by a particular political rationale. In analysing this rationale, this 
research w ill draw on the three different 'ideal types' of adaptation identified by 
Pelling as resilience, transition or transformation. As these general approaches 
and ideal types cannot account for the actual form of a particular discourse of 
adaptation, this w ill need to be accounted for in terms of its discursive 
constitution.
In tying the mode of adaptation into its discursive construction, this thesis 
follows constructivist and post-structuralist accounts of discursive contingency 
in the fields of environmental policy (Oels 2005, Feindt and Oels 2005, Stevenson
2009], and climate change science (Shackley and Wynne 1995a, Lovbrand, 
Stripple and Wiman 2008, Shackley and Wynne 1996, Demeritt 2001, Demeritt
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2006]. Such approaches have already been applied directly to the governance of 
climate change, including through adaptation (O'Brien et al. 2007, Stevenson
2009, Bulkeley and Mol 2003, Okereke, Bulkeley and Schroeder 2009, Head
2010, Schipper 2006]. Whilst these accounts do not necessarily use the term 
discourse or use it  in the same way, all of them analyse the inclusion or exclusion 
of particular concepts in an account of climate change and a response to it, and 
note that this both constitutes and lim its policy responses. It follows that an 
analysis of any given account of adaptation would need to be analysed in terms 
of how it  is constituted and lim ited discursively. Beyond this broad theoretical 
angle, the variety of interpretations of adaptation discussed so far indicate just 
how enormous these exclusions can be and therefore how crucial for the 
inclusion of particular areas into adaptation policy. Thus making the 
problematization and its contingency clear is the first step to critical engagement 
w ith  UKCIP's problematization of adaptation.
2.0 UKCIP's place in the Adaptation discourse
The divisions in adaptation discourse between techno-scientific, socio-contextual 
and socio-emergent approaches to adaptation all clearly give cause to question 
what any organization means when it uses the term. As such, it  is necessary to 
determine what the content and structure of a particular discourse is, and where 
it is positioned in relation to these broader discourses. Official UK policy actors 
have had to contend w ith the different and changing accounts of adaptation 
outlined above in order to create their own policies and guidelines for 
adaptation. Central among these actors was the UK Climate Impacts Programme 
[UKCIP]. This section introduces UKCIP and outlines the existing literature on its
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function and its account of adaptation in particular. The final section of this 
chapter w ill then draw together the general accounts of adaptation, discourse 
and problematization established in Section 1 together w ith  the specific case of 
UKCIP introduced here, to establish the research question and its constitutive 
aims and objectives that are explored in this thesis.
UKCIP was adopted as the case study organization because of the central 
position it  held in the production and dissemination of adaptation discourse 
across the UK, and in particular for its role in creating the official account of 
adaptation in the UK. UKCIP was formed in 1997, charged by Government w ith 
providing advice and support to UK stakeholders, in itia lly  on how to interpret 
climate impacts, and later on how to adapt (UK Climate Impacts Programme 
2004, Hulme and Turnpenny 2004, Willows and Connell 2003}. The client for 
whom it performed this service was in itia lly  the Department for Environment, 
Transport and the Regions (DETR), which was formed in 2001 into the 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra).
UKCIP's in itia l role was to distribute the climate science information coming 
out of the Met Office and Hadley Centre. Since 2001, it began to develop its 
adaptation tools in concert w ith Defra and the Environment Agency (EA). As a 
result, the organisation was positioned at the nexus of all the official UK actors 
issuing public information on climate change and adaptation. Furthermore, even 
through UKCIP was itself a relatively small organization, it represented a 
national discourse, and reproduced this discourse through its interaction in both 
an advisory and facilitatory role w ith a variety of stakeholders from national 
regulatory bodies to regional governmental organisations to sectoral bodies and 
individual companies and local councils. As such, UKCIP operated through a
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network that was rooted in multiple scales simultaneously (Hulme and 
Turnpenny 2004, McKenzie-Hedger et al. 2006, Turnpenny et al. 2005).
UKCIP's centrality in the discourse network extended beyond its direct 
functions, influencing the well-known Stern Review (Brown et al. 2011) w ith in  
the UK, and internationally influencing the advice provided by the European 
Environment Agency, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
(Colls et al. 2005) and the Australian Greenhouse Office approach to adaptation, 
amongst others (ESYS Consulting 2004, Brown et al. 2011). As a result, UKCIP 
can be considered as a significant actor in the production of adaptation discourse 
both domestically and internationally, a position which warrants further 
investigation into its problematization of adaptation. This centrality makes it  an 
ideal point at which to explore how the specific problematization of adaptation 
that emerged in the UK was produced, and its potential to change. As a relatively 
small organization in itself, UKCIP is also an ideal place to observe the real and 
practical effects of its imbrication in power/knowledge relations on its 
problematization of adaptation.
UKCIP remained in operation on behalf of the Government until late 2011 
when its role was gradually taken over by Defra and the EA. However, they have 
largely continued UKCIP's approach and its basic methodology has been the used 
as the basis of the National Adaptation Programme, (Defra 2012b, Defra 2012c, 
Defra Adapting to Climate Change Programme team 2012). This thesis thus 
considers UKCIP's role between its creation in 1997 up until the end of 2011, but 
focuses on the period between 2002 and 2009 when its adaptation discourse 
was being formulated and disseminated. This cut off point falls two years before 
2011 and was determined by the active research period available. However,
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Chapter 7 does include a discussion of UKCIP's discourse after that date and its 
significance for the development of the UK discourse on adaptation more 
broadly.
UKCIP's central role in the production of a discourse of adaptation from 2001 
to 2011, is barely critically engaged w ith  in academic literature. As such, an 
important and potentially powerful discourse has been constructed and 
implemented in a largely 'post-political' context (Swyngedouw 2010]. Whilst it is 
not the objective here to question the efficacy and ethics of UKCIP's particular 
problematization, it  is the intention to make clear the contingencies of its 
conceptual inclusions and exclusions. In sum, the basic research question here is: 
How is adaptation to climate change problematized in the discourse of UKCIP? 
The 'how' here is prim arily a question of content, but entails some consideration 
of the process of conceptual inclusion or exclusion. Crucially, as UKCIP's account 
of discourse has itself emerged over the fifteen years of its operation, this 
question also entails a discussion of the contingency of this problematization, 
including the conceptual convergences and tensions that enabled its 
construction in the first place and its emergence over this period.
The existing academic literature on UKCIP, w ritten in part by UKCIP staff, 
explicitly notes the difficulties that pertain to crossing between scientific 
knowledge and the form of knowledge needed in the policy arena. UKCIP is in 
fact generally acknowledged for 'bridging' this 'gap' by rendering scientific 
knowledge accessible and useable by stakeholders (McKenzie-Hedger et al. 
2006, ESYS Consulting 2004, Gawith et al. 2008, Lorenzoni, Jones and Turnpenny
2007). Lorenzoni et al. characterize this function as that of a boundary 
organization, where UKCIP that acts as an "honest broker” (2007, p. 73) by
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making the scientific information provided by the climate models available and 
accessible to w ider society, and helping them to use it  for the development of 
policy.
Whilst 'bridging the gap' and 'boundary organisation' imply that UKCIP 
resolves a conceptual and political divide, the question remains as to how exactly 
this is achieved and what effect it  has on their discourse as a result. Lorenzoni et 
al. briefly note that boundary organizations help produce 'boundary objects' that 
shape the account of the social and scientific worlds (Lorenzoni et al. 2007). 
However, this is not investigated in terms of what those objects are or how they 
are imbricated in relations of power/knowledge. As such, the accolade of 'honest 
broker' implies a neutrality that is impossible in practice; All the knowledge and 
advice that UKCIP (re)produces on this 'border' arose from an extant and 
contingent set of power/knowledge relations, and passes through their own 
relations to both the scientific and stakeholder communities where it  is 
interpreted in a sim ilarly contingent manner depending on their internal make­
up (Forsyth 2010). Whilst the concern of Lorenzoni et al. is to demonstrate the 
usefulness of this more decentralized approach for 'post-normal science' 
problems, they occlude the investigation of how this decentralized 
power/knowledge network really functions and what this means for the 
discourse and practices that are produced as a result (Eden, Donaldson and 
Walker 2006, Adger et al. 2009, Demeritt and Langdon 2004, Bulkeley and Mol 
2003, Guston 1999, Star and Griesemer 1989).
Simply at a conceptual level, rendering climate science accessible and useable 
demands a series of interpretations and representations. We have seen in the 
first section that relationship between impacts and vulnerability was a new and
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contested discourse during UKCIPs creation. If we combine this discursive 
tension w ith  the situation of UKCIP in a discourse network that stretched across 
research institutions, academic discourses and governmental and public clients 
and stakeholders, it  is clear that there is a need for a deeper analysis of how 
UKCIP's own specific problematization of adaptation was formed. This includes 
its conceptual content and how this was manifested in a series of 'boundary 
objects' such as the reports and case studies that it produced, as well as in its 
practices and the resulting practices of stakeholders.
In the context of the radically different accounts of adaptation, from the 
hazards based 'black-box' approach to the invasive potential of transformation 
(Whitehead, Jones and Pykett 2011], the particular problematization of 
adaptation produced through UKCIP clearly matters. Further, beyond simply 
making clear what its content is, the process of rendering the contingency of its 
content visible also helps open to a more critical ethical engagement w ith 
UKCIP's problematization of adaptation and its legacy.
3.0 Summary, aims and objectives
3.1 Summary of analytical basis of investigation
The lack of critique of UKCIP's discourse of adaptation, including its actual and 
potential development, calls for a deeper investigation of it  at a conceptual and 
political level. The first part of this chapter explored the already established 
tensions in the problematization of adaptation between hazards-, vulnerability- 
and nascent capacity-based accounts of adaptation demonstrated by Burton et al. 
(2002], Fussel (Fussel 2007, Fussel and Klein 2006] O'Brien et al. (2007]. It then
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explored Pelling's three types of adaptation as resilience, transition and 
transformation, which demonstrate further tensions in the more involved 
accounts of the ‘intention and action' of adaptation. These different approaches 
are conceptually linked and can be summarized respectively in terms of 
problematizations of adaptation as either techno-scientific, socio-contextual, or 
socio-emergent. These general problematizations and their constitutive 
elements and rationales w ill help guide the analysis of UKCIP’s own discourse 
through highlighting both what it includes and excludes in its problematization 
and the discursive links it  has to established analytical frameworks. The internal 
characteristics of each category, particularly those different forms of adaptation 
outlined by Pelling, w ill help identify elements in UKCIPs discourse and 
demonstrate the significance of those elements. In particular, whether or not the 
problematization countenances change to the fundamental nature of that which 
it seeks to protect, and to what degree, opens up the critical implications of how 
UKCIP problematizes adaptation at the level of the political (Ranciere 2001).
The first section also identified briefly that problematization depends on 
an account of the threat or problem and its solution, bound together by a specific 
rationale. This structure's basic building blocks are its ontology and 
epistemology. It includes a subject that acts and an object that is acted on, 
although this may be one and the same, as exemplified by the social system in a 
socio-emergent account of adaptation. As such, the presence or absence of 
particular characteristics and the way they are articulated internally and w ith 
each other helps identify the even more fundamental ontological and 
epistemological premises from which each unique account of adaptation to 
climate change is constructed. Breaking these types down into these
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fundamental conceptual elements is useful because it enables the analysis to 
observe how a specific problematization, such as that of UKCIP, might 'combine' 
'ideal types' or move from one to the other over time. It creates space for an 
analysis of why and how this happens at a discursive level.
Table 1.2 below summarizes these various elements and their place in the 
three general problematizations of adaptation. It separates them into their 
ontological and epistemic foundations. These are created around two facets of 
ontology and epistemology, which are broadly conceived of in terms of time and 
space; broken down into subject and object to which pertain certain accounts of 
action and agency. All of these aspects are tied together w ith  a particular political 
rationale that moves from certain elements that are characterized as a threat, to 
an account of the solution, creating as it  does so a particular problematization of 
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This discussion of the content of a problematization recalls Fussel's 
comment that many climate change adaptation programmes, including UKCIP's, 
combine a hazards- and vulnerability-based approach. The suggestion of the 
discussion so far is that this complementarity is far from natural and cannot be 
assumed; not only is it a historically contingent formation, but it  would seem 
likely that it  is difficult to maintain at a conceptual level given the conceptual 
differences and tensions identified above.
As such, this research seeks to problematize the assumption of 
complementarity through looking more deeply at how this development occurs 
at UKCIP. That is, through analysing how 'complimentary' these approaches are 
discursively, at a conceptual level as demonstrated through speech, writing, and 
communicative practices. As such, how such complementarity works when it 
does occur can be viewed more clearly if  its content is examined w ith in  the 
framework of a discursive problematization: it can be unpicked in terms of the 
ontology and epistemology of the threat, subjects and objects and political 
rationale of the solution to that problem, and how elements from these basic 
frames are brought together can then be discussed in terms of their precise 
articulation. This should shed light on whether their complementary use is the 
same as conceptual coherence, and what effect this (in)coherence might have on 
the problematization's stability or potential for change.
3.2 Aims and objectives
On the basis of the discussion of the tensions between the different 
problematizations of adaptation above and the suggestion that UKCIP makes 
some of these complimentary, the aim of this research is to critically analyse 
UKCIP's problematization of adaptation to climate change.
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The objectives contributing to this aim are:
• First, to situate problematization in terms of the contingency of its 
emergence, in order to enable more critical engagement w ith  the 
conceptual content and form of this problematization.
• Second, to provide an account of UKCIP's problematization of adaptation 
in terms of its ontology and epistemology and how these are drawn 
together discursively through a political rationale.
• Third, to explore how the problematization relates to other discourses of 
adaptation established in the literature, and determine if, how, and w ith 
what implications these function in a complimentary manner w ith in  
UKCIP's problematization.
3.3 Summary of thesis structure
This chapter has established three basic problematizations of adaptation from 
existing accounts against which to assess conceptual content of UKCIP's 
problematization of adaptation. The next chapter, Chapter 2, develops a 
theoretical account of discourse and its potential to change, while Chapter 3 
establishes a methodology for turning these theoretical insights from adaptation 
research and discourse analysis into an analytical framework and toolbox for 
accounting for and unpicking UKCIP's own problematization of adaptation.
Chapter 4 provides an overview of UKCIP's discursive development, 
highlighting the power/knowledge relations that enabled the dominance of some 
accounts of adaptation over others and sets the groundwork for the account of 
UKCIP's problematization in the following two chapters. The first of these, 
Chapter 5, accounts for the epistemic basis of the problematization of adaptation 
in UKCIP's discourse, and identifies the presence of a core epistemology,
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articulated together w ith supplementary elements. These resonate w ith  the 
distinction between the techno-scientific and socio-contextual respectively. How 
these are rendered complementary in the discourse is examined, and the effect of 
this on their substantive meaning is analysed. Tensions in this articulation are 
explored. These become increasingly clear over time, particularly through 
naming the distinctiveness of a socio-contextual epistemology and pointing in 
turn to the possibility of a socio-emergent epistemology based on irreducible 
uncertainty.
Chapter 6 examines the ontological aspects of UKCIP's problematization 
of adaptation. Again, a core ontology is identified that resonates w ith the techo- 
scientific framing of adaptation. There are also supplementary moments which 
resonate w ith  socio-contextual accounts of adaptation. The tensions between 
these, although linguistically resolved in UKCIP's key documents, become 
increasingly distinct over time, and in doing so hint at the possibility of an 
alternative and very different problematization of adaptation that is socio- 
emergent.
Chapter 7 considers the effect of these supplementary moments on 
UKCIP’s problematization of adaptation and whether these are complimentary in 
the sense that they have made it  more effective as a discourse through increased 
ontological and epistemic inclusion, or whether this has in fact weakened the 
substantiveness of its constitutive elements or the internal coherence of the 
problematization. It then discusses the coherence between these supplementary 
moments and their suggestion of a supplementary problematization that moves 
beyond a socio-contextual problematization to a socio-emergent 
problematization. Finally it  discusses UKCIP's position on such an alternative
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discourse, and the effect of UKCIP's departure from a government role for the 
presence of the supplementary problematization in the UK. Chapter 8 
summarises the thesis as a whole in relation to the aims and objectives 
introduced here and considers the wider political implications of UKCIP's 
problematization of adaptation and the alternative problematization suggested 
by its supplementary moments.
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Chapter 2: Discourse and Theory
'To analyse a discursive formation is to [weigh] the 'value' o f statements, a value 
that is not defined by their truth... but which characterizes their place, their 
capacity fo r  circulation and exchange, their possibility o f transformation, 
not only in the economy o f discourse, but more generally in the administration o f
scarce resources'
-  Foucault, The Archaeology o f Knowledge (1972].
'Politics is aesthetic in that i t  makes visible what had been excluded from  a 
perceptual field... i t  makes audible what used to be inaudible'
- (Ranciere 2004, p. 226, quoted in Stamp 2009, pp. 11-12).
1.0 What is discourse, and why does it matter?
1.1 Introduction: Why discourse matters for policy analysis
As we have seen in the previous chapter, there are substantial debates over the 
meaning of adaptation and its implications for practices, including policy. This 
research seeks to address this question in the UK context, specifically in terms of 
the discourse of the UK Climate Impacts Programme problematizes adaptation to 
climate change.
This research situates itself w ith in the mode of policy analysis that has 
developed from the poststructuralist linguistic turn in the social sciences in the 
1980's (Szerszynski and Urry 2010). This has taken policy and discourse analysis 
radically beyond the 'transmission model' of communication, which assumes 
language to directly represent reality, and reality to be merely represented by
45
language. Instead, the linguistic turn proceeds from the claim that we perceive 
and construct reality itself through a complex social process of meaning making.
Policy, as a specific practice of discourse, plays on the 'common-sense' 
assumption of a transmission model of communication. In fact, policy transforms 
this into an art, seeking to convince its audience of a particular tru th  in order to 
elicit a particular kind of response (Hansen 2006, Campbell 1998]. In this way 
policy works through utilizing the malleability of discourse pointed out by 
poststructuralist approaches (Roe 1994}.
This chapter seeks to establish the theoretical basis of this research and in 
to provide an account of the central analytical concepts it w ill use to unpick the 
content and contingency of the problematization of adaptation established in 
UKCIP's discourse. This chapter begins by discussing an ontology of discourse in 
in Section 1.2, and how this relates to the political in Section 1.3, and the ontology 
of the irreducibility of meaning in Section 1.4. It then discusses the role of 
power/knowledge in the contingency particular problematizations in Section 1.5. 
This contextual positioning is followed by an account of the content and 
structure of a problematization in Part 2, followed by an account of discursive 
change in Part 3. Part 4 draws together all of the aspects into a list of analytical 
concepts to deal w ith the content and contingency of the problematization of 
adaptation in UKCIP's discourse.
1.2 From language to discourse: from closed to open systems
Foundational to any discussion of policy or discourse is a conception of meaning, 
and its connection to language. The 'common sense' account of language is as a 
"transmission model of communication" (Reddy, 1979, quoted by Wertsch 2001}, 
where language is seen as functioning as a 'conduit' that simply transferred
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stable, complete meanings from speaker to listener or w rite r to reader, such that 
they were assumed to be spoken and understood in exactly the same way.
In laying bare the assumptions behind our use of language, Reddy 
provided leverage for critiques of extant language theory. Beginning in the 1920s 
w ith  Wittgenstein, philosophers began to reject the idea of language as an 
accurate and consistent system of representation. Wittgenstein found instead 
that the meaning of a word arose from "its use in language" as "an ostensive 
definition can be variously interpreted in every case" (Potter 2001, pp. 40-41}. 
He noted that this interpretation was a partially deliberate choice about the use 
of alternative understandings of words and phrases, such that language could be 
understood as a "toolkit" used in a "language game" (Potter 2001, p. 40}. More 
fundamentally however, this capacity meant changes in language could 
fundamentally restructure worldviews, such that Wittgenstein noted that "the 
lim its of my language are the lim its of my world” (Johnstone 2008, p. 34}.
This basic malleability of meaning was extended by John Austin from the 
role of the individual to the function of social context in shaping the use of 
language. He showed that the meaning of words and phrases depended on social 
or psychological 'felicity conditions' whereby they only were deemed to make 
sense if  they fitted w ith the frame provided by language and social context 
(Potter 2001, p. 43}. In this sense, meaning is relational: black is only black in the 
way we understand it because of the existence of the term blue; and the values 
(negative or positive} of that colour are shaped by the context in which it  is 
spoken about. In this way, words have meaning only because of their relation to 
other utterances (Wetherell 2001b}.
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However, Austin did not follow up the element of deliberate manipulation 
that Wittgenstein introduced. It was Bakhtin who noted that there is always 
political. He noted that there is always a 'struggle' over what meaning is 
expressed and how between author and reader on the micro scale and between 
centrifugal and centripetal social forces on the macro scale (Maybin 2001]. As 
such, the “meanings of words are derived not from fixed relationships between 
abstract signs, but from the accumulated dynamic social use of particular forms 
of language in different contexts and for different and sometimes conflicting 
purposes" (Maybin 2001). This allowed for language systems to be emergent, yet 
also to slow down and 'sediment' around particular uses of language w ith in 
particular social contexts, such as institutions or generational groups. However, 
these different uses inevitably come into contact and 'struggle' again, as they 
"cohabit" social space, "supplementing and contradicting each other, and 
intersecting or becoming hybridised in various ways" (Maybin 2001).
1.3 Discourse and the Political
This contingent (re)production of meaning not only has fundamental political 
effects but it is itself the essence of the political. For Michel Foucault, whose 
account of knowledge is accutely sensitive to the question of power: knowledge 
is contingent on a 'struggle' or power-relation of some kind while at the same 
time knowledge also shapes power-relations. Discourse is thus productive of 
particular forms of life and rationalities of government as well as a product of 
these same political formations (Howarth 2000, Foucault 1977).
This applies at both the collective and individual level. In either case it  is 
Foucault's contention that knowledge does not just manipulate or mislead the 
subject, but actively constitutes the subject as such (Foucault 1998). The power
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of language to shape perception has been demonstrated from a variety of other 
theoretical perspectives. The ethnographical Sapir-Whorf hypothesis contends 
that the everyday 'language habits’ of a group produces an understanding of the 
world or 'worldview' (Renkema 2004). Billig transfers this to an overtly 
psychological analysis and claims that conversation directly constitutes the 
unconscious (Billig 2001).
However these regularized systems of meaning are described, as 
language, discourse, or worldview, such accounts understand knowledge as 
contingent on power relations of some kind. As such, they do not represent a 
universal or objective 'truth.' The contingency of discourse means that they can 
be regulated and sedimented, or that they can emerge and change, w ith 
fundamental implications for the content and lim its of what we 'know' and who 
we can 'be' as a result, including in our interaction w ith the wider social and 
material world (Hall 2001, Laclau and Mouffe 2001). As such, the form of 
discourse is political, both in its production and in what it  seeks to produce both 
ontologically and institutionally.
Although Foucault avoids making any fundamental claim as to the basis of 
this contingency, the capacity to reform the social is linked in post structuralist 
and particularly in post-foundational political theory to an ontological 'lack' of an 
objective or coherent system of meaning. Instead, the 'overflowing' of possible 
meanings that constitute 'the real' or the 'divine' (Kate 2000, Marchart 2007). 
Drawing consecutively from Lacan and Laclau Howarth (2000) and Howarth and 
Glynos (2007) connect this ontology to Derrida's account of structural 
undecidability, and the thought of Heidegger, Foucault and Wittgenstein. In other
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words, this is a "negative ontology” of "lack" that assumes the "radial contingency 
of social relations" [Glynos and Howarth 2007, p. 14).
Laclau's account of the institution of discourse takes it  beyond being just 
"a theory of 'political signification' [to] a 'political theory' of signification" 
[Marchart 2007, p. 146). However, it  is Ranciere who perhaps offers the clearest 
explanation of this philosophical position and how it relates to an account of the 
political. Although he himself, like Foucault, might deny it  was such, the lack of 
foundation becomes the foundation of the account for the political. Rather than 
drawing legitimacy from universal laws or telos, the political becomes not the 
account of what must or ought to be instituted, this impossibility of accounting in 
a commensurate way is the foundation of the properly political. The political is 
the act of institution of an account itself that w ill necessarily be partial [Ranciere 
and Panagia 2000, Ranciere 2001).
Ranciere in fact wishes to distinguish himself from Foucault - believing 
the latter's account of power as 'everywhere' to mean that politics in Foucault's 
vision is therefore also 'everywhere' and thus substantively meaningless 
[Ranciere and Panagia 2000). However , Foucault's determination that power 
and knowledge are imbricated and highly contingent assumes an account of the 
political that is w ithout foundation, or perhaps more accurately, where the entire 
presence and function of a political act occurs in the constitution, removal or 
replacement of a foundation -  either as an account of society or of a subject/self 
[Stamp 2009).
They also share, particularly in Foucault's later work, an understanding of 
the self as exceeding its subjectification where ethical comportment is to open 
the self to the exploration of excess in order to transgress existing power
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relations (Foucault 1990, Foucault 1992, Stamp 2009]. In Foucualt's account this 
is enabled through the 'v irtuality ' of power relations and the experimental 
playing out of potential against a limitless background (Stamp 2009], a term that 
resonates markedly w ith Ranciere's term 'poetics.' Poetics accounts for the 
opening up of the extant order to fundamental change, where the rules of 
inclusion/exclusion change, which occurs in part through the discursive as a way 
of making the invisible visible and creating new orders of knowledge (Ranciere 
and Panagia 2000]. Here we see a relation to the political significance of 
articulating elements as moments into a discursive 'order.'
This foundation of foundationlessness, and the political moment as 
creation and change means that for Ranciere equality cannot be established by 
the political moment or assured through a police order, but is instead the 
generative condition of the political. We are equal in that we are all able to be and 
become otherwise -  not in a sense of numeric equality of likelihood, but in the 
sense that the presence of a particularity of order or subjectivity can only exist 
because it  excludes, and that which it  excludes is as valid ontologically or 
politically, separated from the real only by contingency rather than universal law. 
The excess thus adds to an order the conflicting logic of an equal claim to 
presence while the order's own logic seeks to exclude this 'originary equality' 
(Dillon 2005] by obscuring the visib ility of excess.
Politics, for Ranciere, occurs at the specific moments where these logics 
conflict (Ranciere 2007b, Chambers 2010] as politics names the extant order as 
contingent and a ‘fundamental miscount' (Chambers 2010, quoting Ranciere, 
1998, p. 7] while it  should be understood, in contrast to modernist thinking, that 
all orders are necessarily miscounts of an incalculable and incommensurable
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totality. It is this excess of established relations is what enables the political act of 
freedom at a performative level. Accordingly, Ranciere notes that:
"The principle of political interlocution is thus disagreement; that is, it  is 
the discordant understanding of both the objects of reference and the 
speaking subjects. In order to enter into political exchange, i t  becomes 
necessary to invent the scene upon which spoken words may be audible, 
in which objects may be visible, and individuals themselves may be 
recognized. It is in this respect that we may speak of a poetics o f politics" 
(Ranciere and Panagia 2000, p. 116}.
The political is thus the act of ontological institution, of creating a common 
account, even as this act is only possible because of the inherent impossibility of 
accounting. This ontology entails the inherent possibility, or even probability, 
that a 'flaw' or 'crack' w ill eventually reveal any social structure to be what it 
really is -  contingent.
Here Ranciere shows a marked sim ilarity w ith the Foucaultian and wider 
discourse analysis mode by noting that accounting for the poetics of politics 
requires in turn a "poetics o f knowledge. This means an operation on the objects 
of knowledge and on the modes of knowing that brings them to the level of a 
common language" (Ranciere and Panagia 2000, p. 116). It is clear then that on 
this ontology the institution of a particular order of thought and associated social 
orders is the essence of the political, and that discourse, as the account itself and 
its means of communication, is fundamentally a political object as well as being 
performative of the political.
In this sense, the political appears to be the moment of disruption and/or 
institution. However, once established, the sedimentation this new order is
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secured through what Ranciere terms the 'police/ the established order [1998, 
2001], no longer an expression of freedom through radical institution but an 
entrapment or curtailment of it  though its specificity. However, this begs the 
question: why does society, or the subject, seek to formulate a set social system, 
and how? Lacan traces this back to a fear of the lack, and a desire for meaning as 
a way of feeling security, which he describes as enjoyment (jouissance). This is 
provided through “a narrative that covers-over or conceals the subject's lack by 
providing an image of fullness, wholeness, or harmony, on the one hand, while 
conjuring up threats and obstacles to its realization on the other" (Glynos and 
Howarth 2007, p. 130]. In doing so, the narrative's prescriptions attach the 
subject to a particular social order, giving a place and identity to the subject 
w ith in  this order, and explaining the presence of the 'excess' of meaning in ways 
which exclude it and secure the extant order as somehow natural.
The key question in accounting for any particular discourse or order then 
is: what is included, what is excluded? There are two aspects to this: First, certain 
things are overtly or im plicitly excluded. In doing so however, they are included 
as excluded [Howarth 2000]. By contrast, the second form of exclusion covers 
that which is simply beyond a given discourse; that which has yet to be 
encountered or thought; or is simply excluded from accounting. In this context, it 
is again contingency that alerts us to moments of exclusion, if  not necessarily to 
what is excluded [Howarth 2000]. This makes clear that any analysis of discourse 
should cover not only what is said, but those contingent moments of inclusion or 
exclusion -  whether happenstance or deliberate - including strategies for lim iting 
or controlling what is cast as positive or negative and thereby instituting and 
policing the content and shape of a given order [Jager 2001].
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1.4 Discourse and materialities
Any discussion of the contingency of discourse immediately begs the question: 
how does this relate to the apparently "hard facts” of the material world as 
revealed to us through scientific endeavour, in this case, through climate science? 
Accordingly, it  is necessary to establish the relationship between discourse and 
materiality. For Lacalu and Mouffe (2001, p. 107], "every object is constituted as 
an object of discourse, insofar as no object is given outside every discursive 
condition of emergence; and... that any distinction between what are usually 
called the linguistic and behavioural aspects of social practice... ought to find its 
place as a differentiation w ith in the social production of meaning, which is 
structured under the form of discursive totalities.” Here, practices are only at the 
level of the technology applied to the reality already constituted in discourse.
As discourses become institutionalized in practices, a system emerges that 
supports and effects a particular discourse and its [re]constitution of society and 
the subject. Foucault terms this emergent "net” a dispositif or an 'apparatus' 
(Jager 2001, pp. 39-40]. The concept of the dispositif combines both practices and 
discourse, including technologies for creating and implementing knowledge, and 
demonstrates the connection of discourse to the materiality of the practices 
involved on physical systems, such as identifying individual gases, or monitoring 
atmospheric content, to the structure and practices of institution like the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change; in turn these practices create and 
reinforce particular types of knowledge.
Foucault's account develops much further the function of materiality in 
the production of discourse and discursive effects. For Foucault, the imbrication 
of materiality and practices w ith  knowledge means that discourses are not
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abstracted from the reality they both construct and inhabit. As such, “ their 
intrinsic technology, the necessities of their operation, the tactics they employ, 
the effects of power which underlie them and which they transmit -  this, and not 
a system of representations is what determines the essential features of what 
they have to say" (Foucault 1998, pp. 68-69). This does not posit separate 
domains of materiality and practice beyond discourse, but rather the constitutive 
effects of the one on the other, rejecting the dominance of the linguistically 
produced reality.
This is expressed more clearly as: “power and knowledge directly imply 
one another... such that there is no power relations [sic] w ithout the correlative 
constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose 
and constitute at the same time power relations" (Foucault, 1977, p. 27). The 
differentiation between 'knowledge' and discourse is interesting, because here it 
seems that there is an 'extra-knowledge,' which is various forms of power which 
are nonetheless inextricably connected to it, but not as extra-discursive.
That this concern only highlights the inescapability of discourse as the 
means of 'access' to the real is highlighted when Foucault discusses his ‘Rule o f 
Immanence'whereby power and knowledge are inextricably linked;
"If sexuality was constituted as an area of investigation, this was only 
because relations of power had established it as a possible object; 
conversely if  power was able to take it  as a target, this was because 
techniques of knowledge and procedures of discourse were capable of 
investing it. Between techniques of knowledge and strategies of power, 
there is no exteriority, even if  they have specific roles and are linked 
together on the basis of their difference" (Foucault 1998, p. 98).
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This gives traction to the claim that Laclau and Mouffe and many others posit, 
that the materiality is mediated by language, not replaced by it  (Campbell 1998, 
Jager 2001, Hall 2001, Laclau and Mouffe 2001), under a semantic notion of 
discourse constructed as much by material technologies and material practices.
Arising from a completely different field of enquiry, Norgaard (1994) 
stresses how all the 'cultural' accounts discussed above are nonetheless situated 
w ith in  an ecological materiality, and both respond to and shape this ecology in a 
'coevolutionary' manner. He too warns against the "blindspots” our particular 
ontology might provide for "other ways of knowing" (Norgaard 1994, p. 9-10) 
which here could be said applies to the lack of consideration of the physical 
environment in the production of knowledge. As we shall see, the (lack of) 
materiality of climate change is one of the key aspects in lim iting the power of 
adaptation discourse through experiential identification, and the ways in which it 
is made to appear tangible enables certain discourses to become established. 
This view, which stresses that ecology and society are intrinsically related, 
extends beyond the 'subject' and the 'social' to show the effects of discourse on 
ecology, or the environment more broadly; human discourse exerts selective 
pressure on the environment, for example regarding it through a resources- 
driven logic, the environmental effects of which in turn exert pressure on extant 
discourses to account for new phenomena and effects (such as the coal-based 
industry and acid rain relationship). This adds another plane to the contingent 
emergence of discourse, and to the potential for on-going discursive change, 
particularly if, as Norgaard claims, "cultures, like gene pools... survive if  they 
make the culture more fit" for its environment (Norgaard 1994, p. 88). The 
significance of the coevolutionary view is to bring to the fore the depth of
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connection between discourse and environment in a complex emergence that not 
only demonstrates how profoundly culture affects ecology, but also how ecology 
effects culture, situating the contingency of discourse in terms of its origins and 
implications w ith in  and w ith nature w ith in  a broader set of materialities and 
power-relations than Foucault.
Traversing this intersection of culture and ecology in modernity are 
'science' and 'policy.' Crucially these discourses have their own particular logics 
and modes, which Sheila Jasanoff terms 'co-production' (Jasanoff 1996), which 
enables the "simultaneous making of the natural and social worlds (Jasanoff 
2010, p. 235). Here, policy draws on science for information and legitimation 
due to science's supposedly objective status, yet conversely, scientific content 
and results are shaped by particular policy environments or 'civic 
epistemologies' (Jasanoff 1987, Jasanoff 2010). These are productive and 
responsive to 'paradigms of control’ and regulatory cultures (Jasanoff 2012a), 
demonstrating a fundamental dynamic of the "simultaneous production of 
knowledge and social order" (Jasanoff, 1996, p. 393). Jasanoffs account clearly 
echoes Foucault's, that "there is no power [relation] w ithout the correlative 
constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose 
and constitute at the same time power relations" (1977, p. 27). Jasanoffs 
critiques of the particular logics of the science/epistemology and policy/social 
order relationship are clearly relevant to the use of climate change science in the 
production and distribution of UKCIP's adaptation advice. Further, she highlights 
that these relations and distinctions between science and policy "are played out 
in the realm of language" through "discourse" (Jasanoff 1987, p. 199), and not 
only create a certain order but in doing so empower some ways of life -including
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“policy options” - and actors whilst occluding others (Jasanoff 2012b, p. 137}. 
Crucially, it  is the apparent objectivity of science that in fact helps disguise this 
operation of power/knowledge and in doing so, disguises the political nature of 
its institution of'social order' through the accepted account of the 'police' (to put 
this in Ranciere's terms} which in the UK context is the supposed objectivity and 
neutrality of science (Hulme 2009}.
Shackley and Wynne (Shackley and Wynne 1995a, 1995b, Wynne 2010} 
develop the co-production perspective directly in accounting specifically for the 
relationship between climate change science and policy in the UK. They 
demonstrate the inherence of culture and politics in science and science-based 
policy, and draw out the critical implications of obscuring its role: policy requires 
science to produce reliable, concrete evidence. They argue instead that this 
requires science to be something it is not, and call instead for a better acceptance 
and appreciation of uncertainty and as part of this an awareness of the way in 
which particular epistemologies and values are built into or excluded in scientific 
accounts of climate change and risk assessments based on these. This w ill be 
discussed further in Chapter 4 which explores the origins of UKCIP's discourse of 
adaptation, and in Chapter 5 which critically engages w ith  UKCIP's account of 
risk. The obscuring of social values im plicit in the 'translation' of science to policy 
(Wynne 2010} also obscures the need for engagement at the level of 'the 
political' discussed above, contributing to the stasis and rig id ity of the social 
orders, or 'the police'. Chapters 6 and 7 discuss such effects and their 
implications for the kind of adaptation that is possible.
The broad foundations of the sociology of scientific knowledge laid by 
Norgaard, Jasanoff, Shackley and Wynne, offer extremely useful starting points
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both theoretically and empirically for the discussion of UKCIP adaptation 
discourse. Here they have been situated in the more fundamental critiques of 
knowledge provided by Foucault, and related to the significance of articulation of 
discourse by Laclau and Mouffe, to highlight the function of the supplement as 
not only as discursive moment but as the political moment, as discussed through 
Ranciere and Derrida. Together, they demonstrate the contingency of discourse 
and its associated 'forms of life' (Jasanoff, 1996), rendering the process of the 
formation and content of policy, including how it draws on science, as an 
essential object of study. The groundwork they have laid gives a good indication 
of particular kinds of relations to look out for, particularly given the epistemic 
framings at the national level (Jasanoff 2012a). However, they can also be given 
additional conceptual 'teeth' through a deeper engagement w ith  theories of 
discourse, particularly at the linguistic level, as indicated by Laclau and Mouffes 
account of articulation. This w ill be discussed in the remainder of the chapter.
2.0 Ontics and Core Terms of Analysis
2.1 How to identify a discourse
If all meaning is constituted through discourse, an ontics for accounting for and 
making sense of the extant discursive field becomes necessary. There are many 
accounts of this field and its characteristics. Ernesto Laclau describes the whole 
of society, understood as discursively mediated, as an "argumentative texture" 
which Wetherell draws into a metaphor to describe every text as a smaller 
portion of this "fabric": “ If we take a pen and make a circle on a piece of cloth 
then we have certainly created a boundary...but if  we follow one thread from 
inside the circle our boundary becomes rather irrelevant since the thread
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continues through the pen marks and onwards" [Wetherell 2001a, p. 389]. This 
account of the discursive field as a complex weave resonates w ith  Jager's claim 
that every text is in effect a 'discourse fragment,' never whole in itself nor wholly 
representing any single discourse [Jager 2001). This view echoes Kristeva's 
account of the fundamental intertextuality that marks all texts [Hansen 2006). As 
a result, the conceptualization of the 'lim its' of any text, let alone discourse, are 
problematic, making the identification of 'a' discourse necessarily a relational 
practice.
Any discourse's necessary connection to the wider discursive field also 
presents a problem where it is necessary to 'isolate' a discourse for the purposes 
of analysis. One definition that takes on board this dual tension between 
emergence and sedimentation is Foucault's account of a discursive formation, 
which refers to a particular discourse as a 'regularity in dispersion.' This is 
picked up by Laclau and Mouffe. They interpret the term dispersion as signifying 
the evidence of a 'point of reference’ around w ith other terms are ordered, or 
connected. They interpret the term 'regularity' as a relatively set 'ensemble of 
differential positions... [which] constitutes a configuration, which in certain 
contexts of exteriority can be signified as a totality' [Laclau and Mouffe 2001). 
'Regularity in dispersion' then, is the working definition of discourse here, useful 
not only for accounting for discourse, but also for discursive change because, as 
Howarth and Glynos put it, 'it allows us simultaneously to hold on to the idea of a 
pattern and an open-endedness.’ [Glynos and Howarth 2007)
Howath and Glynos attempt to identify this configuration through the 
concept of "judgment" as a "situated ability" where a subject -  a category that 
includes the analyst - posits the content or limits of a discourse by drawing on a
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necessarily "a contingent and contestable framework" (Glynos and Howarth 
2007, p. 184] such as the one described here. For them, this is deeply related to 
the issue of naming discourses, as a "(re]description," which through "rhetorical 
displacement or re-aggregation has precisely the function of emancipating a 
name from its univocal conceptual attachments,” or the objects to which the 
discourse in question describes, but which the act of analytical naming helps to 
open to question (Glynos and Howarth 2007, p. 187, quoting Laclau, 2005, p. 
109]. In this way, an external point of view that is able to 'see' the discourse as a 
singularity through the use of judgement, establishes it  as a discourse and 
provides an account of its contents through naming (Glynos and Howarth 2007].
The discussion in Chapter 1 of the emergence of adaptation as a new 
discourse, and of UKCIP's centrality in the wider discourse of adaptation in the 
UK acted as the first part of such the naming and justification of a discourse, this 
w ill be extended to a specific time period in Chapter 3, dependent on key 
discursive events in establishing this discourse, and the time period in which the 
research was conducted. In this way, for the purposes of accounting for the 
specific form of a discourse, which is always emergent, is necessary not only a 
'cut' in discursive space, but also a 'synchronic cut' isolating one 'stage' of the 
discourse's development in time, in a way that justifies overtly the significance of 
that selection.
2.2 How do discourses create limits and meaning?
How exactly discourses create limits and establish meaning by what they include 
and exclude needs further exploration. As judgment and justification should 
demonstrate, the 'lim it' of a discourse may be very much responsive to its own 
account of the lim it, that is, of 'what' the discourse itself includes and what it
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exteriorizes, explicitly or implicitly. Discourses function as systems of 
representation by placing objects in relation to one another. There are several 
explanations of how they do this, all of which centre on the creation of some kind 
of rationale, either at the macro-level of a narrative (Gergen 2001, Roe 1994), or 
at the micro level of rhetorical structure of sentences and phrases (Fairclough 
2000, Johnstone 2008, Wodak and Meyer 2001). What is so critical in the 
production of such a story is that it  requires a level of coherence that demands 
the connection, the (re)interpretation or exclusion of certain elements. Nietzsche 
expresses this in terms of the account of an ideal life as corresponding to a story 
in the sense that all the things that happen relate coherently to all the other 
elements (Gergen 2001). This links back to Lacan's account of the fear of the lack 
(and thus the fearfulness of the excess that indicates the real) discussed in the 
ontology section above.
As such, for discourses to exist in a regularized fashion, there must be 
logics “which produce effects of tota lity capable of constructing the limits, and 
thus constituting the formation" (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985:145-6). Kenneth 
Gergen (2001) notes a series of ideals and techniques through which this is 
achieved, including: establishing a valued endpoint; selecting events relevant to 
the endpoint, and thereby excluding those that do not fit; the ordering of events 
particularly to show causal linkages, and claims about causal linkages.
Such narratives play an active role in stabilizing policy discourses as well, 
particularly in the face of uncertainty, which might be understood as the 
encounter w ith the real. In fact, Roe calls for policy narratives to be explicitly 
considered regardless of the technical content of a policy itself as "these stories... 
often resist change or modification even in the presence of contradicting
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empirical data, because they continue to underwrite and stabilize the 
assumptions for decision making in the face of high uncertainty, complexity, and 
polarization" (Roe 1994, p. 2].
Foucault's own account of this organizing capacity of discourse moved 
beyond assumptions to interventions in the subject and practices, and indeed in 
the account of reality itself. Foucault's final offering in his analysis of the 
emergence of truths was as a discursive 'problematization:'
"Problematization doesn't mean the representation of a pre-existent object, 
nor the creation through discourse of an object that doesn't exist. It denotes 
the set of discursive or nondiscursive practices that makes something enter 
the play of the true and false and constitutes it as an object for thought 
(whether under the form of moral reflections, scientific knowledge... 
political analysis, or the like]" (Flynn 2005, pp. 26-27 quoting Foucault, 
translation from Dits et Ecrits, p. 670]
Problematization thus refers to the specific content and meaning of a discourse; 
in doing so, it makes certain ontological and epistemological assumptions and 
places them together in such a way that they constitute a problem, thus 
generating a particular type or range of solutions. As such 'problematization' 
entails a basic problem-solution rationale. The particular rationale that arises 
from this structures particular fields of intervention which bring certain subjects 
and objects under its purview and calls for them to behave in a particular way, 
becoming institutionalized and sedimented through a variety of practices, 
established terminologies, and objects such as policy papers and educational 
materials (Flynn 2005, Foucault 1998].
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This is not to say that a problematization's specific contents do not change 
over time, it  w ill either retain a core referent that it problematizes differently, or 
w ill retain the same structure of problematization, replacing the core referent in 
order to maintain a particular rationale. Campbell gives the example of the 
communist threat being replaced by the war on drugs whilst retaining the same 
problematization in the discourse of the US Department of State (Campbell 
1998}, whereas changing problematizations of sexuality show how the same 
issues were understood differently by church and medical institutions (Foucault 
1998}. This recalls the account of discourse as "regularity in dispersion," as 
circulating in a general pattern, rather than a completely stable structure.
The centrality of the rationale in this discussion of the problematization so 
far indicates the need for a conceptual terminology to explore how exactly this 
functions. We have seen already the principles of narrative structure and 
inclusion/exclusion are key aspects. However, their basic conceptual operation is 
developed by Laclau and Mouffe's account of articulation (Laclau and Mouffe 
2001}:
"...we w ill call articulation any practice establishing a relation among 
elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory 
practice. The structured tota lity resulting from the articulatory practice, we 
w ill call discourse. The differential positions, insofar as they appear 
articulated w ith in a discourse, we w ill call moments. By contrast, we w ill 
call element any difference that is not discursively articulated" (Laclau and 
Mouffe 2001, p. 105}.
This conceptualization sees discourse as the articulation of elements - which 
might be terms, concepts, or identities. When these are articulated, or connected
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through some conceptual relation, they become moments of a larger whole 
thereby establishing them w ith a relationally constituted meaning. Although they 
use 'discourse,' their determination of this as a "structured tota lity" is used as 
leave here to return instead to Foucault's account of the problematization that 
structures the discourse.
Howarth and Glynos divide the ontological content and functions 
established by their connecting rationale according to three different kinds of 
logic: social logics, political logics, and fantasmatic logics, and utilize these as 
their core analytical devices (2007). There seems to be a close relation between 
Foucault's use the imbrication of discourse and its effects and their account of a 
social logic, as well as between his use of 'rationale' and 'problematization' and 
the political logics identified by Howarth and Glynos. As such, the original 
Foucaultian terms w ill be used here.
However, Fantasmatic logics represent the real addition of a Howarth and 
Glynos' Lacanian-based account of discourse, as it creates an explanation for why 
political and social logics in question are able to be accepted by the subject 
(2007). After all, why should the subject seek to identify in any particular social 
order, and how is it possibly that identity might change? Lacan traces this back to 
the lack, or rather, to the fear of the lack and a desire for meaning. This desire for 
closure is resolved in Lacan's account of enjoyment (jouissance) mentioned 
earlier. A fantasmatic logic responds to this, by producing "a narrative that 
covers-over or conceals the subject's lack by providing an image of fullness, [or] 
while conjuring up threats and obstacles to its realization” which explain the 
absence of fullness (Glynos and Howarth 2007, p. 143). The enjoyment, as either 
participation in or desire for this apparent wholeness "hooks the subject... to a
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given practice or order, or a promised future practice or order, thus conferring 
identity” (Glynos and Howarth 2007, p. 130). As such, fantasmatic logics account 
for one way in which a discourse appeals to and shapes an existing subject.
The account of the fantasmatic offers an interesting supplement to 
Foucault's account of subjectivity as produced through disciplinary power and 
disciplinary power/knowledge. The two are not necessarily exclusionary, both 
assume a lack, but do not necessarily agree on the subject's autonomous desire to 
f ill it. For Foucault, the greater project is to break down the cover (see, for 
example, Foucault 2001). Furthermore the fantasmatic appeals to the extant 
subject, perhaps particularly when they are challenged by events that signal the 
excess of the real. Therefore 'fantasmatic logic' w ill be used where this kind of 
appeal is in operation, although judgement is withheld as to whether the 
fantasmatic desire itself is ontologically prior to the constitution of the subject.
Whilst problematization and critical logics of explanation provide 
analytical capacity, they provide limited substantive capacity in terms of 
accounting for precisely how they themselves are constituted. As such, there is 
little  traction on the actual discourse beyond trusting the non-explicit 
interpretation of the analyst. Returning to Laclau and Mouffe, problematizations 
are an articulation of specific elements as moments, the overall arrangement of 
which is constituted by a political rationale. However, these elements can be 
further broken down into whether they are principally ontological or epistemic. 
As such, the term 'ontological moment' describes any of the specific elements of 
foundational assumptions brought w ith in the problematization and giving 
meaning by how they are placed in relation to other elements. 'Epistemological
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moment' refers to claims as to how knowledge can be gained and applied to 
reality, covering both the element included the manner of its articulation.
The actual articulation is enacted through linguistic operations of 
reasoning. The role of narrative structure, rhetoric and other linguistic 
techniques is thus inherent to how a rationale can appear rational, and thus 
successfully cover over the irreducibility of meaning. Whether these are macro or 
micro, the problematization is constantly [re]articulated through such 
techniques. These w ill be discussed in detail in the Methodology presented in 
Chapter 3.
In sum, 'discourse' describes a regularity in dispersion, centred on a 
problematization. This problematization might focus on a particular referent, 
although this can change. This referent is the prominent moment in a rationale 
that articulates particular ontological subjects and objects w ith  certain and 
epistemological assumptions, functions and practices. The rationale itself is 
established through conceptual connections established through linguistic 
techniques, and other meaning-making functions such as symbolic acts and 
physical practices. This enables the rationale to establish an apparently cohesive, 
and hence limited, account of life.
3.0 How does discourse change?
This ontics of discourse, built on an ontology of the irreducibility of meaning and 
the contingency of discourse itself, clearly makes space for the possibility of 
change when an excess is presented that cannot be fully accounted for w ith in the 
existing order of discourse, or where the contingency of the order becomes
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apparent, revealing excluded elements that exceed it, or where certain aspects of 
an extant discourse are utilized by excluded elements, disrupting the integrity of 
its account of the social order [Ranciere and Panagia 2000).
However, unless agency is given to the surplus of meaning per se, it is 
clear that further discussion is needed to see how discourses actually emerge and 
change, and what ontics describes this process. This also raises significant 
questions, such as: how does what is said now affect or effect discursive futures? 
What power/knowledge relations give an indication of the possible routes of 
emergence, and those routes that might be in the process of being shut down? 
What are the potential effects and ethics of the analyst's intervention in this?
From the discussion in the previous section, there appear to be two 
starting points for approaching these questions about discursive change. The 
first might be termed a context-based approach, as seen in Foucault's later work, 
which tends to make discourse and discursive change visible in terms of the 
operations of power including technologies of knowledge. The second approach 
analyses on the semiotic content of the discourse, drawing prim arily on 
Foucault's account of a problematization of discourse and Laclau and Mouffe's 
account of articulation.
This research attempts to remain sensitive to both power/knowledge and 
its manifestation and operation through the conceptual content of a discourse, 
particularly at a linguistic level. The latter is explored because the main basis of 
the study organisation, UKCIP, predominantly replicated its in a linguistic form 
through verbal and w ritten content, as well as through epistemic tools, the 
justification for which was presented linguistically. Furthermore, the relatively 
short lifespan of UKCIP's discourse on adaptation, which is less than a decade,
68
and the lim itation of the penetration of its problematization of adaptation into 
the practices of stakeholders in 2009, places the main weight of the analysis in 
terms of the conceptual content of UKCIP's discourse internally, rather than 
viewing discourse in terms of the effective production of subjects outside of 
UKCIP. The rest of this section w ill now briefly examine the contextual power 
aspects of discursive change that w ill situate the semiotic analysis. It w ill then go 
on to consider the content based aspects of discursive change in more detail as 
the mainstay of the analysis, building on Howarth and Glynos' account of logics, 
and drawing in particular on Derrida's account of ‘the supplement' (Derrida 
1976).
3.1 Contextual power/knowledge and discursive change
Much discourse analysis has tended to explain change through connecting it  to 
the competing discourses of different political or social groups w ith  established 
identities and agendas (Wodak and Meyer 2001). However, Foucault's account of 
the m ultip licity of power-relations cautions against such a simplistic imaginary of 
the relation between power and knowledge: "we must not imagine a world of 
discourse divided between accepted discourse and excluded discourse, or 
between the dominant discourse and the dominated one; but as a m ultip licity of 
discursive elements that can come into play in various strategies" (Foucault 
1998, p. 92). The inherent interconnection of power and knowledge means that 
discourse itself should be conceived as made up of a "series of discontinuous 
segments whose tactical function is neither uniform nor stable" (Foucault 1998, 
pp. 100-101). This description of power/knowledge opens up the spaces in 
which discursive change can occur.
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This diffuse understanding of discourse and power/knowledge is related 
to Foucault's account of power itself. On this view, power is not exercised by one 
person or thing over another, but rather is formed by the nature of the relation 
between the two (Foucault 1994). As such "resistance is never in a position of 
exteriority in relation to power,” but also defines the terms of the relation 
(Foucault 1998, p. 95). Each are also given particular capacities as a result of the 
wider set of relations in which they are positioned, so that "there is a p lura lity of 
resistances, each of them a special case" (Foucault 1998, p. 96) w ith  the result 
that the landscape of power relations is constantly changing. As a result, the 
discourses that are imbricated w ith these relations are also emergent.
Nonetheless, relatively sedimented discourses and their constitutive 
relations do come into being. Foucault encourages us to accept this as the 
contingent result of the complex emergence of power and resistances. Rather 
than looking "for the headquarters that presides over [power's] rationality," we 
should for the "tactics that are often quite explicit at the restricted level where 
they are inscribed" and observe if  and how these localized tactics are "becoming 
connected to one another, attracting and propagating one another, but finding 
their base of support and their condition elsewhere, end by forming 
comprehensive systems" (Foucault 1998, pp. 92-3). The formation of such 
comprehensive systems can be self-reinforcing, creating a vortex of normative 
discursive practices that draw variations back into its central problematization 
and discursive describing of the content and limits of being (Foucault 1998).
However, it  also seems that small resistances w ith in power/knowledge 
relations can occur to the point that allows for a new crystallisation to be formed: 
"it is doubtless the strategic codification of these points of resistance that makes
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a revolution possible" (Foucault 1998, p. 94). W hilst Foucault it  talking prim arily 
about power-relations here, the relation between power and knowledge means 
this would enable, encourage and result from the codification in discourse of 
such a resistance. This process of codification resonates w ith Laclau and Mouffes 
account of articulation, and places it  in the context of social change.
Foucault's mode of investigation into the imbrication of power and 
knowledge, and the resulting, contingent, development of discourse, is through 
genealogy. The genealogical approach "focuses on the 'ignoble beginnings' and 
the contingent fabrications of historical phenomena," which allows him to 
radically historicize discourses and the sets of power-relations which they are 
connected to (Foucault 1998, p. 96). In effect this looks at articulation, although 
on a macro-scale of the coming and going of different elements and rationales 
made apparent by the passage of time (Foucault 1998, Hall 2001). Foucault 
suggests four 'cautionary prescriptions' for a genealogical methodology 
(Howarth 2000) that sketch out the relations between discourse and power in 
terms of general strategies and micro tactics, all of which demonstrate ways of 
tracking discursive change in terms of the contingency of its current content and 
its potential to change.
The first of these prescriptions is the ‘Rule o f Immanence' of power and 
knowledge. This states that all objects of knowledge are produced through 
power relations. Yet those same power-relations are only possible because of the 
existence of a particular knowledge. Thus "between techniques of knowledge and 
strategies of power, there is no exteriority." As such, neither can act as the causal 
starting point in the analysis of discourse. Rather, analysis starts from "local 
centres" of this power/knowledge imbrication, which entails an "incessant back-
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and-forth movement of forms of subjugation and schemas of knowledge" 
(Foucault 1998, p. 98]. An example of a ‘local centre' is the body of the child, 
which is the subject of a series of power-relations that (re]produce particular 
discourses and practices of nursing, educating, and mothering, amongst others.
The second 'prescription' for analysing discourse follows from the account 
of power as diffuse. This is the rule ‘o f continual variations' which specifies that: 
'We must not look for who has the power... and who is deprived of it...We must 
seek rather the pattern of the modifications which the relationships of force 
imply by the very nature of their process' (Foucault 1998]. There are two aspects 
to this. First, we should not seek to name who has power and who doesn't, but 
rather to observe how the effect of something on someone constitutes a power 
relation. From this comes the second aspect: as there is no foundation 
determining who has power and who does not, these relations and patterns of 
relations also change continuously, if  perhaps mostly incrementally. As such, 
immanence and emergence are necessarily objects of investigation under 
conditions where power, and its reflection in discourse, is diffuse and unstable.
Although this inherent instability is an ontological condition, it  does not 
follow that power is in practice always 'unstable.' Foucault observes in his th ird 
rule of ‘double conditioning' that there is:
"[no] "local centre," no "pattern of transformation" could function [as 
such] if, through a series of sequences, it did not eventually enter into an 
over-all strategy. And inversely, no strategy could achieve comprehensive 
effects if  it  did not gain support from precise and tenuous relations 
serving... as its prop and anchor point" (Foucault 1998, pp. 99-100].
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This is exemplified by 'the father' who is not the representative of the state, nor 
the state representative of the father. However, both try  to draw the other into 
their mode of operation, sometimes acting contrary to the other, sometimes 
attempting to co-opt them in their current form (Foucault 1998, p. 100] for 
example the father altering his tactics to draw on the public discourse of the 
state, or the state absorbing the particular tactics of fathers to shape and gain 
support for its discourse. There is a clear resonance here w ith  the earlier debate 
on the dual explanation of the fantasmatic logic discussed earlier.
The fourth and final rule, developing from the ontology of the diffusion of 
power, continual variations and double conditioning, is the ' tactical polyvalence 
o f discourses,' whereby:
"we must not imagine a world where discourse is divided between 
accepted discourse and excluded discourse, or between the dominant 
discourse and the dominated one; but as a m ultip licity of discursive 
elements that can come into play in various strategies. [...] It is this 
distribution that we must reconstruct, w ith  the things said and those 
concealed, the enunciations required and those forbidden... w ith  the 
variants and different effects -  according to who is speaking[,]... 
context[,]...[and] shifts and reutilizations of identical formulas for 
contrary objectives that it also includes" (Foucault 1998, p. 100].
This polyvalence means that "there can exist different and even 
contradictory discourses w ith in the same strategy [of power]; they can, on the 
contrary, circulate w ithout changing their form from one strategy to another, 
opposing strategy" (Foucault 1998, p. 102].
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There is a distinction made here between discourses and strategies, and 
earlier between 'discursive elements' and the strategies that seem to take the 
place of 'a' discourse. The focus on discourse’s partial insulation from power, 
provided by its ability to be played between tactics and strategy, enables 
discourse to both adapt in small steps, and maintain its general form even while 
being attached to a completely different strategy. There are clear resonances 
here w ith  the account of discourse as ‘regularity in dispersion' discussed in the 
previous section. It is for this reason that problematization is used as it accounts 
for a precise formation of the structure of the discourse at any one time.
This points to the importance of the specific 'content' of the 
problematization and how this is given meaning by its rationale. However, this 
polyvalence also means discourse itself is a tool for discursive change, 
particularly if  disassembled into its component elements. These descriptions of 
discourse demonstrate the link between Foucault's power-oriented account of 
discourse and a content-oriented account: first as partly insulated from 
strategies of power, and secondly as a substantive starting point of resistance or 
change. As such, whilst discourses exist as a product of power relations, including 
power/knowledge, they are also productive in themselves, and as such are 
worthy objects of investigation. The precise way in which this can be pursued 
w ill be considered in detail under the 'content-based' ontics of discursive change 
that follow below.
3.2 From "context' to 'content'-based accounts of discursive change and the 
function of the supplement
Whilst Foucault allows an account of discursive change through his sensitivity to
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the diffusion of power, Discourse Theory as advanced by Laclau and Mouffe, and 
followed by Howarth and Glynos, is sensitive to the diffusion, and indeed 
'profusion/ of meaning. This ontology makes explicit allowance for discursive 
change, as "...all discourse is subverted by a field of discursivity which overflows 
it, the transition from 'elements' to 'moments' can never be complete" (Glynos 
and Howarth 2007]. More explicitly, the practice of articulation means that all 
meanings that are 'fixed' necessarily introduce and link to wider and alternative 
meanings or combinations of meaning that undermines this fixity, recalling 
Kristeva's account of intertextuality (Hansen 2006].
Bakhtin explains these connections and reinterpretations in terms of 
interpersonal interactions: "The internally persuasive word is half-our and half- 
someone else’s [allowing] dialogic interanimation [and awakening] new and 
independent words... The semantic structure of an internally persuasive 
discourse is not finite, it is open; in each of the new contexts that dialogise it, this 
discourse is able to reveal ever new ways to mean" (Wertsch 2001 quoting 
Bakhtin, 1981, p. 227]. As such, an account of discourse that focuses on content 
in terms of systems of meaning is also able to explain discursive change.
Although the section above discusses Foucault's account of discursive 
change mainly in terms of power, it  has hinted at two processes through which 
discursive 'content' might change. The first is the movement of different 
discourses as a whole to and from different strategies of power, that is, where a 
particular articulation of elements is attached to a different political rationale. 
The second is the strategic codification of points of resistance, which in Laclau 
and Mouffe's terms might be characterized as the rearticulation of particular 
'discursive elements' from extant discourses into a new one.
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Howarth and Glynos' account of logics of critical explanation demonstrate 
in detail how this articulation can be observed in extant discourses. However, 
they also give some indications of how this approach might help explain 
discursive change. This centres around the re-articulation of the original 
elements and ones that were previously excluded, into a "counter-logic" (Glynos 
and Howarth 2007, p. 187). Whilst it  is of course possible that these counter­
logics or re-articulations of discourse are externally generated by additional or 
subaltern groups, Glynos and Howarth maintain that counter-logics can also be 
"immanent,” or "exist in the incipient form -  in the self-interpretations of 
[actors]" (Glynos and Howarth 2007, p. 187). This argument is adopted for this 
research, however as Howarth and Glynos' use of logics has not been adopted 
here, their basic principles of articulation into a rationale is used as the 
justification to instead use the terms alternative rationale and alternative 
problematization.
This raises the question of: how does the content or structure of a 
particular discourse allow for the emergence of a alternative problematization, 
and how does this relate to self-interpretations as the (re)articulation of that 
discourse? Although it  is not used by these authors, Derrida's account of ‘the 
supplement' adds depth to their understanding of'immanence' and 'incipience' of 
alternative rationales. It begins w ith the addition of a new element from the 
excess as a 'supplement' that when articulated into an existing problematization 
extends its breadth. In doing so, the supplement acts to maintain the integrity of 
the discourse through helping to mask a place where the extant discourse 
struggles to ‘cover over’ the 'lack' (Derrida 1976).
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However, this very 'outsideness' of the term added as a supplement 
means that it  also effects the second sense of Derrida's supplement -  the ability 
to supplant the prior and primary term and the shape of the problematization as 
a whole, as its addition also necessarily reveals the conceptual lim itations and 
discursive contingency of that order which existed before. In this way, the 
supplement "comes from without to affect the integrity of the subject" (Derrida 
1976, p. 163). This dual function challenges the 'natural' order yet does so by 
positing a new account of the 'natural' which allows for the myth of a fundament 
to continue, w ith  all the functions this serves of founding a particular social or 
governmental order, and for the (re)constitution of the subject, enabling the 
supplement to in fact serve a policing role (Chow 1999). In this way, the 
paradoxical function of the supplement is both a strength and a weakness, 
making it is useful to regimes of power, just as it is useful to those seeking to 
change such a regime. Put simply, the supplement both "opens and lim its 
visib ility" (Derrida 1976, p. 153).
Laclau and Mouffe's account of articulation adds some precision to how 
the supplement comes to occupy this ambiguous position. The supplement is an 
element that is adopted from, or resonates with, a fundamentally different 
discourse or problematization that does not match ontologically, 
epistemologically or politically w ith the original. It is because of this that it  can be 
understood as 'dangerous' to the original (Derrida 1976, p. 163) even as it  tries 
to add value to it. As such, to remain as a supplement it  has to be articulated in a 
way that obscures these inconsistencies if  it  is to remain an apparently 
innocuous addition, merely extending the 'cover' of the original 
problematization, rather than threatening it.
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The nature of this articulation determines when the supplement appears 
as "a subaltern instance" (Derrida 1976, p. 151), that is, being marked as an 
addition, or a superfluous, minor, or subsidiary point, whilst the core term or 
problematization is still characterised as natural, full, or ideal. In this sense, the 
supplement is included in a way that uses but also denies it its full presence 
w ith in the original discourse. Thus it  is crucial to note not only the 
supplementary term, but the way it is maintained as supplementary. As such the 
form of articulation that holds the supplement as subsidiary w ill be termed 
'supplementary moments,’ drawing on Laclau and Mouffe's account of the 
articulation of elements as moments. Crucially, this manner of articulation is 
what ensures the conceptual differences the supplement introduce remain 
indistinct and inert, thereby leaving the core problematization intact.
A further way of understanding the reinforcing role of the supplement 
comes w ith what Derrida describes as 'lim it-points' that ensure a text appears as 
coherent, maintaining its integrity, or re-establishing it against the threat of 
rupture of the real by masking the lack. Such lim it points are created through the 
"privileging of certain conceptual oppositions and logics, and the repression of 
others" (Derrida 1976, p. 145). Such lim it points occur in the articulation of the 
supplement in order to lim it its potential to supplant an existing rationale, 
problematization, or discourse. Therefore the strength as well as the type of 
articulation into the existing problematization accounts for the level of impact 
that the supplement has, and its potential to act as a gateway to discursive 
change.
Another form of lim it point is where an element is "constitutively 
excluded in the construction of an identity or regime [which nonetheless] render
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that identity vulnerable to being subverted and eventually transformed' 
(Howarth 2000). This recalls Agamben’s inclusion through exclusion (Agamben 
1998), or the overt 'othering' of an extant term as beyond the problematization, 
where although it  is named, it is designated as 'bad' or undesirable and therefore 
beyond the 'natural' order or the 'good' life (Hansen 2006, Laclau and Mouffe 
2001).
If the presence of the supplementary term and the nature of the 
supplementary moment is made clear, they highlight the contingency of the core 
problematization, and in this way provide points of departure immanent to the 
text for actual extension or change. This is why Derrida refers to the supplement 
as dangerous: the inherent power of the supplement is that it  reveals the original 
term is somehow lacking, and the supplement steps in as a source of 
replacement, in Derrida's example when Nature becomes the supplement of art 
and society (Derrida 1976).
This does not, of course, mean that change w ill occur. Laclau and Mouffe 
warn against believing "that our problem may be reduced... to one of 
determining the points of rupture and their possible modes of articulation" 
(Glynos and Howarth 2007) as not all of these w ill develop into full discursive 
change. Rather, as already discussed, such change is connected to how mutually 
reinforcing power/knowledge relations are, which has important implications 
for understanding the transition from a supplementary moment to a 
supplementary rationale or problematization as a whole.
Crucially it  is this irruption that is significant. Returning to Ranciere's 
account of the political, we see that the supplement is significant because it  is 
inherently political insofar as it remains 'dangerous' to the extant order. It is not
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simply an element floating around in abstract potentiality, but the point of 
friction or encounter between the excess and order. Ranciere extends the 
theorization of the supplement to not merely an instance of the other or excess, 
but rather as making visible the 'void' between order and excess, between the 
'human' and the 'divine.' The specific supplement is then only a function of the 
excess which w ill always ensure there is always "a supplement to all social 
(ac)counts and an exception to all logics of domination" (Ranciere 2001, p. 6].
In sum, "[political] struggle is not a conflict between well-defined interest 
groups; it  is an opposition of logics that count the parties and parts of the 
community in different ways" (Ranciere 2001, p. 7). Here the established logic is 
the ‘police' and the interrupting account is ‘politics' as a verb, rather than a noun: 
"Politics is specifically opposed to the police. The police is a 'partition of the 
sensible'... whose principle is the absence of a void and of a supplement 
(Ranciere 2001, p. 7)."
The significance of this for 'policy' as effected by our case study of UKCIP 
advice and technical approaches is indicated by the etymological relation of 
'policy' to 'police:' policy is a: "‘way of management, government,
administration,'" originating "from Old French policie (14c.), from Greek politeia 
'state, administration, government, citizenship,' from polites 'citizen,'" (Harper 
2012b) and where 'police' sim ilarly is: "essentially the same word as policy... 
from Middle French police (late 15c.), from Latin politia 'civil administration,' 
from Greek polis 'city'" (Harper 2012a). For Ranciere, this order of the polis is the 
onto-political ordering of life, and is instituted through an 'order of discourse' 
(Chambers 2010, p. 196). This polic(y)ing is clearly a form of the police, an
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account of the solidification of an order, of those allowed to participate and those 
partitioned-off.
Like Derrida, Ranciere examines w riting as the supplement to speech in 
Plato, but notes that it is not just its presence as such but its adoption by the 
supplementary population for use outside of their allocated space and role that 
makes it  political, undermining the existing order and allowing the demos to 
become scandalous, or in Derrida's terms, 'dangerous' when it  utilizes 'excess of 
words' provided indelibly by w riting (Chambers 2010]. Whether he likes it  or 
not, Ranciere's account of the political nicely draws together the ontological 
account of the supplement and the power/knowledge realtions analysis of 
Foucault, to reveal the political significance of discourse and its groundedness in 
actual relations.
The supplement operates as an element of excess that becomes visible in 
the political moment. Insofar as it disrupts or supplants the existing logic or 
order, the coming to presence of the supplement is the enactment of equality as 
freedom and the moment of the political in Ranciere's account, which he in fact 
calls the 'supplementary part' or 'the part of those who have no-part' (Ranciere 
2001): "Politics is a specific rupture in the logic of arche [order/accounting of the 
real]. It does not simply presuppose the rupture of the 'normal' distribution of 
positions between the one who exercised power and the one subject to it. It also 
requires a rupture in the idea that there are dispositions 'proper' to such 
classifications" (Ranciere 2001, p. 3). This is the crucial distinction between a 
consensus driven, stakeholder-engagement and a radical rethinking of the order 
of thins implied by function of the supplement. The police accounts for the other 
function of Derrida's supplement -  its capacity to be subsumed into an order or
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logic -  "the police that is, in turn, always attempting [the supplement's] 
disappearance either by crudely denying it, or by subsuming that logic into its 
own" [Ranciere 2001, p. 6]. The police in this way act to ensure the lim it of 
in telligib ility, of meaning - achieved in part through accounting for value. 
Consensus, therefore is achieved through policing of one form or another, and is 
not the operation of the political, but is rather "the reduction of politics to the 
police" [Ranciere 2001, p. 10).
Ranciere explores the excluded nature of the supplement as policed and 
produced as an exteriority by the order of 'normal' discourse. Going back to the 
Aristotle's account of the order of the city, the poor are taken to have speech that 
cannot be recognised as such -  because the fact that they speak and the things 
that they want are unintelligible to the existing order, the white noise of their 
utterances are ‘blaberon' [Ranciere 2004, Hewlett 2007). Ranciere "thus 
considers words not as mere superstructural manifestations of something 
deeper and more significant, but items of significance in themselves, real political 
acts" [Hewlett 2007, p. 98) both in terms of the speaker staking the claim to be 
heard and the content of their speech. The demand to be heard is thus an 
insurrectional event that has to penetrate this barrier of [politico-ontological) 
in te llig ib ility if  it  is to be tru ly  political in the sense of effecting real change.
This raises the question of how this apparently 'Other' supplement can 
effect change on an extant order, and brings us full circle back to Foucault's more 
detailed investigations of conceptual change and power relations. The 
interactions of multiple conflicting discourses as 'surfaces of friction' around 
'local objects' and the intersection these have in a given subject [Foucault 1998, 
Foucault 2001) are two ways of accounting for discursive change. This may cause
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a 'dislocatory event' that disrupts the lim its of what is held to be true, and the 
constitution of the subject or fantasmatic identification (Heidegger 1962, Lacan 
2006: 693). If we return to Lacan's account this "dislocation signifies the 
presence of 'the real' in the symbolic order, which can be characterized as a 
moment when a sense emerges, however localized or diffuse this may be, that 
'things are not quite right,"' (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, p. 131).
The significance of the dislocatory event for discourse is that this desire 
for presence, or awareness of the incoherence, causes the 'chain of signification,' 
as people seek to cover over the lack (Derrida 1976, p. 66). In this regard the lack 
itself is constitutive rather than merely permissive. That is, the irreducibility of 
meaning effects a situation in which no identity or subject can ever be fully 
constituted, such that all logics, even fantasmatic ones, are open to rejection, 
alteration, or change. Thus, dislocatory events thus provoke genuinely political 
practices through calling for the formation of new political articulations and 
rationales, as subjects seek to again cover over the 'spaces’ opened up by the 
disruption of the extant (discursive) order (Glynos and Howarth 2007). Similarly, 
the ethical comportment to the self, and the encounter w ith excess also provokes 
the production for new discursive articulations and parallel new power relations 
(Foucault 1990, Foucault 1992, Hall 2001). This '(re)covering over' that follows 
is achieved either by rearticulating these new elements either into a transformed 
version of the problematization, or by adopting a new discourse.
This account of the supplement as supplementary moments, and their 
articulation into the original or an alternative problematization provides some 
pointers as to how to investigate the lim it points of a discourse, and the need to 
explore how open its avenues of change are. Through naming the supplement, it
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also points to discursive change arising either at the level of single objects or 
terms, or through specific power/knowledge connections to alternative 
problematizations and discourses, thus giving an indication of how the extant 
problematization might change.
3.3 Contingency and the role of critique
If, discourse produces truth, as has been argued above, this has major 
implications for the ethics of critique. The formation of any discourse represents 
the exclusion of the real, and the more hegemonic the discourse, the less the 
ability of individuals to act politically in the [re]constitution of the discourse and 
how they identify through these acts. This prompts a mode of ‘ethical critique' 
that avoids rearticulating the discourse into a particular form but instead seeks 
to make these power/knowledge relations overt (Glynos and Howarth 2007]. In 
doing so, it opens up space for the political by making it clearer what a discourse 
does, including what avenues of being it opens up and closes down (Ranciere 
2007a, Ranciere 2004]. By doing so the discourse becomes not only more visible 
but more accessible as a field of political intervention (Foucault 1998, Ranciere 
and Panagia 2000, Foucault 2001, Hall 2001, Glynos and Howarth 2007].
However, there is also the possibility of engaging w ith a 'normative critique' 
which supports a particular discourse. This might be the discourse in its extant 
form or a counter-discourse (Glynos and Howarth 2007]. A normative critique 
approach has been adopted by many Critical Discourse Analysts in the attempt 
to equalize the hegemonic power of the dominant discourse and associated 
dominant group (Wodak and Meyer 2001]. However, as discussed above, this 
would constitute a political act and an attempt to suture the void. As such only an 
ethical approach is taken here. Nonetheless, it is sometimes difficult to avoid
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being perceived to adopt a normative approach, in as much as naming the 
supplement and counter-logics to demonstrate the moments of articulation that 
police the original discourse has the effect of helping reify these and in doing so 
appears to support a particular alternative. It is here the Howarth and Glynos' 
[2007) determination that the counter-logic arise from the self-interpretation of 
subjects of a discourse becomes significant if  the researchers role is to remain as 
'ethical' as possible and as such it is necessary to demonstrate is origins w ith in 
the case study material.
Accordingly, this research uses supplementary moments and their suggested 
logics to reveal the contingency of the extant discourse for the purposes of ethical 
critique. However, it is also concerned to use very generic terms in the 
identification of these supplements in order to avoid linking them falsely or 
prematurely to a discourse that does not arise from the subjects themselves. For 
this reason, broad terms like 'the social' and 'social' and 'social organisation' are 
used in Chapters 5 and 6 to demonstrate supplementary elements that although 
present are only weakly defined and not clearly linked to a particular alternative 
discourse.
However, supplementary moments are nonetheless significant; the 
substantive occlusion of the elements they signify is as much an act of power as 
that which is included, and therefore where the actual articulation to each other 
or to external discourses is clear, these are explored further in Chapter 7. Again, 
this is ethical in Howarth and Glynos' sense of not being an external imposition, 
but rather arising in an 'immanent' manner from the existing form of the 
discourse and its extant supplements [Sabia 2010).
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4.0 Conclusion
This chapter has sought to establish the theoretical basis on which to account for 
UKCIP's discourse of adaptation to climate change in terms of its content and its 
contingency. In doing so, it has established core terms of analysis. The most 
essential of these is the account of discourse in its specific structure as a 
problematization. This is understood as made up of different conceptual 
elements, which, once they are articulated into the problematization are referred 
to as moments. These moments may be ontological or epistemic in nature, and 
the problematization as a whole is likely to revolve around one of these, called 
the core referent.
The nature of articulation w ith in a problematization is as significant as what 
is articulated, as it  is through being placed in relation that these elements are 
given a much more precise meaning. As such, being included, or included as 
excluded is significant, as is the sequence and value placed on the element 
through the manner of its articulation as a moment. Articulation can work 
through various forms, including linguistic, narrative and rhetorical, and through 
established routines, rituals and procedures of practices. Together, these form a 
specific political rationale, or argument that institutes a particular account of 
reality, but does so through establishing a rationale of problem and solution. The 
linguistic means to give traction to this articulation of the problematization are 
established in Chapter 3.
This content and its articulation are contingent upon power-relations. 
Foucault's four 'rules' of power/knowledge are used as pointers here to help 
uncover the contingency of a problematization. The first of these is the rule of 
immanence, whereby power and knowledge imply one another. As neither are
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prior, a particular discursive formation can be investigated through a 'local 
centre' as an entry point to this imbrication of power and knowledge. For this 
research UKCIP as an institution is one such focal point, and an even more ‘local 
centre' lies in the creation and use of a particular report. Accordingly UKCIP as a 
whole and a more precise focus on this report are used to ground the 
investigation of the contingency of its problematization of adaptation. This 
process w ill be discussed further in the following chapter on methodology.
This contingency of discourse is marked by continual variations, such that 
discourse is constantly being re-articulated, modulating perhaps only slightly but 
always w ith potential to change. This opens the door for double conditioning, the 
use of the same problematization for different objectives, which in Lacanian 
terms can be accounted for as a fantasmatic logic, the appeal of a discourse to an 
extant subjectivity, or the desire to be made subject. However, this can run in the 
opposite direction in the sense that the same subjects and strategies of power 
can appeal to very different discourses for the same ends: signifying the 'tactical 
polyvalence of discourses.' This also appears in a more minor fashion through the 
appearance of supplementary moments, and perhaps a supplementary rationale 
that extends the reach of an existing problematization. However, the contingency 
of discourse on power relations and the excess of all discourse by the real means 
that these supplements are inherently 'dangerous' as they can act as moments of 
discursive emergence. The real may also appear as a dislocatory event, 
disrupting a problematization and prompting efforts to resolve this aporia, which 
may be resolved through the articulation of a supplement into the core 
problematization.
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The inherent possibility of discursive change, marked in actuality by 
supplementary moments, recalls the objective to account for how different 
problematizations of adaptation might merge together in practice and whether 
these are really 'complementary', particularly given the inherent possibility of 
the supplementary moment to form the basis of an alternative problematization 
given the lack of foundation of the original. To this end, it  is the objective of this 
thesis to follow an ethical mode of critique: demonstrating the content and 
contingency of the extant discourse and where its lim its lie as a result, while also 
exploring its existing supplementary moments and their potential links to 
alternative discourses in order to recognize the political nature of the 
(re]articulation of UKCIP's problematization of adaptation to climate change.
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Chapter 3: Methodology
1.0 From theory to methodology
1.1 Introduction
The previous chapter identified discourse as the object of analysis for this 
research, and made a practical distinction for analytical purposes between the 
conceptual content of the discourse and its context of contingency through 
power/knowledge relations. W ithin this tw in focus on content and contextual 
contingency were established several core terms of analysis. Specifically, it 
established the discursive problematization as the key analytical frame, 
composed of particular ontological and epistemic moments produced through 
articulation, where this nature of this articulation as a whole forms a political 
rationale. The fundamental contingency of discourse is also taken to mean that 
discourses as a whole and their specific problematizations can be re-articulated 
to create supplementary rationales, and even supplementary problematizations 
which may graduate to becoming independent, alternative problematizations.
In order to operationalize this theoretical approach as a methodology, this 
chapter w ill first outline the selection of UKCIP itself as the object of research in 
the remainder of Part 1.0. Part 2 w ill describe the techniques and processes that 
were used to collect different discursive material that was representative of 
UKCIP's discourse of adaptation. Part 3.0 w ill describe the linguistic basis of the 
discourse analysis approach to UKCIP's problematization of adaptation. In each 
section, the link between this practical methodology and the core terms of
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analysis w ill be explained, to show how this approach helps provide traction for 
the theoretical analysis of UKCIP's discourse and its potential to change. Finally, 
Part 4.0 w ill concluded the chapter, and note the limitations of the methodology 
in accounting for UKCIPs discourse of adaptation, and the significance of this.
The explanation of the theoretical basis in the previous chapter and its 
practical application here are necessary in order to demonstrate how the 
'judgements' and 'naming' of UKCIP's discourse, and in particular it's 
problematization of adaptation, were reached (Glynos and Howarth 2007]. In 
doing so, it  responds to the discussion of the 'lack,' and the ultimate contingency 
of meaning, not by claiming all discourse and thus its analysis is invalid, but 
rather by recognising that as objectivity is not possible, it is necessary to 
communicate openly and clearly the “choices and strategies" that have been 
made (Hansen 2006, p. xix] in identifying a discourse for analysis.
1.2 Selection of UKCIP
Through a review of academic and policy literature and of government structure, 
Chapter 1 established that UKCIP was the core organisation in the production of 
official adaptation discourse in the UK during the research period. It is 
recognized that this wider discourse network necessarily places limitations on 
UKCIP's discourse, not only in terms of content but also in terms of "the degree 
of stability [the] official discourse enjoys w ith in the wider political and public 
sphere” (Hansen 2006, p. 72]. As such, where possible these connections have 
been pointed to in the literature review in Chapter 1, but w ill also be considered 
in Chapter 4 in particular, and in the 'postscript' in Chapter 7. However, as the 
institutional context of this discourse was not the primary object of research,
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these concerns are only raised where they add to a consideration of the 
conceptual content of the problematization.
This is not to say then that UKCIP was the only organisation that influenced 
the discourse of adaptation in the UK, but that it exercised a strategic role in the 
consolidation and production of that discourse through its position at the centre 
of a governmental-scientific network, and as the disseminating node between 
that network and the public. As it is UKCIP's discursive 'products' and practices 
that do this work, an 'intra-discursive' analysis of UKCIP's discourse, rather than 
the wider power/knowledge relations which play into this, is a valid approach in 
accounting for its actual problematization of adaptation.
The first chapter also established that UKCIP's discourse and position in the 
UK discourse-network on adaptation was not explicitly or heavily politicized. 
While no discourse exists independently of power/knowledge relations, the 
general lack of discursive contestation that this revealed also made it  appropriate 
to focus on UKCIP's internally produced discourse as the 'official discourse' of 
adaptation (Hansen 2006}. This entailed a methodology that focuses on its intra- 
discursive constitution.
However, it is important to note that the decision to focus on UKCIP was 
made in early 2008. Halfway through the primary research period, on the 26th of 
November 2008, the Climate Change Act was introduced, which broadened 
responsibility for adaptation w ith in the UK to the Climate Change Committee, 
specifically through the Adaptation Sub-Committee, which has powers to 
demand risk assessments and adaptation actions be carried out. At the time the 
complete role of these bodies was yet to be fully established, and as such could 
not form part of the research. Thus, UKCIP remained at the time as the core
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provider of adaptation advice w ith in the UK, a role which continued until 2011. 
Since then, it  emerged that much of the adaptation procedure produced by UKCIP 
would be taken-over by the Environment Agency and the Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra 2012b, Environment Agency 2012, 
Defra 2012c). The implications of this for adaptation discourse in the UK are 
discussed further in Chapter 7, but for now it is sufficient to note that much of 
UKCIP's discourse, specifically its technical approaches and practices, are 
continued under this new institutional basis. As such, the research and findings 
carried out here still have significance for the discourse as it  moves forward, but 
the real validity of the research is for the period of 2002 to 2009, the period 
actively covered by the research, as w ill be discussed further in the remainder of 
this chapter.
The choice of the UK as the country for the exploration of official 
discourses of adaptation was logistical, as the country where the doctorate was 
based. However, it was also a necessity that arose from the theory of discourse 
analysis, in that it  relies on a 'native' understanding of linguistic use in order to 
interpret the discourse in a relatively common fashion including (Hansen 2006). 
Here it should also be noted that, as discussed in Chapter 2, there are lim its to 
this ability for any individual to interpret a discursive statement completely as it 
was intended by the author, particularly w ith in different fields of research 
(Maybin 2001). This is at once a strength and a weakness, rendering UKCIP’s 
technical discourse somewhat 'strange' to a social scientist and in doing so 
making the analysis of its language both more difficult to grasp as well as more 
critical as it is not taken as 'natural.' In part this issue of the validity of the 
analyst's interpretation is addressed in this Chapter through the triangulation of
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several techniques, and through making judgments as overt as possible such that 
their own contingency is open to critique. This section has described the choice 
of 'including' UKCIP and excluding other organizations from the analysis of the 
discourse of adaptation in the UK. The next two sections w ill cover the choices of 
inclusion and exclusion w ith in UKCIP's discourse.
1.3 Data selection within UKCIP's discourse
The first methodological approach to working at this interface of 
power/knowledge draws on the Foucaultian method of identifying a ‘local 
centre,' described in Chapter 2. In a sense, UKCIP as an organization is itself a 
local centre, where its account of adaptation is the focus of power/knowledge 
relations. This also enables us to address the often neglected question of the 
mechanisms of intra-discursive change through making visible tensions and 
change over time and across social space within one discourse group.
However, more specifically this research focuses on the creation, and also 
the changing interpretation and use in practice, of a particular technical report. 
This report, 'Climate adaptation: risk, uncertainty and decision-making' [Willows 
and Connell 2003) was selected because it established UKCIP's first account of 
adaptation, and also because it formed the foundation of its later responses, 
before finally being adopted as the basis of adaptation for the 'post-UKCIP' 
adaptation regime [Environment Agency 2012). As such, the report acts as a hard 
and fast starting point against which to measure change, and thus as a 'local 
centre' of discourse production.
As the basis of UKCIP's approach, the report was also used as a 'local 
centre' in its varying use and interpretation across the 'social space' of the 
organization [Hansen 2006). For Foucault, the local centre was in principle
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something at which practices were directed, so strictly speaking a more accurate 
application of this concept would have been the adaptation policy of the 
stakeholders w ith  which UKCIP interacted. However, as this research is about 
UKCIP's 'common denominator' discourse, regardless of the particular 
stakeholder, analysing this variety of very lengthy interventions and interactions 
would be too time consuming. As such, UKCP's official basis of these interactions, 
in the form of the 2003 report, is a useful centre-point in the analysis. The variety 
then of discourse in social space is addressed by the range of observations of 
UKCIP practices w ith stakeholders together w ith interviews w ith  UKCIP staff 
carried out across the organization in the first half of 2009.
The report also functions as one temporally fixed discourse moment, 
enabling temporal comparison of discursive change. As adaptation only became a 
part of UKCIP's official discourse in 2003 w ith  the publication of the report, the 
core period under consideration is 2003-2009, w ith the end date established by 
the end of the time available for practical research. As such, the report's starting 
point is compared also to the interviews and observations in 2009 operating as 
comparative discursive moments through which to identify discursive change 
over time. However, during the writing-up period, from late-2009 to 2012 it 
became clear that significant discursive changes were taking place, and as such 
these are included in brief form in the discussion in Chapter 7 and traced back to 
the discursive tensions highlighted in the main body of this thesis.
The decision to track both change over time and across social space is 
because using both approaches gives the clearest indication of any concrete 
changes and immanent tensions to the problematization of adaptation. Looking 
at 'intra-discursive' constitution and change over a relatively short period of time
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requires a high-resolution analysis, able to observe micro-changes in the 
discourse content and problematization structure. The capacity to do this lies in a 
detailed analysis of documents and practices, where small changes are most 
visible through looking at linguistic and conceptual construction of discourses.
However, this in turn requires a balance to be struck between a detailed 
focus on smaller amounts of material, and a broader, more superficial reading of 
all of UKCIP's work. The necessity of keeping the data used to a manageable size 
meant a judgment needed to be made as to what discursive moments, objects 
and subjects, best represented the discourse's problematization (Titscher et al. 
2000], which could be determined for example, through being commonly 
referenced (Hansen 2006]. Significant here were not only those moment that 
represented its' content but also those that represented its contingency. As such, 
texts, practices and subjects that created or solidified or altered its 
problematization of adaptation were selected (Foucault 1998]. In this case, 
UKCIP, like any organization, has an enormous range of w ritten and spoken 
discourse events from which an account of its discourse can be drawn. The 
justification for the selection of specific examples is given in the following section 
on 'archival' research, including the selection of the 2003 technical report, and 
other documents that significantly altered the problematization of adaptation it 
represented. This is followed by a section that accounts for the selection of 
observations of UKCIP practices, and interviews w ith the core authors of the 
2003 report and a range of UKCIP staff in 2009.
Different types of discursive event also have varied effects on a discourse 
as a whole. The breadth of data collection methods and the selection of the 
specific range of discourse events is an attempt to recognize the principles of
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'tactical polyvalence' 'continual variations' and 'double conditioning' [Foucault 
1998) on the formation of UKCIP's discourse through looking at the different use 
of the discourse as it  is applied or represented in different contexts by different 
people. For example, the discourse produced by w ritten texts may not be fully 
replicated in verbal discursive practices, and may also change at a different 
speed. Internal discourse may be more fragmented and change more quickly that 
that presented to the public. These different modes of event in UKCIP's discursive 
production affect each other and as discussed in the previous chapter, such 
differences demonstrate a richness of potentiality. As such, the exploration of the 
problematization does not seek to obscure or reify their contribution, but rather 
to reveal more clearly what content they bring and what work they do in the 
(re)presentation of adaptation.
To develop the insights these different kinds of data bring to the 
understanding of the problematization of adaptation, they have been used 
"actively" to provoke deeper level of conceptual analysis [Holstein and Gubrium 
1995). Key UKCIP texts have been 'triangulated' w ith observations of UKCIP's 
practices, and w ith interviews of UKCIP staff about their practices and their 
understanding of adaptation discourse. The objective was to use each event and 
event type as a m irror to the knowledge gained in the others, so that they could 
be used provocatively to guide questioning and reflection on the discourse, such 
that a deeper quality of explanation emerges from each source, and a much more 
nuanced understanding of the discourse as whole arises. This enabled critical 
purchase on the contingency of the conceptual content of UKCIP's 
problematization of adaptation. This section w ill now discuss each of these 
different types of discourse event, the specific events chosen for analysis, and
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how these contribute to an 'active' engagement w ith  the material in question. 
The first type, 'archival' or document-based analysis, is discussed below.
2.0 Basic methodologies of research and analysis
2.1 'Archival' research and the genealogical method
One way of observing a discourse's change over time is through 'archival' 
research, based on Foucault's techniques for engaging w ith the historical 
contingency of knowledge is prim arily through 'genealogy.' This "focuses on the 
'ignoble beginnings' and the contingent fabrications of historical phenomena," 
allowing him to historicize knowledge in terms of its production and change over 
time (Howarth 2000, p. 71). Although accounting for this historical production 
and change is not the objective of this research per se, this process helps make 
clear 'what' was included and what excluded and the effect that this had on the 
problematization of adaptation.
Given the short time span of UKCIP's discourse of adaptation this 
genealogy can be best tracked through versions of policy documents and 
interviews about their creation, followed up by interviews and observations 
about their use in contemporary practice.
In selecting the material for analysis, it  was considered that although 
UKCIP provide an archive of organization-specific adaptation attempts, it is their 
own reports show their central, and common account of adaptation most clearly, 
even if  this might change in specific interactions w ith stakeholders. As a 
reference literature these documents also permeate beyond these direct 
encounters and form UKCIP's public discourse as it is seen by a number of
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consultancies that utilise the material (ESYS Consulting 2004], although they, 
again, may not completely reproduce it. The discourse as presented in UKCIP's 
policy-type documents is thus also the most stable public representation of 
UKICP's problematization of adaptation, and as such was a basis of expectation 
amongst stakeholders as to how the topic would be addressed, as well as being 
the likely foundation for how UKCIP staff represented adaptation in practice. 
Such documents therefore seemed the appropriate starting place for analysis. Of 
particular importance was the first piece of 'archive' type text selected was the 
2003 UKCIP Technical Report on 'Climate adaptation: risk, uncertainty and 
decision-making' (Willows and Connell 2003]. As discussed above, this was 
selected because it  was the first document to establish UKCIP's account of 
adaptation, and continued as the foundation of its approach in late 2008-2009 
when the research period began.
The genealogical technique was utilized through reading this report 
together w ith a draft version (Willows et al. 2003b] in order to identify any 
differences between the two in terms of what they included and excluded, any 
changes in the manner of their articulation. These differences made clearer the 
nature of the final problematization disseminated to the public, and also revealed 
some of the areas where articulation was weaker or more fragmented or had 
been a more difficult process, demonstrating areas of the problematization that 
were likely to be less stable, and more open to supplementary elements. These 
aspects were compared and analysed in greater detail using linguistics-based 
discourse analysis techniques, which is described in detail in Part 3 of this 
chapter.
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The power/knowledge relations that produced these differences can be 
analysed in several ways. First, there are obvious institutional relations that 
shape a discourse's formation. These might be the influence of departmental or 
government objectives, political norms, as well structural and economic aspects 
such as budget allowances and external legal influences from bodies such as the 
European Climate Change Programme or the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (Campbell 1998, Roe 1994, Stevenson 2009). 
Other power/knowledge relations might arise from public opinion polls and 
media attention to a particular issue (Fairclough 2000, Hansen 2006). It is 
important to note that these are not being analysed as 'causal mechanisms/ but 
instead to shed light on the particularity of the problematization in question, 
what it  really includes, how it  really works, and what practices it  calls for.
The contingency of the problematization can also be unpicked through 
smaller indicators of genealogical origins from w ith in the discourse event. This is 
evidenced through the referencing, either overtly or implicitly, of other texts or 
sources of authority. This 'intertextuality' is easily demonstrated through 
bibliographic references for example, or through the use of specific concepts or 
terminology that draw on other texts (Hansen 2006, Fairclough 2010). Crucially, 
all intertextual elements, although articulated as moments w ith in the 
problematization, are also connected -  in so far as this relation is clear -  to their 
prior origin and its discursive situation. These thus serve either to anchor the 
problematization in a wider discursive formation, which may give it  increased 
stability if  it is very similar to the particular problematization. However, where 
the intertextual elements are supplements, this connection to an external
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discourse may weaken their articulation into the problematization, and weaken 
the structure of the problematization as a whole.
Beyond these investigations of documents through discourse analysis, a 
broader survey of UKCIP documents was conducted in order to situate the 
problematization more clearly in terms of the breadth of UKCIP practices, and 
any change over time. Some of these documents were also 'tools' for adaptation 
produced by UKCIP. These have gone through several iterations, so the versions 
used here were those current for mid-2009, although several have changed since. 
All of these documents and tools are listed in the table below, w ith  a short 
explanation as to their particular significance and relation to each other as part 
of the genealogical method. Where no specific discourse analysis techniques 
were used, they are marked as 'basic review,' used for providing contextual, 
power-relation information about the discourse rather than the specific form of 
the problematization.
Table 3.1: UKCIP documents and related articles used for Analysis
Document Significance Methodological tools
UKCIP Technical 
Report -  Review 
Draft (Willows et al. 
2003b)
• Unfinished version of founding 
document of UKCIP’s 
problematization
• Demonstrates areas that were 
difficult to resolve or 'articulate,' 
and contingency of 
inclusion/exclusion
• Genealogical archival 
research (Comparison 
with final version)
• Discourse analysis 
(linguistics-based)
• Findings used 'actively' in 









• First official account of adaptation 
for UKCIP
• Basis of UKCIP's online tool: 
Adaptation Wizard launched in 
2008
• Remained overall basis although 
supplemented with more sector 
specific material (see below)
• Supplemented in particular with 
the LCLIP approach (see below)
• Genealogical archival 
research (Comparison 
with draft version)
• Discourse analysis 
(linguistics-based)
• Tensions demonstrated 
through comparison used 
'actively' in interviews 
with report's key authors.
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Document Significance Methodological tools
A Changing Climate 
fo r Business: 
business planning 




• Applies approach more specifically 
to businesses, comparison across 
social space of discourse
• Published in 2009, offers a 
temporal comparison of discursive 
change, linked to BACLIAT 
(Business Areas Climate 
Assessment Tool)
• Basic review
• Minor discourse analysis
• Comparison with 2003 
document over space and 
time
A local climate 
impacts profile: 




• Makes organizational response the 
focus of analysis, introduces more 
substantiated supplementary 
rationale
• Published in 2009, offers a 
temporal comparison of discursive 
change
• Basic review,
• Minor discourse analysis
• Comparison with 2003 
document over space and 
time
Socio-economic 
Scenarios fo r  
climate change 
impact assessment: 
a guide to their use 
in the UK climate 
impacts programme
Use for conceptual content of UKCIP's 
discourse. The 'absence' of use 
particularly with regard to adaptation 
(rather than impacts) matters 
enormously for how 'adaptation' is 
problematized.
• Basic review
• Minor discourse analysis
• Combined with interview 
and observations data for 
analysis
Critical Review o f 




learnt and future  
directions (Hughes, 
Tomei and Ekins 
2009)
Power/knowledge analysis of 
conceptual contingency: this provides 
an explanatory account of why the 
socio-economic scenarios were side­
lined, and enables a deeper 
understanding of the discourse of 
adaptation through this exclusion of 
conceptual content and how this was 
justified.
• Basic review
• Combined with interview 
and observations data for 
analysis
Review o f UKCIP: 
fina l report (ESYS 
Consulting 2004)
* Indicates institutional responsibilities 
and connections, including to the Hadley 
Centre and to stakeholders
• Basic review
Attributes o f Well- 
Adapting 
Organisations 
(Lonsdale et al. 
2010)
•  Significant moment, representing a 
supplementary problematization of 
adaptation in terms of 
organizational capacity, 
implications for UKCIP 
problematization as a whole need 
to be considered
• Temporal comparison 2010 to 
2003
• 'Social space' comparison: effect of 
specific staff member
• Conceptual background: 
used to discuss the extent 
of discursive change and 
its implications
• Basic analysis, limited use 




Theory and Practice 
(Brown et al. 2011)
•  Significant moment, introduces a 
supplementary rationale in UKCIP's 
problematization of adaptation
• Temporal comparison 2011 to 
2010 and 2003
• Conceptual background: 
used to discuss the extent 
of discursive change and 
its implications
• Basic analysis, limited use 
of discourse analysis 
techniques
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However, reliance on the analysis of policy-type documents is prevented 
by several factors. First, there is the general problem associated w ith the policy 
text genre that there is an "inverse relation between the degree of formality and 
the degree of sharpness" of its conceptual content (Hansen 2006, p. 85]. As a 
technical report, some aspects of its content were extremely clear, although its 
political rationale and political ontology were less so. This combined w ith  the 
genre-related modes of appearing comprehensive and neutral to make it difficult 
to identify the problematization that is actually practiced. In order to account for 
and analyse UKCIP's problematization of adaptation, it  was therefore necessary 
to 'triangulate' the problematization as presented in the report w ith interviews 
and observations of UKCIP’s contemporary staff, as discussed earlier in the 
chapter.
2.2 Observation of UKCIP-stakeholder practices
The observation of UKCIP workshops w ith stakeholders was necessary to 
account for its changing problematization across space and to verify connections 
to the report's in itia l problematization in 2003. The major concern here, given 
the focus on UKCIP's problematization, was to look at how they sought to 
establish an account of adaptation. As such it was the in itia l encounters w ith 
stakeholders that were the essential 'moments' to observe before the 
problematization emerged through interaction w ith stakeholders. The case 
studies were selected accordingly to cover UKCIP's engagement w ith 
stakeholders in their initial stages.
There were a very limited number of stakeholder projects w ith in  the 
observation research period, which was late-2008 to mid-2009. Stakeholder 
meetings were postponed and changed frequently, and there were several
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months between meetings, resulting in a small number of events analysed. In the 
end, one stakeholder meeting and one professional organization presentation 
were actually observed, whilst an audio recording of one more stakeholder 
meetings was provided by UKCIP for my analysis. The stakeholder meeting 
observed was in fact the second meeting, but the process was still in its early 
stages w ith UKCIP still leading proceedings. Notes and minutes as well as 
materials produced and power-point presentations were analysed from all 
events. To redress the limited number of observation sessions, the discourse that 
appeared at the meetings was then followed up 'actively' in interviews w ith the 
staff that presented at them. See Appendix 1 for more detail. As agreed, the 
companies involved have not been identified.
Whilst there is necessarily some basic ethnographic interpretation to the 
observations of stakeholder meetings in terms of social interactions, the primary 
focus was on 'words' spoken or w ritten as the primary means of communication 
and as the focus of analysis. As such, field notes taken during these meetings 
were limited, and they were not filmed, but were instead audio-recorded. 
However, power/knowledge sensitive notes about the visual and inter-personal 
interaction were kept where these clearly affected the meaning that was being 
produced. The transcripts of these events were analysed using discourse analysis 
and coded according to the conceptual elements they added to the core terms of 
analysis. See Part 3 of this chapter for more detail.
2.3 Interviews with UKCIP staff and report authors
Although the research question focused on UKCIP's official discourse, it was 
thought that in order to gain an understanding of the contingency of what was 
produced a more reflexive account of the discourses emergence, rather than just
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snapshots of what was produced, would need to be undertaken. Interviews were 
the only way to gain access to this information in any quantity. The interviews 
also allowed an opportunity to 'actively' use data already collected to gain a 
deeper understanding of the concepts and rationales that created their 
problematization of adaptation and any variations in this.
There were two sets of interviews w ith different specific objectives. The 
first set had the objective of getting to grips w ith the content and contingency of 
the 2003 technical report. A short informal meeting w ith one of the key 
contributors identified two primary authors. As they were responsible for the 
actual linguistic articulation of the final document, they were likely to be a good 
source of understanding the conceptual contingency of the actual articulation of 
the various elements as moments for the final problematization, so they were 
sought for interview.
The second set provided a temporal comparison to the first, through 
focusing on the contemporary UKCIP staff involved in (reproducing its discourse 
on a day-to-day basis. Those asked for interview were in itia lly  determined by the 
need to follow up the UKCIP staff involved w ith the stakeholder meetings that 
had been available for observation. Beyond this, it was made sure that the two 
sides of the knowledge transfer team were covered: Business and Local 
Authorities as these represented UKCIP's most direct interventions into society 
in the wider (re)production of its discourse.
In addition, the Technical Director of the Science Team was also 
interviewed, w ith the intention of contrasting his views w ith  those of the 
Director of Knowledge Transfer, who had a different background arising from 
business partnerships, as a deliberate way of surveying the breadth of
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organizational practice. However, the latter was unavailable. In the meantime, 
UKCIP's internal openness was an advantage in overcoming this obstacle, as I 
was pointed to a new member of the organization who brought an alternative 
account of adaptation to the table, and who was later the key author of the most 
substantial formalization of the supplementary problematization to arise at 
UKCIP to date (Lonsdale et al. 2010). For a schedule of interviews and their value 
to the research, please see Appendix 2, which contains a summary of the 
interviews carried out and their significance for the analysis of UKCIP's 
problematization of adaptation.
The interviews w ith  participants were semi-structured, and carried out 
after their consent was given to being recorded. There were very few instances 
where interviewees explicitly asked for certain comments to remain anonymous. 
However, a condition of the pre-interview agreement was that the transcripts be 
approved before publication. As no approvals were received, I cannot publish 
these names and so interviewee names and quotes are anonymous in the final 
version of this thesis, except where explicit verbal instruction was received that 
the material was publishable. This should not be taken as a reflection of the 
sensitivity of the interviews, rather that approving them was probably a low 
prio rity  for busy individuals, particularly as the research model did not provide 
any clear or immediate benefit to the organisation.
To discuss how the interviews themselves were conducted, the theoretical 
concern w ith power/knowledge discussed in the previous chapter was seen as 
just as pertinent to the practices of interviews and meetings as it  was to the 
production of documents. One entry point to this is the positionality of the 
interviewer and their role in shaping both 'what' is said and 'how' it  comes to be
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said, (Holstein and Gubrium 1995]. Positionality here accounts for the elements 
of identity that mark a participants perception or how they are perceived by 
others, such as class, race, gender, age. Crucially it  is the relation between 
participants w ith in these categories that structures their 'positionality,' which is 
demonstrated in part through their behaviour toward one another (Chacko 
2004). It should be noted that the dominant account of interviews, were the 
interviewer needs to access the 'pure' thought of the interviewee, assumes the 
transmission account of language and discourse (Holstein and Gubrium 1995, p. 
3] that was rejected in the previous chapter. Following from the analysis 
presented there, the interview is understood here as an inevitably productive 
process.
Certain positionality comes into play even before the interview starts. The 
background of the interviewer and respective participants, their perceived or 
actual identity, be it  of race or gender, class, or level of education among others, 
all play a part in how the researcher and the 'researched' interpret the objectives 
of each other, and the meaning of particular questions and answers. Positionality 
also shapes the level of comfort or discomfort felt in revealing particular 
information, and willingness to cooperate (Chacko 2004). In the case of the 
interviews my positionality was of course dependent on the individual being 
interviewed, as it  is a relational property. In most instances, I was interpreted as 
an 'academic' and an 'outsider' while the interviewees occupied the identity of 
'professional' and 'insider.' This was clearest among those longest in their posts 
and more senior in the organisation. On one occasion this resulted in the 
presentation of an official 'line' of representation that made power-knowledge
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considerations difficult to assess, although this was balanced out by the other 
interviews which were more open.
By contrast, on another couple of occasions my positionality as a 
perceived neutral outsider and also as someone who presented the opportunity 
to 'set the record straight' played into some responses. It should be stressed that 
as there was no intention on my part to provide a 'correct' version of adaptation 
in this research, these cases were in fact very useful; the identification of 
moments of contention helped to open up the contingency of the discourse's 
production and to identify inclusions and exclusions in the formation of the 
discourse.
Of course, such utilisation of the researcher and deliberate self­
presentation usually happens both consciously and subconsciously, and may 
have happened in many smaller, more subtle instances throughout all of the 
interviews, but my own positionality as an actual outsider lim ited my perception 
of these moments. As all accounts are partial to some extent, and indeed the is no 
'objective' single truth to the origins of any discourse, there is no solution for this 
itself, but there are certain methods that can be used to make these moments 
clearer.
Primarily, this was addressed by deliberately utilizing the productive 
process of the interview that arises from alternative positionalities and concerns 
can be utilized as an 'active' component in the practice of the interview itself 
(Holstein and Gubrium 1995}. In this case, the 'active' approach was used first 
slightly im plicitly and then more explicitly during the interviews. For the 2003 
report authors, the indirect approach was to ask them to tell the story of how the 
report came into being. In the case of UKCIP staff members, they were asked how
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they would present adaptation to stakeholders now, how their thinking about 
adaptation arose, and whether it had changed over time. This chronological 
narrative format used to get respondents to position themselves more reflexively 
w ith regard to the conceptual content of their discourse of adaptation. 
Accordingly, the introduction to the interview deliberately primed respondents 
for what I was interested in, in terms of language and content regarding 
adaptation. In this sense I tried to "[challenge] the respondent to produce a 
coherent ... narrative out of a designated, limited stock of mutually relevant 
resources" [Holstein and Gubrium 1995].
However, there is an important distinction here between this and the 
second, more explicit; although these questions asked for a particular type of 
answer, they did not intend to lim it the conceptual content of that answer, 
although of course this may have happened to some extent. By contrast, the 
second approach asked directly why adaptation was spoken about in a particular 
way, why certain concepts were included and others excluded. These questions 
came later in the interview in order to avoid prejudicing the individual's own 
narrative content. This dual approach produced an account of the content of 
adaptation, and of the power/knowledge context through which it was 
[reproduced.
In practice the second more 'active' approach resulted in questions to 
interviewees about what they meant by 'adaptation' and how this word related 
to, for example 'resilience.' At this time, the analytical frame of adaptation used 
was somewhat different than that now presented in Chapter 1, owing to 
advances in the literature in the intervening period. Nonetheless, although some 
different concepts were used, such as 'emergence' and 'complex adaptive
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systems' these still enabled a more focused conceptual discussion that made 
clear how strongly certain concepts were included or excluded from UKCIPS' 
problematization of adaptation. This approach fits most closely w ith  Holstein and 
Gubrium's account of the active interviewer as one who “ ...intentionally, 
concertedly provokes responses by indicating -  even suggesting -  narrative 
positions, resources, orientations, and precedents for the respondent to engage 
in addressing the research questions under consideration" (Holstein and 
Gubrium 1995].
One resource for this kind of interviewing was the repetition of some 
questions across all interviews: this enabled chronological comparisons of the 
basic problematization of adaptation between the historical position of the 2003 
report authors and contemporary UKCIP staff; and synchronic comparison across 
the 'social space' of the organisation. These differences were used to inform 
'active' interviewing questions. A similar process was carried out using particular 
moments from the 2003 Technical Report. An example here is the 2003 report’s 
inclusion of the term 'decision-maker' as the subject of adaptation, which 
revealed striking differences between the 2003 imaginary and its use in 2009, 
which provoked further questions of contemporary staff as to where this 
understanding came from, and what effect the change of 'subject' was having on 
the meaning of adaptation itself. However, not all provocations are intentional or 
controlled. Relative experience, academic and professional background shaped 
what kind of interpretative narrative the respondents produced as well as how 
they interpreted my questions, and how I interpreted their answers at the time.
Since then a clearer understanding of the particular production of 
meaning during the interviews was aided by further reading of the topics in
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question to provide a broader understanding of possible meanings. Further, the 
interview transcripts were revisited several months later in order to approach 
these w ith a more neutral interpretation. This was aided in part by informing 
that interpretation w ith linguistic analysis techniques and noting the process of 
coproduction of meaning as the interview progressed (Doyle 2012]. In this sense 
the practice of revisiting this process and doing so intentionally and critically 
was itself a practice of reflexivity (Doyle 2012].
Not feeding back findings to participants was perhaps unfortunate. In part 
this occurred because of taking a year out from the PhD project and therefore 
feeling that too long a gap had been left for the results to be seen as useful to the 
organisation. However, it was also simply not part of the research strategy, in 
part because I was concerned it would reduce the independence of the research 
findings i f  an opening was given to contest them, of if  I felt compelled to frame 
them in a 'policy useful' manner that glossed over arbitrary moments of 
formation. Of course, this could have been dealt w ith as part of the research 
model and not engaging w ith it further was simply an oversight resulting from 
inexperience of ways to negotiate these issues.
However, the absence of feedback was corrected to some extent through a 
reflective and comparative component that was already built into the research 
model. This was enabled through the active use of differences between the report 
and current practice and noting differences among contemporary staff, as well as 
the utilization of subsequent UKCIP documents for comparative purposes (see 
Chapter 7 for the latter]. It is felt that although these don't necessarily address 
how comfortable an individual might be w ith my interpretation of their 
discourse, the comparative use of multiple sources goes some way to ensuring a
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broad account of the discourse as a whole and multiple opportunities for actively 
reflexive analysis (Doyle 2012).
It should be noted that my access to UKCIP took some time to procure. 
Attempting to set up interviews independently had no effect, but eventually I was 
able to name-drop an academic associated w ith the orgnaisation institutionally 
which opened the door to the first interview, which then snowballed once I was 
physically in the office and was referred from person to person. I also gained 
access to one of the report authors coincidentally as institutionally related to 
Lancaster University. I do not have reason to believe either of these connections 
had any effect on the content of the interviews, they simply increased the 
willingness of the interviewees to make time to be interviewed on the general 
principle that it was good practice to make time for those connected into wider 
existing institutional relations.
At the forefront of my consideration was the theoretical positionality I 
considered myself to have or be perceived as having. The selection of the 
research question itself automatically implies a particular interest on the part of 
the researcher (Chacko 2004, Hoogendoorn and Visser 2012), in this case in the 
contingency of discourse which therefore rejects the assumption that it  is a 
purely rational and objective approach to adaptation. I was concerned this might 
be offensive to the report authors but in fact it  was clear that they, better than 
anyone, recognized and admitted this contingency, which was extremely helpful 
in enabling a discussion of the production of the discourse.
A second aspect this was that my initial research topic had focussed on 
organisational approaches to adaptation and a specific interest in complex 
adaptive systems. When I observed this was somewhat lacking in UKCIP's in itial
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approach to adaptation this both piqued my interest as to why this was the case, 
yet it  also made me anxious that I might read into their work the presence of this 
approach when it  was not in fact there, as it  was the topic 1 would prefer to 
research rather than risk-based scientific approaches.
The only solution at the time appeared to be to remain as conscious as 
possible of whether this was affecting my judgement, and to actively use 
discourse analysis techniques in the analysis of the interviews by separating out 
where my questions had pulled out particular framings of responses. My 
confidence in keeping a balance was only finally resolved by the indirect 
approval of my analysis which came from UKCIP itself in the form of new 
documents that more or less validated my findings, which are discussed in 
Chapter 7. To be clear, I do not think that these outputs had anything to do w ith 
my interviews acting as an intervention -  the research for those documents had 
already been approved when I undertook the interviews and was performed by 
people far more knowledgeable about the supplementary elements than I was.
Third, I experienced a clear sense of what might be termed temporal or 
generational positionality (Hoogendoorn and Visser 2012]. Many interviewees 
had begun work in the field while anthropogenic climate change was still a very 
contentious issue, and worked daily w ith people for whom it remained a 
contentious issue. As a result of my personal inexperience of this period and 
generation or opinion, I did not appreciate the significance of this context as a 
continuing political driver of UKCIP's discourse at the time of interview. Although 
I have faithfully reported this as a power-knowledge context to the production of 
the report and the focus in UKCIP’s contemporary work on demonstrating 
climate change, at the time of the interviews I missed the opportunity to
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investigate this context and its influence on the contemporary discourse more 
fully.
This clearly demonstrates that positionality translates into the ethical 
question of the validity of the research and whether it solely reflected the 
interviewer-author's own positionality. I have done my best to recognize my 
existing biases and redress this through active reflexivity such as referral to later 
documents, or in the case of active interviewing, to use my interests deliberately 
to open up contingency, carefully taking my effect on the interviewee into 
account through discourse analysis techniques. I have also recognised where I 
failed to identify temporal biases in time and proffer instead the caveat that this 
may have been an oversight in one aspect of the power-knowledge context, 
however as UKCIP's discourse per se was characterised using linguistic discourse 
analysis techniques, while its power/knowledge origins have been occluded, I do 
not th ink its effects have.
2.4 Combined analysis of data and coding of discourse analysis
The results of the final discourse analysis of the combined material from the 
documents, observations and interviews were then in itia lly  coded in terms of the 
two core aspects of'contextual' power/knowledge and conceptual content, which 
was then divided according to the ontology and epistemology, subdivided into 
accounts of space and time, in providing moments that described the 'threat' and 
'solution' of adaptation, an analysis which included how these were articulated. 
The conceptual content was then coded in further detail through an iterative 
process of seeing how these particular moments were replicated, modulated or 
changed in each of these discourse events. It became clear that some of the
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elements were articulated less strongly, although they became more central in 
later UKCIP discourse events. This generated the need for a theoretical and 
conceptual means to talk about this function, which led to the adoption of 
Derrida's account of the supplement, which was discussed in Chapter 2.
The transcripts and document material and analysis were then copied and 
pasted according to these 'codes' as the combined effect of their conceptual 
content and the manner of their articulation, which was further subdivided into 
core and supplementary moments. The original wording was kept, and the 
extracts were listed w ith reference to their original interview and place in that 
interview, so that their full articulated 'meaning-in-context' was not lost. Placed 
together in this way, it was easier to see the breadth and depth of UKCIP's 
discourse and of the problematization that structured this over space and time. It 
also revealed how it was riddled w ith supplementary moments which when 
viewed separately from their articulation into the problematization 
demonstrated a shared alternative conceptual resonance.
By triangulating both content and contingency through the analysis of 
these varied discourse events as a cross section of UKCIP's discourse in time and 
space, it  was possible to derive a fuller and more complex account of the 
constitution of UKCIP's problematization of adaptation. The diagram below 
summarises this process. Part 3 of this chapter w ill then give details on how 
linguistic techniques were used to produce the discourse analysis material so 
that it  could be coded in relation to the core terms of analysis.
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Figure 3.1: Data Selection and Analysis flow chart
Interviews with report 
authors
Interviews with relevant 
Staff
Interviews with cross- 
section of UKCIP Staff
3.0 Linguistics-based discourse analysis
3.1 Introduction
The analysi of these various types of discourse 'events' draws on the linguistic, 
rhetorical and narative analysi techniques comon to Critical Discourse 
Analysi (Wodak and Meyer 201, Fairclough 2010), Discourse Analysi 
(Titscher et al. 200, Johnstone 208) and Discourse Theory (Wetherel, Taylor 
and Yates 201). The linguistic analysi techniques cover overal structures 
down to individual word choice. They were used to draw out the conceptual 
content or 'meanig' of these discourse events, not in a quantitative but rather in 
a qualitative, semantic, sense that is linked to the fundamental idea of meanig 
being established through articulation, as discussed in Chapter Two.
It should be noted here that although ‘discourse analysi' is the term often 
used to speak about these techniques in general, this research makes a 
distinction betwen the use of these techniques at the level of discourse events, 
and the theoretical framing asociated with these various schols of Discourse
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Analysi and Critical Discourse Analysi, and has instead conected these 
linguistic techniques comon to al forms of discourse analysi into the 
theoretical framing established in Chapter 2. This section establishes these 
conections betwen specific linguistic techniques and the 'core terms of 
analysi' with the conceptual framings that were identified there.
3.2 Power/knowledge context and its relation to linguistic content and structure 
Table 3.2 below shows the analysi techniques that were used to ases the 
power/knowledge components of the core terms of analysi. These are 
expresed in the form of questions, with indications of which terms of analysi 
are most relvant, and examples of answers given to demonstrate conections in 
detail in order to demonstrate their significance to the theoretical framing of the 
problematization. In the consideration of context, the most pertinent of these 
were the power/knowledge aspects: the rules of 'imanence,' 'continual 
variations,' 'double conditioning,' and the 'tactical polyvalence of discourses.'
Table 3.2: Macro-level power/knowledge 'context and relation to core terms of analysis
Linguistic Questions 
for Analysis:
Core terms of analysis: Relation of linguistic questions to core terms 
of analysis; implications for problematization
Who is 'responsible' 
for the discourse 
event, overtly and 
implicitly?
•  Where does it sit 
institutionally?
• On whose 
authority  is it 
written/spoken?
•  Who is the 
actual 'author'?
Immanence [o f power to 
the production o f 
knowledge and vice versa]
Tactical polyvalence of 
discourses [The ability of a 
discourses to  be co-opted 
by d ifferent political 
rationales, or several 
rationales to  operate 
w ith in the same discourse]
Continual variations
[power/knowledge 
relations, hence discourse 
itself are continually 
(re)articulated]
The authority and the author/speaker directly, 
indirectly, overtly or im plicitly responsible fo r 
the production of a discourse event w ill have 
an influence on the conceptual content and 
form. This demonstrates the immanence of 
power to  knowledge production.
W hat is overt/im p lic it indicates tactical 
polyvalence, and the combination of the tw o  is 
related to  the function o f the supplementary 
moment as connecting an im plicit rationale to  
an overt one.
Awareness of the potential fo r continual 
variations in the power/knowledge 'context' of 
discourse, enables a sensitivity to  the possibility 





Core terms of analysis: Relation of linguistic questions to core 











the discourse, and 
(fantasmatic) 
identification]
A material or discursive event tha t disrupts the 
validity and coherence o f an extant 
problematization; its characteristics may also 
influence the subjects chosen to  'cover over' 
the resurgence o f the real, which affects in turn 
the rearticulation of the problematization
W hat function  is the 
discursive event 
meant to  achieve? 
Consider its:
•  Overt/stated 
function
•  Implicit function.
W hat audience is 
the discourse event 
aimed at, and who 
does it  actually 
reach?
•  W hat effect does 
tha t have on 
meaning?
•  Is tha t audience 
likely to 
in terpret the 
meaning 
diffe rently/in a 
particular way?





particular relations to  
overall strategies and vice 
versa; where locked in 
produce hegemonic 
discourse, where disrupted 
enable discursive change 
(Laclau and Mouffe 2001)]
Tactical polyvalence 
Continual variations
Authors are only one part o f the equation. The 
subjects they are aiming to affect and the way 
they are aiming to affect them structures the 
particular construction of a discourse, in terms 
o f genre and mode as well as content, w ith key 
implications fo r meaning. This double 
conditioning works both ways: Policy often 
uses a persuasive, authoritative mode to  mask 
more dubious, unpopular functions, but it may 
also include popular functions to  enable other 
agendas, linking here to  tactical polyvalence.
Considering difference between overt and 
implicit function helps identify if a discourse is 
being used tactically to  suit another 
problematization and how.
Consider role of power/knowledge variations; 
m ight the discourse event be continually being 
shaped by both 'author' and 'audience' 
depending on the ir particular (and changing) 
relations?
W hat are the other 
power/knowledge 








Consider whether this discourse event fits 
w ith/d isputes existing discourses, what 
indications in tertextuality or overt 
interdiscursivity m ight mean fo r content and 
lim its o f its problematization?
3.3 Macro-level Conceptual Articulation
Beyond the general origins of discourse events, macro-level power/knowledge 
relations help identify macro-level conceptual structures and content. 'Medium' 
and 'genre' and their constituent 'modes' such as a persuasive or educative mode
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are the most immediately evident, structuring the kinds of truth claims and the 
ways such claims are made. Recognizing the norms of a medium or genre helps 
to identify the problematization's methods of articulation and the ontological and 
epistemic claims it  is likely to assume and appeal to. Such recognition also draws 
attention to any deviations in the specific discourse event in question, which may 
highlight significant conceptual inclusions or exclusions, enabling a clearer 
understanding of the actual problematization and the status of its articulated 
elements. Ways of identifying genre, mode and medium are given in the first 
section of Table 3.3, below.
Once these aspects are established, the problematization can then be 
discussed in more detail. Macro-level semantics and rhetorical structure are the 
two central ways in which this problematization is established. First, the 'macro - 
semantics' or major themes and meanings give an overview of its basic 
articulation through the inclusion of particular concepts. This includes named 
objects and subjects. At this level, the referent around which the discourse is 
centred should appear, although it  may not be immediately clear which of these 
core elements forms the referent.
Beyond this basic level of inclusion and exclusion, rhetorical structure 
plays a key role in articulating these concepts in a way that provides a particular 
problematization of a topic, through a political rationale. This depends in part on 
medium and genre. The possible forms of macro-level semantics and macro-level 
rhetorical structure are described in the second two sections of Table 3.3, below.
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Table 3.3: Macro-level Conceptual Articulation
Linguistic Questions for Analysis Core terms of analysis: Relation of linguistic questions to 
core terms of analysis; 
implications for problematization
What genre (including its 
subsidiary characteristics) is 
demonstrated, and how does 
this effect meaning?
Genre was determ ined by the 
consideration of the purpose of 
the discourse event combined 
w ith  the follow ing 
characteristics:
Medium: what typical 
materiality,
layout/typography/images and 
image-use? In a text, this would 
refer to titles, headings, 
subheadings (Jager 2001), but is 
appropriate also to  other 
'instrum entalities,' such as 
website design, or locations of 
people in a room, which accord 
d ifferent meanings to  a 
particular order or mode of 
presentation.
Speech acts: what type - such as 
statements, commands, 
promises, and in what 
order/structure?
(Mode) Lexis: what kind of 
vocabulary is in evidence here?
(Mode) Syntax: what kind of 
grammatical patterns? For 
example: complex noun phrases, 
passive tense.
(Mode) Key: what tone -  
serious/joking; does this shift?
Norms of interpretation?
Political rationale [a
rationale or explanation tha t 
calls fo r a particular account 
o f the social]
Fantasmatic logic [accounts 
fo r how a discourse shapes 
the subject through 
appealing to  the ir sense of 
the lack and need fo r 
enjoyment or security of 
self/relates to  the 
dislocatory event]
Articulation
Elements [a concept, such 
as an idea, topic, or subject 
(identity), but this becomes 
a moment when it  is 
established as such through 
the discourse in question]
Particular practices, such as 
the use of assessment tools, 
may also have a ritual 
function (similar to  a genre), 
and enable a fantasmatic 
logic
Genre is a norm o f representation, 
often associated w ith  a general 
type of rationale and a related 
fantasmatic logic.
For example, 'the sermon' as a 
genre m ight present a 
commandment or morale rule, 
provide a story or 'parable' tha t 
acts as evidence o f the rule. This 
formula is a social norm, but it 
also institutes a political logic and 
responds to  the fantasmatic 'lack' 
o f rules to  live by.
Consider w hat kind o f knowledge 
the genre and mode (identified 
through lexis, syntax, key and 
medium amongst others) claim as 
tru th , and what effect this has on 
the epistemology and ontology 
included in the problematization, 
the kinds o f subjects and objects 
most likely to  be addressed.
All o f the linguistic techniques 
listed in the first column represent 
some form  o f articulation, 
significant fo r the 
problematization; Consider the 
difference between a 'joke' and 
'mission statem ent' w ith the same 
elements, but articulated into very 
d ifferent kinds of moments -  tha t 
is w ith  very d ifferent meaning as a 
result, and together creating a 
very d ifferent rationale.
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Linguistic Questions for 
Analysis
Core terms of analysis: Relation of linguistic questions to 
core terms of analysis; 
implications for problematization
Macro-level semantics
W hat top ics/ major themes 
addressed by the article?
Which 'subjects' are said to  
personify the discourse?
What obvious practices are 
spoken of or enacted?






epistemology [a theoretical 
understanding of these 
moments as producing a 
particular account o f reality 
and how to  know it ]
Supplementary moment [a
term  tha t is loosely 
articulated to  the discourse 
in question, or articulated 
in a subsidiary form, or 
references an alternative 
problematization)
Identify the major elements and 
the ir constitution as moments 
through articulation
The 'referent' as the core element 
around which the discourse is bu ilt 
(revealed through articulation) 
Basic account o f moments in 
terms o f ontology and 
epistemology
Look fo r indicators o f wholeness 
or purity in the original term , and 
indicators o f an element 
articulated as a lesser, exceptional 
or additional m om ent in the 
problematization
Macro-level rhetorical structure
Plots (Johnstone 2008): W hat is 
the basic plot?
•  More specifically, is this 
a scenario it has a 
beginning, middle and 
end.
•  However, if it has 
premises and 
conclusions, it is an 
argument. (Roe 1994)
Are there any obvious 
supplementary moments?
Referent [the core concept 
around which the discourse 
is built, particularly as the 
'problem ' to  which it aims 
to  'solve']
Problematization: the
structure of a discourse as 
constituted around a core 
rationale, whereby a topic 
is set up as a problem in a 
particular way, such tha t it 
calls fo r a solution, and 
tends to  shape the manner 
o f the solution by its very 
articulation of the problem.
Supplementary moment
The plot or narrative are a form  of 
articulation tha t positions 
elements (positive or negative, 
essential or peripheral, present or 
absent, first or second) affecting 
the ir meaning and tha t o f he 
problematization.
The particular form  o f the 
narrative -  through its p lot and 
whether this is a scenario or 
argument - enables this 
articulation to  occur in the way 
that it does, and calls fo r different 
epistemic types of content in 
particular, problematizing the 
epistemic and ontological content 
differently as a result.
If this articulation seems awkward 
or flimsy, or moves from  one 
mode to  another, then this may 
indicate the articulation of 
supplementary elements tha t are 
supplementary moments because 
they do not f it  into the 
problematization very 
comfortably, e ither by exceeding 
or undermining it. Look fo r 
indicators tha t something is a 
supplement because it is 
characterized as 'additional' or 
'exceptional' to  replace a natural 
ideal o f deficit.
1 2 0
3.4 Micro-level articulation
The problematization presented in a particular discourse event, such as a 'whole' 
speech or document is also affected by articulation at the micro-level. The major 
claims dealt w ith in the macro-semantics section above are supported, nuanced, 
or even undermined by these smaller linguistic operations. These are the 
semantic inclusions/exclusions and rhetorical structures that occur at the level 
of the paragraph or sentence. Table 3.4 below demonstrates this, proceeding 
from micro-level semantics or 'content' to micro-level expressions of 'context' 
based power/knowledge in order to get to grips w ith the production of meaning 
at the micro-level w ith in a particular discourse event. The meanings established 
here should in general reflect the overall problematization, as they help form it, 
but i t  is also here that supplementary meanings are most likely to be articulated, 
as they remain small enough to remain as supplements, even though at this level 
they may not only broaden but also undermine the problematization.
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Table 3.4: Micro-level conceptual articulation
Linguistic Questions for Analysis: micro-level 
semantics
Relation of linguistic questions to core terms of 
analysis; implications for the problematization
Identify what terms are central to the 
problematization and are connected to 
adaptation
•  W ith in document - overt definitions, e.g. in 
the glossary
•  A t sentence level -  what terms are coupled 
together
•  A t word level - are they nouns, verbs, 
adjectives? Singular or plural nouns? 
Definite or indefinite? Mass noun or count 
noun?
Elements/moments, specifically in terms of 
w hether/how  these are ontological or 
epistemological in nature
These 'term s' are elements. They im port not only 
concepts but a related ontology and 
epistemology to  the discourse. Consider fo r 
example:
human action and society
values/ideals
knowledge/technology
Are there possible conceptual tensions? If there 
are elements which do not seem to  'f it ' these 
may be supplementary moments -  but this 
depends on how well and frequently they are 
articulated into the discourse.
Are these conceptual combinations obvious? Are 
the terms put together logically compatible? If 
so, is this because they conform to  an already 
entrenched discourse? If not, are they made to 
seem logical through the way in which they 
articulated?
Linguistic Questions for Analysis: Micro-level 
rhetorical structure
Relation of linguistic questions to core terms of 
analysis; implications for the problematization
Mode: Key, Syntax, Lexis
Local meaning and coherence: Be aware o f this 
when looking at the terms used, as the ir 
relationships as structured w ith in  clauses or 
sentences alters the ir meaning (Dijk 2001) 
Including:
Persuasion: (Renkema 2004) which is created 
through, fo r example:
•  Exemplarity: use o f just one example to  
make a universal point (Roe 1994) from 
w ith in sentences to  entire case studies 
(Dijk 2001).
•  Strategic ambiguity: as deliberate 
vagueness, or gloss tha t makes it easier 
to  move a term to  an illogical or 
otherwise awkward articulation and 
logic
•  Presupposition: tha t which must be 
assumed fo r a claim to  make sense, 
such as the presence o f particular 
subjects or objects and qualities, 
w ithou t explicitly accounting fo r or 
justifying the ir presence
•  implicature: the implication o f shared
Articulation
All rhetorical techniques enable a specific form  of 
articulation. Together create a rationale which 
structures the problematization as a whole. 
Rhetorical structure is a general term  fo r this and 
works precisely to  obscure the lack, to  obscure 
contingency, by making an argument appear 
certain, necessary, or better.
In observing the operation of rhetorical 
techniques, it is possible to  draw out the role of 
the supplement as tha t which articulation works 
to  con tro l/lim it in its extent and in its 
connections to  alternative problematizations,
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knowledge or a concept w ithou t 
explicitly noting it (Johnstone 2008)
' Modification: where the meaning is 
modified so as to  appear less offensive 
or extreme (Renkema 2004) through 
techniques such as: 
o hedging strategies: words or 
phrases tha t indirectly remove 
certainty from a claim, such as 
'may' 'possibly' 'perhaps' 
o euphemisms: words tha t soften 
harder ones -  e.g. 'disincentive 
instead of penalize'
deictics (deictic expressions) and anaphora 
- e.g. ’th is1 which includes in an 'assumed1 
way w ithou t specifying overtly and 
therefore making it accusable 
Active/passive tense: what effect on 
meaning?
(in)transitive verbs? - highlight effect 
rather than agency?
nominalization - removes agency from a 
verb/adj'/adv. by making a noun
Visual articulation, through: 
layout/typography/images such as:
•  Lists, grammatical parallelism, ordering of 
titles, headings, subheadings (Jager 2001), 
which accord d ifferent meanings a 
particular order and significance
•  Other visual elements like images or 
graphs (Jager 2001), website design, or 
locations of people in a room, which 
accord d ifferent meanings (including 
people) a particular order and significance.
Binary oppositions: are certain terms presented 
as opposites of each other? W hat does this do 
fo r the ir meaning, and fo r the meaning o f terms 
associated w ith them? (Wetherell et al. 2001) 
Metaphors
•  catachreses: fairly overt metaphors - 
'floods of refugees' (Jager 2001)
•  Cognitive Metaphor, where there are 
subtle ontological or epistemological 
correspondences to  the use of terms, e.g. 
words like 'establish' together w ith 'policy' 
- imply longevity/solidity but not flexibility) 
(johnstone, 2008, p. 46)
Binary oppositions in particular are indicative o f a 
political logic o f equivalence (mutually exclusive 
terms or ways of being).
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Euphemism/Dysphemism: relative terms that 
appear to  have tangible meaning, fo r example 
’luxury1 (Johnstone 2008).
Note, there are levels o f syntax, phonology and 
morphology -  tha t are simply too detailed to 
look at fo r a project on this scale to  do w ith 
overall discourse and not particular instances. 
These are not used here. Instead, the replicable 
elements and modes of articulation tha t cross 
from  diffe rent kinds o f discourse events and are 
easily reproduced are used as indicators of 
discourse per se.
Specific techniques -  micro-level 
power/knowledge relations
Implications for meaning
Intertextuality and interdiscursivity (Johnstone 
2008): do specific ideas, phrases or terms link to 
other discourses or discourse events? Is this: 
overt, e.g. direct referencing 
implicit? through use of the same ideas, 
phrases, terms
Supplementary moments -  are indicated by 
in tertextuality and interdiscursivity, as well as the 
polyvalence of discourses.
Consider what meanings are enabled or excluded 
by articulation through these techniques? For 
example, are these excluded as 'counter- 
narratives' or 'non-stories?' (Roe 1994, W etherell 
2001a).
Consider what this reveals about the contingency 
of the meanings included/excluded?
Consider w hat this means fo r the stability o f the 
problematization? Supplementary moments: if 
poorly articulated to  the core problematization, 
these signify an additional but also a replacement 
concept, tha t undermines the necessity o f the 
core problematization, and signifies the 
possibility o f a supplementary problematization
3.5 Practical Application
The tables discussed above were condensed into two 'crib sheets' that were used 
for the analysis. The first of these listed the macro aspects included in the tables 
above on power/knowledge context, genre and medium and rhetorical structure 
and semantic content. This was answered systematically for the documents 
which were first analysed as a whole, and then in terms of their subsidiary 
sections, before these were broken down and the micro-level analysis applied. 
This last stage in particular made use of a crib-sheet based on the tables above in
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order to prompt the analysis of the myriad of techniques used in the document's 
discursive construction, which are otherwise often so subtle or so familiar that it 
can be difficult to notice the 'work' that they 'do' meaning.
Both macro and an overview of the micro aspects were then w ritten up in 
a report, w ith particular attention paid to how these levels fitted together. This 
included being summarized in a table that demonstrated the core rhetorical 
moves that established the articulation of the problematization on a macro-scale 
and replicated more frequently on a micro-scale, a list of included and excluded 
terms or concepts, and a list of key moments of tension w ith in the document over 
this inclusion/exclusion, which functioned as supplementary moments. In the 
case of the 2003 Technical Report, this summary formed the basis of the 
questions raised in the interviews w ith the report's core authors. This has been 
discussed in more detail in the interview section 2.3, above.
However, for each document analysed, it  became clear that there was so 
much detail that it would need to be condensed to the most pertinent theoretical 
aspects. The collection of data revealed a striking flu id ity of discourse formation 
over time, and as such, there was a reflexive movement between theory and the 
analysis, resulting in an increased exploration of accounts of conceptual change 
w ith in  a discourse, and arriving at Derrida's 'supplement' as an explanation of 
this process that resonated w ith the articulatory basis of discourse theory used 
here. The analysis was then re-assessed on this basis. Although in itia lly 
accounted for slightly differently as 'moments of fragmentation,' the theoretical 
questions asked in the interviews linked well w ith  the final terms of analysis, and 
did a better job of accounting for how they could maintain their position in the 
core problematization while also providing it  w ith additional flexibility.
125
4.0 Conclusion
This chapter has laid out the basic methodological approach followed for this 
thesis. It builds from a discourse analysis of texts and triangulates these w ith 
speech and a small amount of observation. Although how UKCIP presents its 
discourse has been justified as the 'common element' here, it  remains the case 
that practices of adaptation assessment represent a more substantial account of 
this problematization. As such, the validity of the narrow window that was 
observed is open to challenge. Some of these same organisations have since 
produced publicly available reports. With more time and space to review this, 
these would offer excellent starting points to observe how much the 
problematization of adaptation developed in practice. If used comparatively, 
different stakeholder final reports would give a good assessment of just how 
flexibly adopted UKCIP's problematization is, and thus give a better indication of 
its significance in shaping wider UK adaptation discourse and policy.
Similarly, the later developments at UKCIP represented in the 2010 and 
2011 documents are very significant, further research could have been done on 
these. The emergence of the vulnerability based Local Climate Impacts Profile 
(LCLIP) was the biggest shift during the research period. This represents the 
biggest gap in this analysis. With more time, this would have been considered in 
much more depth. Efforts are made to draw out its significance in the subsequent 
chapters, but they lack a linguistically-based discourse analysis, and the 
appearance and adoption of the LCLIP approach was not picked up on in time for 
the interviews, and therefore not investigated further, which was an oversight 
that was unable to be corrected due to the small window in which the interviews
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could be undertaken. Nonetheless some aspects of its additional approach were 
mentioned in the interviews and have been considered here.
Although the specific techniques are many, discourse analysis at the 
linguistic level centres around questions about the semantic meanings 
(ontologies and epistemologies) that are included/excluded, and the way in 
which these are articulated to a rationale, constituting a problematization. This 
articulation is enabled through many linguistic forms, including genre and mode 
and rhetorical structure, all of which also have the effect of enabling but also 
introducing particular meanings. If certain conceptual inclusions are only loosely 
articulated into the discourse, they suggest these terms as supplementary 
moments, particularly if  they establish clear intertextuality or interdiscursivity 
w ith alternative discourses. The questions of analysis about these linguistic 
forms, particularly as described here in terms of their links to the core terms of 
analysis, demonstrate how the discursive event (re)produces a particular 
problematization. As such, these questions were followed through for each 
discourse event analysed as part of this research, w ith greater detail for the 
foundational 2003 report, and the problematization and its emergence was 
derived from through the triangulation of document, interview and observation 
material.
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Chapter 4: A genealogy of UKCIP's discourse: from scientific 
knowledge to risk
7  think the issue... with anything like this [is] there's so many things you could 
draw in to it, there's so many ways it  could go..."
- Interviewee H, 2009, p. 6
"The play o f substitution fills  and marks a determined lack"
- Derrida, 1976, p. 157
1.0 Introduction
UKCIP's discourse of adaptation has developed over time. This chapter describes 
the dominant ways in which it  has accounted for adaptation between 1997 and 
2003, using a basic genealogical approach that accounts for the major shifts in its 
problematization of adaptation through a sensitivity to power/knowledge. As 
discussed in the Chapters 2 and 3 on theory and methodology, this research 
stems from the contingency of discourse in two senses. This chapter discusses 
one of these, the power/knowledge as a representation of its ‘contextual’ origin, 
such as the institutional and theoretical heritage of a particular discourse, 
demonstrating the immanence of power and knowledge; the gradual addition 
and subtraction of new voices, pressures and knowledges that cause continual 
variations in the (reproduction of the discourse; the double-conditioning of local 
relations of power/knowledge to bigger strategies and vice versa; and the 
tactical polyvalence of discourse where elements can sit somewhat discordantly 
w ith in the same discourse, and can be rearticulated to form a new discourse. In 
regard to these characteristics of power/knowledge, this chapter looks at the 
particularity of the tim ing and combination of actors and institutions involved in
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the production of UKCIP's discourse up until, and including, the production of the 
2003 technical report. W ithin this contingency, it  considers the conceptual 
content of the discourse thus produced.
Following this theoretical approach, the first section, 2.0, begins w ith  the 
first problematization in UKCIPs discourse, which was not about adaptation to 
climate change per se, but identifying climate change impacts. This is significant 
because it  demonstrates how adaptation discourse was shaped by the prior 
problematizations centring on scientific knowledge as a means of knowing 
climate change. This combined w ith an uncomfortable fit w ith  qualitative socio­
economic approaches to foresight, w ith the result that scientific means of 
knowing trumped social means, and a focus on the biophysical trumped the focus 
on the social, as is discussed in 3.0. Section 4.0 discusses the shift from 
accounting for impacts to discussing 'what to do' about them as the point at 
which adaptation was introduced to the discourse, whilst section 5.0 discusses 
the reasons why this took the precise form of a 'risk based approach.' The 
penultimate section considers the establishment of lim its for others forms of 
knowledge in 6.0, and the final section and conclusion, 7.0, discusses how the 
in itia l framing of climate change in terms of biophysical impacts has remained a 
foundational part of UKCIP's discourse, and is linked into a powerful dispositive 
(or institutionalized strategy of power/knowledge effects] and as such has 
retained a central part in the discourse. The discussion of the power/knowledge 
origins of the discourse provides the context for a more in-depth discussion of 
the conceptual content of UKCIP's discourse of adaptation from 2003, which is 
explored in Chapters 5 and 6.
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2.0 "Climate Impacts" and knowing through science, 1997-2003
The immanence of power and knowledge can be observed at a basic level in the 
call by the UK Government for an organization to provide policy support for 
climate change. This was born out of the developing consensus at scientific and 
governmental levels both nationally and internationally that, not only did climate 
change exist, but that given the inertia in the climate system from greenhouse 
gases already in the atmosphere climate impacts would occur regardless of the 
success of the mitigation agenda (Interviewee H 2009, UKCIP Interviewee F 
2009). The discursive and institutional context fundamentally structured the 
discourse that arose in response to the call to tender, as both UKCIP and the UK 
Government were operating w ith in the terms of a global debate which was 
dominated by the role of the IPCC and the particular climate science of Global 
Circulation Models and the climate change scenarios these produced.
This married well w ith the deeply entrenched practice of western 
governments to base policies on the science of nature. For almost two hundred 
years, the right to enact policy had been linked to the supposed objectivity of 
scientific knowledge, using it as the authority on which governments can 
intervene on behalf of their populations (Foucault 2008). This central norm of 
western liberal government produces the cyclical effect of creating a need to 
'know' in order to act, driving a search for the creation of appropriate and 
expedient knowledges for policy (Hansen 2006). As such, a claim to knowledge 
must be established in order to establish a claim to policy intervention. In turn, 
the more scientific and objective this information can be held to be, the greater 
the validity of the policy. In the UK, this is a particularly pronounced cycle, w ith 
little  room for doubt of the science or litigation over its validity, as there is in the
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United States, for example (Jasanoff 2010, JasanofF 2012a]. In turn, this 
knowledge-policy intervention link w ith in the UK is perhaps most pronounced in 
environmental policy, being the 'original' domain of science (Castree and Braun 
2001]. Climate change as a particular area of expertise is no exception 
(Szerszynski 2010, Shackley and Wynne 1995a, Wynne 2010]. As a result, since 
the 1970's the focus in the UK has been on getting the science of climate “right" 
as the basis for policy making (Dessai et al. 2009, Shackley and Wynne 1996, 
Shackley and Wynne 1995b].
However, the global debate over the very existence of climate change -  
driven in the main by climate change scepticism in the US - translated into a 
heavier investment in UK climate science, entrenching Global Circulation Models 
as a foundation for policy. As a result, any policy on climate change, including in 
the UK, had to jump through the hoop of scientific proof existence of the 
phenomenon before policy could move on to deciding what to do about it.
The discursive focus on climate models was thus institutionalized in UK 
government policy prior to the creation of the UK Climate Impacts Programme in 
1997. This model-based discourse of climate change was deeply rooted in the UK 
scientific and policy community and climate models were seen as the primary 
means of identifying climate change and understanding it. Accordingly, national 
climate change scenarios were produced in 1991 and 1996 by the Climate 
Change Impacts Review Group (CCIRG] , a role which was taken on by UKCIP 
after 1997 (Hulme and Dessai 2008]. This placed scientific knowledge at the 
heart of the UK climate change discourse, whose own climate science institutions 
-  such as the Hadley Centre - were amongst the primary contributors to global
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scientific knowledge (Shackley and Wynne 1995a, Hulme and Dessai 2008, 
Hulme and Turnpenny 2004).
In fact, the centrality of climate modelling to the discourse of climate 
change became so established that it was not just the scientific community that 
reproduced it. UKCIP was requested by Government to produce such scenarios, 
and even a decade after the original publication of UKCIP's first scenarios, there 
is still “an expectation [by stakeholders] that in the science, the climate 
information... w ill be more exact" (UKCIP Interviewee D 2009, pp. 8-9). As such, 
it  is clear that government bodies and businesses also assume climate models are 
the way to understand climate change as a biophysical phenomenon. This may be 
partly due to the dominance of the models in the global discourse discussed 
above, but also undoubtedly arises from the established, if  not foundational 
discourse of liberal government which calls on science to establish its claim to 
authority and desire for control, by providing a modern basis of certainty and 
order (Foucault 2008).
It is no surprise then that UKCIP's in itial remit followed this fundamental 
vein of reasoning that it must produce an account of climate change as a 
biophysical phenomenon, and that the content of its initial discourse reflected 
the imbrication of these scientific-governmental power/knowledge relations. In 
the context of a scenario driven epistemology of climate change, preparing for 
climate change meant providing information about the potential biophysical 
impacts of climate change in the UK. The limited work at that time on national or 
local level impacts at that point meant UKCIP saw its primary role as raising 
awareness of climate change impacts: “basically what stakeholders wanted to 
know was 'what's the climate [going to] be like where we are'" (Interviewee H
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2009, p. 2). As a result, from 1997 and certainly 1998, "there was much more of 
an emphasis on the climate data, [so] the first product that UKCIP had was the 
UKCIP '98 Climate Change Scenarios" [Interviewee H 2009, p. 2). In this way it  
was clear that scientific knowledge of biophysical climate impacts was the core 
referent: not having this knowledge was the problem, such that getting or 
creating such knowledge was how climate change was problematized, creating a 
political rationale focussed on creating and disseminating climate change 
impacts information.
These foundations meant that UKCIP was required not only to 
demonstrate the 'proof of climate change to support its policy role, but to 
demonstrate the specifics of the climate change impacts that would occur as a 
result. However, the persistence of the climate change debate in the public arena 
and the relatively recent scientific consensus on the existence of climate change 
meant that the focus on producing knowledge about biophysical climate change 
was also demanded by a political context where climate change was such a 
divisive and distrusted issue. As UKCIP staff often noted in interviews, "our job 
really is to work at the grassroots level and raise awareness of [climate change]... 
[and] get [stakeholders] to realize that actually this is an issue [relative to them]" 
[UKCIP Interviewee F 2009, p. 17).
To do this, UKCIP produced a series of scenarios and a highly detailed 
imaginary of the biophysical climate change threat. The first was UKCIP'98, 
followed by UKCIP'02 and the probabilistic version of these as the UK Climate 
Projections UKCP’09, w ith the next set of scenarios to be delivered after 2012 
once UKCIP's government work programme is finished, called UKCP 'next' 
[Hulme and Dessai 2008). These scenario and projection packages have been
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represented in a variety of forms as tables, charts, graphs, maps, and descriptions 
of climatic changes. The high resolution detail makes these scenarios appear 
much more 'real' than they really are (Hulme and Dessai 2008) and tends to 
obscure as a result the basic uncertainties by making the scenarios so tangible 
and malleable that they can be integrated w ith policies and technologies. The 
latest rendition of the scenarios, UKCP'09 included a 'weather generator' which 
was able to give precise (rather than accurate) results (Dessai and Hulme 2004) 
that were available daily and hourly for 5 kilometres squared areas. These 
results were statistically derived from the climate change scenarios' 25 
kilometres squared projections (Defra 2012a). This wealth of representative 
artefacts functions in the same manner as Benedict Anderson's 'census, map, 
museum' to create not an imagined community, but an imaginary of climate 
change as not only real, but as having a particular reality (Anderson 2006).
The precise imaginary cements knowledge about biophysical impacts as 
the central referent of the problematization of climate change and in doing so 
makes it the focus and the foundation of the responses that follow. This means a 
focus on trying to provide "accurate and precise climate predictions at a range of 
geographical and temporal scales as a key element of decision-making related to 
climate adaptation....[such that] prediction becomes indispensable and indeed a 
prerequisite for, effective adaptation decision-making” (Dessai et al. 2009, p. 67). 
Thus the UK Climate Impacts Programme, as its name implies, focused entirely 
on producing an account of what the impacts of climate change, at a biophysical 
level, might be. As we shall see, this science-policy relationship shaped UKCIP's 
entire problematization of adaptation to climate change.
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The corollary effect of the focus on biophysical knowledge was that the 
policy application was more assumed than developed at UKCIP's end of the 
policy-nexus, 'black-boxing' what was to be done w ith this knowledge. This also 
arose because the UK was not so clearly at the geographical front-line of actually 
occurring impacts as, for example, Bangladesh or many Pacific island states. 
Furthermore, the UK's status as a developed country was seen to remove it  from 
the need for the vulnerability approaches to adaptation utilized in developing 
countries. These approaches focused on adaptive capacity including social 
networks and social capital, rather than relying heavily on technological 
approaches (Fussel 2007, Fussel and Klein 2006, O'Brien and Leichenko 2007, 
Schipper 2006).
The combined effect of the focus on scenarios and impacts and the 
occlusion of explicit discussions of adaptation because the dominant discourse 
had rendered it  taboo (Schipper 2006), led to a discourse that heavily focused on 
impacts, and left a blank space for adaptation as the 'what happens next,' even 
though the very existence of the impacts was presumably based on the rationale 
that it would somehow enable adaptation. Moreover, this meant that an im plicit 
account of adaptation was produced where 'knowing' the effects of climate 
change was assumed to be a sufficient basis for policy responses, that is, 
adaptation. This makes sense w ith in a techno-scientific world-view where 
empirical knowledge is assumed to provide the certainty on which to act (Dessai 
et al. 2009). This problematization was easily maintained w ith in scientific circles, 
but this assumption fell down very quickly in the face of attempts to practically 
apply this knowledge, as became clear in UKCIP's work. This increasingly visible 
gap called for the discourse to evolve. There was also another driver to the
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emergence of adaptation discourse. Various UKCIP staff (Interviewee H 2009, 
UKCIP Interviewee F 2009], as well as secondary researchers (Hulme and 
Turnpenny 2004], have also asserted that it was the nature of climate knowledge 
itself -  its inherent uncertainties -  that triggered the need for adaptation advice.
Nonetheless, the move to focussing on adaptation took some time because 
adaptation was still impolitic. This was reflected in UKCIP's development: “when 
UKCIP was first set up it was ... very much looking at the impacts of climate 
change, and we weren't working on adaptation as such, [as] talk about 
adaptation was seen as being very defeatist [regarding the mitigation agenda]" 
(UKCIP Interviewee F 2009, p. 1]. Practical applications, finding ways to deal 
w ith uncertainty, and accepting the need to engage w ith adaptation explicitly, all 
called for a more explicit account of adaptation itself, resulting in a recalibration 
of UKCIP's problematization of climate change in terms of adaptation, rather than 
scientific accounts of biophyscial impacts.
3.0 Limit points: the inclusion and exclusion of the social
Crucially for the development of the discourse, the production of this information 
was tied to a mandate that it be useful to the stakeholder, helping them to 
understand the science of climate change and apply it  in practice (McKenzie- 
Hedger et al. 2006, Lorenzoni et al. 2007] The stakeholder focus was also 
influenced by the founders of UKCIP in 1997, who drew in particular on the 
Canadian 'Mackenzie Basin Impact Study,' an integrated impact assessment 
published in the same year. The study placed stakeholders in partnerships w ith 
government in order to generate appropriate adaptation strategies (UKCIP
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Interviewee F 2009, Interviewee H 2009, Cohen 1997]. As we shall see, UKCIP's 
adoption of this approach places it  in direct power/knowledge relations w ith 
other 'stakeholder' actors. These relations enable variation and modification in 
what it  problematizes as part of climate change and how. It also introduces a 
social 'subject,' of discourse in addition to the biophysical subject in the ontology 
of the threat. The polyvalence of the way in which this subject is used does not 
appear until the 2003 technical report, but it makes its entry in 1997.
Some social elements of UKCIP's climate change discourse were in itia lly  
introduced through their Socio-economic Scenarios (SES) [UK Climate Impacts 
Programme 2000). The SES were created in 1999, w ith the objective of sketching 
out possible socio-economic futures w ith in which the response to climate change 
would occur, and thereby giving "some kind of insight into how the society would 
deal w ith those changes, and also how vulnerable different types of society 
would be" (UKCIP Interviewee F 2009, p. 6). Thus very early in UKCIP's lifespan 
the concept was introduced of the social, including the economic, began shaping 
the understanding of climate change as a problem, through giving stakeholders a 
chance to understand what constraints they might face in trying to respond to 
the biophysical impacts.
Both forms of scenarios, scientific and socio-economic, painted a range of 
possible futures that enabled stakeholders to position themselves in terms of a 
critical reflection on the possible vulnerability of their property, goods and 
processes. In this sense, both scenarios were part of the same discourse, and 
were in fact characterized as complementary tools for assessing climate impacts, 
w ith the socio-economic scenarios providing a characterization of the context 
w ith in which climate impacts might occur (UKCIP Interviewee F 2009, p. 5).
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However, the different scenario sets arose from very different epistemic 
and ontological bases. Initially, this led to epistemic tensions that meant the two 
scenarios acted as lim it points for each other, in that socio-economic scenarios 
resisted the quantification drive associated w ith the climate scenarios, and in 
doing so introduced a qualitative element to the imaginary of climate change 
impacts. But this created tension over the apparent validity and u tility  of the 
socio-economic scenarios seen from the dominant, quantitative, techno-scientific 
perspective. As a result, there was pressure from the then DETR (Department of 
Environment, Transport and the Regions) to recondition the way in which the 
socio-economic scenarios were used, so that they could be brought into the core 
techno-scientific discourse. In their own terms, this was to "have a set of... 
numbers on socio-economic things that people could plug into their models... 
The difficulty was that the people who actually produced the scenarios felt really 
uncomfortable w ith any of those numbers” (UKCIP Interviewee F 2009, p. 5) as 
the scenarios were created as 'descriptive,' rather than as precise likelihoods. 
These origins meant it was possible for the producers of the SES and UKCIP to 
diverge in how they used the socio-economic scenarios.
It seems that the dominance of the techno-scientific world-view that 
married so well w ith the scenarios began to affect how the SES were judged. 
"[One] of the key criticisms of the scenarios was... the idea was that we would 
have a national set of scenarios and people would scale down for use in their 
region. And the problem [was] for things to have meaning in a particular region 
they need to come from that region, and of course the more regionalized they 
become, the less one can compare them, because the less true they are to the 
national set” (UKCIP Interviewee F 2009, p. 6). This demonstrates a tension
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between having an objective, universal scenario set that could be scaled down to 
the regions, and a bottom-up, emergent scenario set based on regional 
particularities. Moreover, this tension was maintained because of the fact that 
UKCIP was charged w ith ensuring the comparability of regional scenarios so that 
a national picture could be pieced together (Hughes et al. 2009, Gawith et al. 
2008}. This sits more easily w ith a scientific knowledge model, in which the 
future is accounted for as a 'product' against which the actions of the stakeholder 
are assessed and defined, whereas the SES understands the future as arising 
from the processes in which the stakeholder is engaged.
One staff member implied that this same tension was also replicated 
between some users and those who produced the scenarios: "people just found 
them a bit airy-fairy and a b it woolly, and 'they're just kind of descriptions of 
possible futures, but it  doesn't necessarily tell me what to do, and how to do it ’" 
(UKCIP Interviewee F 2009, p. 6}. The critical review of the SES conducted in 
2009 partly attributed this to the w riting of the scenarios themselves. 
Interestingly, whilst both scientific and socio-economic scenarios were 'just' 
scenarios, they were assessed in very different terms -  the scientific scenarios 
were assumed to have more validity on account of having greater precision, 
whereas neither could claim much degree of accuracy (Hughes et al. 2009}. The 
difference was that for the SES this was overt, and part of the methodology, 
rather than assuming it could eventually be minimised (UK Climate Impacts 
Programme 2000}. As a result, the SES were side-lined in the 'evidence-based 
policy' problematization because this limited their usefulness for 'future- 
proofing' adaptation policy. This demonstrates that the dominant ontology was
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objective, product-based knowledge, making it  hard for stakeholders to utilize 
the more explorative approach of the socio-economic scenarios.
This fundamental duality of values associated w ith the physical and social 
sciences was demonstrated by the fact that, whilst the climate scenarios also 
offered a range of possible scenarios, they did not receive the same kind of 
response. "People... find it easier to accept the climate b it of it  in some ways, 
because they're being given maps and data and numbers -  and they go 'oh yeah, I 
can see what it looks like' and then if  you've got a socio-economic scenario that's 
a kind of 'everyone w ill be really selfish and [they] can't really understand what 
that's going to mean..." [Interviewee H 2009, pp. 21-22). In part this was 
encouraged by the statistical downscaling provided by the climate scenarios and 
the highly detailed technical data, whereas the SES were criticized for not being 
'disaggregated enough' or precise enough, and putting the onus on users to do 
this work of imagination, rather than providing it as has been the case w ith  the 
climate scenarios [Hughes et al. 2009).
It also seemed that this conceptual blockage was linked to a linear 
understanding of time and development. "What we found w ith  the socio­
economic scenarios was that, when we tried to use them, let's say w ith a local 
authority planner, we used say 'ok, if  you make a decision about your plan... the 
world could unfold in all these different ways' -the local authority planner would 
actually say 'no, I know what the world's going to look like, we've decided we're 
going to build this many houses here, and our economy is going to grow like that' 
-and they had their own view of how the future was going to pan out. And trying 
to introduce to them a completely different set of futures, um, they couldn't relate 
to them" [Interviewee H 2009, p. 21). The 2009 critique linked this response to
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the lack of detailed SES scenario data and to the absence of a grounding time-line 
or story development that helped transport the stakeholder from the present to 
the potential future, making it  more believable (Hughes et al. 2009). Despite this, 
the decision was made not to change the scenarios, in stark contrast to the vast 
amount of investment in the UKCP09 scenarios and associated tools. As such, the 
failure of the socio-economic scenarios could also be seen as arising because of 
the lack of institutional support for its approach, particularly in order to redress 
the lack of fam iliarity amongst stakeholders in terms of how to use the scenarios. 
Of course the whole principle of the socio-economic scenarios was that they 
broaden horizons by being different to the present day. Therefore social 
identification is necessarily difficult (Glynos and Howarth 2007, Laclau and 
Mouffe 2001). However, to work, they must be made imaginable, in the same way 
that immense effort has been put into climate change scenarios to make them 
imaginable through the tangible graphs, maps, and descriptions applied to the 
potential impacts scenarios.
It should be noted also that UKCIP staff appeared to be generally ill at ease 
w ith the SES -  the vast majority of staff had a background in physical sciences 
and environmental management, which was observed in all interviews w ith 
UKCIP staff bar one recent recruit. This was also observed in the 2004 review of 
UKCIP (ESYS Consulting 2004). One further critique by the 2009 SES report 
concerns the lack of consideration of agency and interaction of different 
relationships of governance and stakeholders w ith in the scenarios and thus the 
lack of 'integrated planning and preparation' being considered in the resulting 
impacts assessments and adaptation policy assessment (Hughes et al. 2009). This
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lack of consideration continues through the 2003 technical report and into 
UKCIP practice through to 2009.
This lack of balance in the provision of expertise, and tools for making the 
social-economic scenarios accessible, imaginable and explorable had very 
significant results, as “there was a ...fairly poor uptake on the scenarios because 
very few of the studies actually had the right expertise to be able to know what to 
do w ith  them” (UKCIP Interviewee F 2009, p. 6). This was particularly clear 
where the scenarios might have made the jump from product to process based 
forms of knowledge. UKCIP Interviewee F noted that UKCIP staff probably 
provided "insufficient guidance for people" so they "used them in the beginning 
of the process to see how things might change, but very few studies actually 
[were] going back to that later [stage]" such that they were used to shape 
'inputs,' but not 'outputs' of the studies (UKCIP Interviewee F 2009, p. 6].
There was not as much investment, culturally and materially, in socio­
economic scenarios, or improving capacity building for social knowledge 
production. Ultimately this epistemic tension began to undermine the validity of 
the SES, and contributed to their general lack of use by UKCIP staff or 
stakeholders (UK Climate Impacts Programme 2000]. That failure became 
particularly significant as the same superficial attempt to re-render qualitative 
social knowledge in quantitative terms was repeated later in the 2003 document. 
The need to connect the two effectively was highlighted after some time, in 2008 
and 2009 (UKCIP Interviewee F 2009, Hughes et al. 2009, UKCIP Interviewee E 
2009).
However, as we shall see in Chapter 7, this tension was never worked out 
w ith in UKCIP's problematization of climate change or climate change adaptation.
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Instead, epistemic tension between using the SES as they were intended and the 
clearly dominant scientific and product based epistemology was resolved in 
favour of the later, and in practice resulted in the abandonment of the socio­
economic scenarios, as their real epistemic power was sapped by placing them in 
an inappropriate conceptual context. There are crucial links here to critiques of 
'impact assessment' modes of adaptation which focus on providing information 
on the climate but not on adaptive capacity (Pelling 2011, Burton et al. 2002), 
and are related in turn to the modernist division between nature and culture, and 
the associated account of climate change as somehow external to society [Head 
2010, Castree and Braun 2001, Fussel and Klein 2006). As we shall see, the 
failure of the socio-economic scenarios presaged the absence of an explicit 
engagement w ith the social, for example through a vulnerability-approach, in 
UKCIP's subsequent development of an explicit account of adaptation.
4.0 The shift from impacts to adaptation
Fussel and Klein [2006) have discussed the shift from impact assessments which 
are science-driven, biophysical accounts of climate change to vulnerability-based 
assessments which increase the visib ility of non-climatic stressors. This section 
discusses the way in which UKCIP's climate change discourse began to shift away 
from seeing adaptation as being im plicitly contained in any response, towards 
the belief that adaptation itself required a far more explicit account of the threat 
through scientific knowledge, specifically as climate change scenarios. There 
appear to be two reasons why this shift occurred, and adaptation became an 
increasingly explicit focus of UKCIP's discourse.
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First, UKCIP's engagement w ith stakeholders in itia lly  meant that having 
raised awareness of how climate change might affect stakeholders, UKCIP "then 
[found itself] leaving it up to [the stakeholders] to th ink about what they wanted 
to do" [UKCIP Interviewee F 2009, p. 1). However, "as soon as ...people found 
that they were impacted they wanted to know 'well, what do we do?' [...] So our 
agenda quickly broadened to start to address w ith stakeholders, at their request, 
to try  and understand adaptation and how they deal w ith the impacts" [UKCIP 
Interviewee D 2009, p. 2). As a result, UKCIP "realised... there was more to it than 
just giving [stakeholders] climate data, you had to show them how to use it 
appropriately" [UKCIP Interviewee F 2009, p. 1). This caused a change in UKCIP's 
definition of its role from "understanding how climate might change to what sort 
of impact that might have... [to taking] on board the idea of engaging w ith 
stakeholders, in order to start them down that process of adaptation shall we say, 
and that tends to be much more the focus now" [UKCIP Interviewee A 2009, pp. 
12-13).
The second reason for the shift to adaptation was that it became a 
legitimate object of discourse at the international level, when it  was recognized 
as necessary because of climate change inertia. This released it from the 
accusation of defeatism that had plagued adaptation in the context of the 
UNFCCC negotiations on mitigation [Fussel 2007, Fussel and Klein 2006). In 
addition, UKCIP also maintained that mitigation and adaptation need not be 
mutually exclusive activities [UKCIP Interviewee F 2009). As such, adaptation 
was introduced into discourses of climate change as a legitimate and necessary 
activity and the adaptation report was requested in 2001 as a result [Willows 
and Connell 2003).
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Having accepted the reproblematization of climate change where 
adaptation is the response to climate change impacts information, the precise 
nature of the account of adaptation had to be formulated. The next section 
focuses on how UKCIP responded to this, namely through the 'risk framework' of 
the 2003 technical report Climate Adaptation: risk, uncertainty and decision­
making [Willows and Connell 2003) that is the focus of the next section.
5.0 The 2003 'Technical Report' and the 'risk-based approach'
In the previous section, it  was established that there was a shift from simply 
providing climate impacts information to the recognition of a need for 
substantive guidance on how to use this to produce an adaptation strategy. The 
climate scenarios that UKCIP had previously used, and indeed the socio­
economic scenarios, insofar as they were meaningfully incorporated, were not 
trumped but rather made useable through an over-arching framework. As one of 
the report's authors put i t "... we realised actually there was more to it  than just 
giving them climate data, you had to show them how to use it appropriately 
which is where the risk framework came in” [UKCIP Interviewee F 2009, p. 4).
However, the call for the risk framework itself did not arise from the 
stakeholders, but rather from discussion between UKCIP and the government 
department that commissioned it [Willows and Connell 2003, Interviewee H 
2009), the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions [DETR), 
which later became the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
[Defra). It seems that in the first instance, a large part of the drive for a risk- 
based approach arose from the general conceptual role that risk had begun to
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take in governance circles and became part of UKCIP's discourse through an 
institutional power/knowledge relation as "part of the brief... and that goes w ith 
the wider government agenda to improve risk-based decision-making" 
(Interviewee C 2009, p. 3). Indeed, this approach was specifically represented 
through the Cabinet Office's Strategy Unit report in 2002 (Cabinet Office Strategy 
Unit 2002] which is noted in UKCIP's 2003 technical report as a key reason for 
their adopting that approach. However, the risk approach has a significant 
precedent environmental risk assessment, represented specifically through 
another key background document: Guidelines fo r Environmental Risk Assessment 
and Management, published in 2000 by DETR, the parent department of UKCIP 
and the Environment Agency in which the primary author was employed. This 
document, and its role in providing conceptual heritage, is directly referenced on 
pages 46 and 47 of the risk framework, in the background section to 'Risk and 
Uncertainty’. It was seen as connected to a hazards approach (Interviewee H 
2009) and specifically notes the DETR's use of tiered approaches and conceptual 
models for the process of risk assessment, which fundamentally shape the risk 
framework's own approach, as we shall see in chapter 5.
It is worth noting here that the move to risk did not emerge from the 
international climate change discourse itself. Rather, it was the application of an 
existing epistemology and a form of governance to a new problem. The following 
quote is repeated in full to demonstrate this confluence of the problem w ith a 
particular trend of knowledge making, underlined for emphasis:
"In terms of their approach it  was... definitely about the notion of risk- 
based decision-making was growing in terms of its importance w ith in the 
environment agency, and w ith in Defra. And there were quite a lot of
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reasons for that: evidence-based policy, risk-based decision making [...] 
And so, what we were trying to do is we were trying to say 'OK, there is 
this strange thing called climate change, and then there is this move 
towards risk-based decision making, let's bring those two things together, 
and let's try  and make climate change -what used to be called 'climate 
change impact assessment,' let's make it  -let's talk about 'risk 
assessment.' And so, it's changing the emphasis..." (Interviewee C 2009, p.
4)
A previous institutional product of this conceptual trend was the 
Environment Agency's National Centre fo r Risk Analysis and Options Appraisal, 
the "brand new sparkly centre” to which the work of w riting the report for UKCIP 
was sent at the time (Interviewee C 2009, p. 3]. So as it  was a figure at the Centre 
who became the report's lead author it  was clear that "there must have been 
some discussion at some level, at which it  was agreed that the Agency would 
provide expertise in risk to UKCIP and to Defra to do something in this area," 
although the author was unable to shed light on "exactly where" that decision 
was made (Interviewee C 2009, p. 3}. However, this flowed from the consensus at 
the time that the "paradigm for making uncertain decisions is risk based, so it  
was about trying to make it clear that climate change was an issue that had to be 
addressed in a risk based way" (Interviewee C 2009, p. 4).
Of course, the institutional situation of the technical report meant that the 
expertise was certainly in risk-based approaches. Placing the author as 
"effectively managing the project" where "most of the resourcing came from... my 
time -  and some of the other people in the agency, [as well as] from UKCIP...." 
(Interviewee C 2009, p. 1] of course created a balance of expertise that shaped
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the conceptual content of the report that emerged. As the main UKCIP author on 
the report noted, the EA thus provided “the main brain behind this report" and 
the "genesis of the thinking and the intellectual capacity really came from 
[there]" [Interviewee H 2009, p. 5].
In the interviews, it appeared that there wasn't really an alternative 
'paradigm' that might have been considered by the authors. Risk simply was seen 
as the 'rational,' and 'scientific' approach that provided the necessary evidence 
base for policy. There was no identification of risk as avoiding process, or 
vulnerability concerns, as discussed in Chapter 2. When asked in interview 
whether risk would be 'enough' to deal w ith climate change, there was little  
suggestion of an acceptable alternative or supplement, which as we shall see, 
varied quite dramatically w ith those actually working in in UKCIP in 2009. This 
may have been the result of unclear interview techniques failing to distinguish 
between a risk approach and its association w ith outcome based knowledge to 
the exclusion of process based knowledge. However, one author proffered no 
supplementary mode, and the other seemed naturally to assume the only 
alternative to a risk-based approach was an 'irrational' or ‘faith-based decision' 
[Interviewee C 2009).
The establishment of evidence in order to create certainty for policy can 
be approached through various different forms, but when it comes to the use of 
science, the very powerful imbrication of modern western epistemology and 
ontology comes into play. In the context of UKCIP, the rendition of 'policy' 
through a Technical Report as a genre both represents and recreates this 
fundamental alliance that draws on scientific knowledge from 'official' and 'peer- 
reviewed' sources and studies in order to use this authority to make its own
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policy discourse also authoritative. Moreover, such entextualisation of authority 
has dispositive effects, in that policy, as a likewise normatively 'authoritative' 
voice gives credence to the institutions on which it draws, creating a cycle of 
validity [Hansen 2006). That the appeal to science was assumed to be the only 
means of accessing knowledge and authority is made clear in the following 
quote:
“The report needed to have credibility w ith  the... climate change 
community, the science community, so it  ... had to have a rational 
approach to decision-making [...] we live in a highly technical, northern 
European, country that prizes engineers [...] so you couldn't write a report 
that... didn't have a sort of scientifically justified approach to decision 
making." [Interviewee C 2009, p. 4)
This quote sets up risk w ith in a modernist, techno-scientific framing, 
creating a political rationale engineered solutions, and outcome based 
knowledge. Indeed, the overt reference to the preference for engineered 
solutions perhaps can be taken at a more fundamental conceptual level as 
shorthand for the dominant epistemology of the problematization in the report. 
What matters here is not so much the power-relations that defined the project 
brief or landed it  w ith this particular centre, but that the resulting discourse was 
contingent upon this, and thus the techno-scientific, risk-based approach can be 
seen as a contingent conceptualization of adaptation, which otherwise may have 
been very different, or at least broader.
In itia lly this research was investigated under the assumption the Climate 
Adaptation: risk, uncertainty and decision-making document was about 
adaptation, and would have adaptation as its core referent. However, this
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demonstrates that at the conceptual level adaptation was tagged onto the need 
emerging from the scenarios and impact assessments, of 'what to do next.' Thus 
we see that the pre-adaptation rationale of knowing scientifically was really the 
basis of the meaning of adaptation as it  developed at UKCIP, w ith risk becoming 
the central means of knowing possible impacts. The links between risk as a 
means of knowing impacts and what to do about them as a form of adaptation 
are forged in the document, but they do not emerge out of a deeper consideration 
of any normative or strategic analysis of the concept of adaptation as a distinct 
entity. In fact, one publicly available draft of the document created in the later 
stages of the framework's development, had adaptation as its title  on the first 
page, but in all the 'header' sections of the document was referred to as 
"Guidance on handling risk and uncertainty in decision-making for climate 
change” (Willows et al. 2003b). Even as an editorial slight of hand, this 
demonstrates the conceptual origins of the document came straight out of a risk 
management agenda, where this pre-formed problematization was coupled to 
adaptaiton, rather than adaptation itself being the core referent, developed in its 
own right, and generating a risk approach as a result. This weak origin of 
adaptation seems to result in the weak positioning of the concept of adaptation 
and its definition in the final report, which w ill be discussed in the following two 
chapters.
There are two key moments to the articulation of adaptation that results. 
First is the centrality of impacts and scenarios to adaptation. Indeed, adaptation 
is here premised on their use. Second, these impacts and scenarios are rendered 
useable and amenable to adaptation through a 'risk framework,' placing risk as 
the key referent of adaptation. In this respect, it is also significant that the
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document is then almost exclusively referred to as 'the risk-framework' by UKCIP 
staff in interviews, making it  very clear that this is its fundamental approach to 
adaptation.
6.0 Ontology and its limit points: scenarios, space and agency
The brief for w riting the 2003 Technical Report clearly asked for a risk-based 
approach, but what the object of risk-based knowledge was taken to be, and who 
the actors were, and what agency they had, also started to structure the 
problematization. One element that did shape UKCIP and Defra's 
problematization of adaptation was the demand that the report create a tool 
useful to UKCIP's stakeholders. This was a very open demand, and there was a 
long period of problem-formation between the authors of the report. The result 
was not reducible to the environment agency's expertise at the outset of the 
project. As one key report author noted:
"...it would have been quite easy to have simply gone to the academic 
literature and ... to the climate change science community, and draw on 
what they wanted, but Defra I think, perhaps in their wisdom actually, I 
mean it  was -they didn't know what they wanted, but what they said was 
'we want something that w ill be useful to all decision makers in the 
UK'[...] and that was quite a challenge but I did take that very much to 
heart" (Interviewee C 2009, p. 2].
Defra’s brief said who the report should be written for, and also gave a 
mode for its discourse: "Defra did say they didn't want anything quantitative 
w ith numbers [...] I th ink this was partly their sort of focus on SMEs, farmers, so
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they wanted something that was accessible” (Interviewee C 2009, p. 4). It is clear 
however that the characteristics of these actors themselves did not really shape 
the problematization of climate change adaptation, but rather its mode of 
delivery:
"I th ink they wanted something that was practical and not theoretical, um, 
so although we talk about quantitative risk assessment and we y'know 
reference some of the methodologies that one would use, we took the [...] 
tiered approach where you start w ith  sort of very qualitative, much more 
judgmental approaches and then you go on to sort of quantitative, 
detailed modelling of - i t  depends on how big a decision it  is, and whether 
you've got the information, all those sorts of things" (Interviewee C 2009, 
p. 4}.
As such the problematization's epistemology was still very much based on a risk 
approach, which as we shall see focuses on the decisions to be made but in doing 
so tends to obscure the social aspects of the actors who are actually doing the 
decision-making. However, this reservation of a named space for the decision­
maker nonetheless ensures a problematization of climate change from their 
perspective or capacity as actors. As such it creates a 'social' space for the 
problematization of climate change. What constituted a 'decision-maker' as 
understood by the report authors w ill be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.
This entry point into the consideration of the social might have 
significantly shaped the degree of overt engagement w ith the social but for two 
factors. First the perceived lack of clarity in the problem definition at UKCIP and 
Defra's end left the substantive conceptualization of the project open to largely
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scientific-based influence. However, this did not result in a simple co-option of 
existing knowledge to a new application.
"[It] was [a] very poorly framed as a problem, so [... ] there was a sort of 
period of almost four years where we tried to understand what it was that 
was required by Defra, by UKCIP, um, who it  was for, and it  -then what it 
would look like. ... so it  was quite ... a difficult process" (Interviewee C 
2009, p. 1).
Nonetheless there was an absence of input at the user-based, process based and 
social end of the equation.
This absence of the social was compounded by a second factor, which was 
the lim ited engagement of the risk-management consultancy in the 
particularities of risk management in a climate change context. As one author 
noted "they thought it  was all a b it theoretical and, and too in the future [...] so 
they weren't terrib ly engaged," resulting in a "[very poor] review of the climate 
adaptation literature, and analysing its risk based context" (Interviewee C 2009, 
p. 1). This was the only point at which social expertise of any kind was deployed, 
and the lack of real engagement here by the specialists brought in to deal w ith 
the actual risk-management processes clearly limited how much it played a role 
in the final document.
However, this was in part a symptom of a more fundamental reservation 
at the leadership of the project w ith in UKCIP, which was also seeking to act 
w ith in a political and discursive context in which it was still felt necessary to 
make a case for climate impacts themselves. As such, "...one of the things we got 
criticized ... for [was] because we emphasised that [...] social attitudes w ill 
change and economics w ill change and all these things actually might be more
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important for what you're trying to achieve than climate change. That was seen 
as -as sort of down-playing the importance of climate [and therefore as] a real 
black mark” (Interviewee C 2009, p. 26]. As the quote indicates, this was a bone 
of contention in the development of the report. The key report authors felt 
strongly this was a necessary contextualisation of the problem, "from day one, 
there was this recognition that, and again it was IPCC driven, that ... it's not just 
climate that's changing but everything else is changing as well," (Interviewee H 
2009, p. 20]. In this way, the political agenda to ensure that climate change was 
recognized as a 'real' risk meant not only that other sources of risk were 
occluded, and this exclusion fundamentally shaped the conceptualization of 
adaptation itself by lim iting the account of the situatedness of climate impacts, 
and therefore the nature of the threat to which adaptation responded.
An indication of this was that the Socio-economic Scenarios were left 
tangential to the report, and their epistemology and ontology were not utilized or 
integrated into its core problematization. The contradiction w ith in the following 
statement makes this clear: "you can't think about [climate risk] w ithout thinking 
about [other sources of risk]," but this "didn't really change our view of how we 
should write this framework. This framework was [...] trying to draw on the best 
knowledge about risk-based decision-making. It wasn't worrying itself about 
what society might look like in the future" (Interviewee H 2009, p. 20].
The problematization of climate adaptation was thus clearly divorced 
from an analysis of the social as part of the object of knowledge. In this sense the 
SES limited the account of the social to an outcome. Yet in representing the social 
in a supposedly sufficient that was determined to be largely irrelevant to the 
problematization of climate change responses, the SES acted as a lim it point that
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prevented further investigation into how 'the social' might affect the 
problematization of climate change. This affected in turn the discursive terrain 
from which the problematization of adaptation was formed.
7.0 Epistemology: Knowing and Time
The corollary question to 'what' and 'who' were understood to be adapting to 
climate change is 'why' and 'how' such adaptation is presumed to take place. How 
both 'why' and 'how' are perceived in the report deeply structure the framing of 
risk knowledge as both a problem and solution. As discussed above, the role of 
the 'stakeholder' as a decision-maker was crucial, but the kinds of decision they 
might make had a particular imaginary. This is demonstrated by the following 
quotes, where planning, particularly for long term decisions, was of foremost 
concern to the authors:
"I th ink we were clear... that the people who need to concern themselves 
about climate change are people building things that are [going to] exist 
for a long time, people who are in planning and in theory therefore are 
influencing those long-term decisions, so it's really aimed at people who 
are making long term decisions, that if  you make them wrongly then 
you’ve backed yourself into a corner." [Interviewee H 2009, p. 12)
"...a short term decision would start today. I would describe a long term 
decision as being... twenty years or longer." [Interviewee H 2009, p. 12)
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In answer to a question regarding climate shocks such as rapid sea level rise, it 
became clear that the planning element was essential:
"Well, there would be adaptation, because sea level rise, and London 
would be flooded, and people would have to move houses, and the 
economy would collapse, asset prices would collapse and there'd be a 
shortage of money [short laugh] just like today. Um, but that we'd be 
managing in a responsive mode, rather than adapting. It wouldn't be 
proactive adaptation it would be forced adaptation.” (Interviewee C 2009, 
p. 23)
This posits an absolutely critical distinction between 'responsive mode' and 
'adapting.' Although the author also categorizes responsive mode as 'forced 
adaptation, as opposed to 'proactive adaptation,' the exclusion of this kind of 
scenario from shaping the report made it clear that the climate science was seen 
as allowing for proactive adaptation, which formed the substantive 
understanding of what adaptation was. In other words, adaptation was 
problematized as a planned, long-term decision, where the emphasis was on 
understanding biophysical climate risk preemptively.
8.0 Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated some of the ways in which particular 
institutional, political, and educational relations were immanent to the kind of 
discourse about climate change that was produced. As part of this, this chapter 
has traced the major developments in UKCIP's discourse that led to the decision 
to problematize adaptation more directly, specifically in terms of risk assessment
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and risk management However, it has also shown the strong basis of the 
discourse in an institutional, educational and cultural basis that assumed the 
primacy of a techno-scientific and specifically risk-management approach.
This coupled w ith the political necessity of justifying UKCIP's existence 
and the cause of climate change to a still dubious public, to set the scene for the 
2003 technical report accounting for climate impacts in terms of biophysical 
effects, and therefore only responding to the social in a very lim ited fashion. In 
fact, even as UKCIP's agenda has moved on to a more in-depth engagement w ith 
adaptation itself, the sense of a need to make a 'case' for climate change is still a 
central part of their presentation of climate change as a problem, which requires 
the use of climate change scenarios to provide an account of climate change 
impacts. However, as we shall see in the next chapter, this is now connected to a 
broader problematization of climate change adaptation, although the latter still 
assumes the use of climate scenarios.
The failure of the Socio-Economic Scenarios to make an impact on UKCIP's 
discourse of adaptation either alone or w ith in the 2003 report also meant that 
'the social' as an object and subject remained largely excluded from UKCIP's 
problematization of adaptation. As such, it is clear that this genealogy of 
adaptation which arose from the biophysical impact scenarios shaped the 
imaginary of what might be included in UKCIP's 2003 account of adaptation 
itself, particularly in terms of the inclusion of a product oriented scientific 
account and the exclusion of a process based social account of climate change as 
a problem.
The power/knowledge relations traced here created a particular 
conceptual topography for the problematization of adaption that was crystalized
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in 2003 through the 'risk framework.' That topography emerges along two key 
axes of analysis which w ill be picked up in the next two chapters. Both connect to 
the fact that the core epistemology of the problematization is risk-based. The first 
axis is epistemological: it accounts for the understanding of time and knowledge, 
or how actions and decisions are made in the context of uncertainty, which as we 
see here has its origins in prescient and preemptive environmental management, 
which is discussed next in Chapter 5. The second is ontological: it  considers the 
overt account of the social, biophysical and material elements articulated into the 
problematization in Chapter 6. As both the following chapters w ill demonstrate, 
the introduction of the risk-based approach introduces contextual social aspects 
to both the ontological and epistemic bases. This results in the presence of 
supplementary moments that expand the problematization of adaptation beyond 
its impacts origins, but also threaten its coherence at a conceptual level.
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Chapter 5: The epistemology of the "risk-framework" and the 
Problematization of Adaptation
1.0 Introduction
The previous chapter discussed the development of a need to provide guidance 
on what to do w ith climate change scenario and impacts information, and the 
simultaneous normalization of adaptation as a legitimate goal at an international 
level. Together, these prompted UKCIP to develop its own explicit approach to 
adaptation to climate change. However, this same genealogy foregrounded 
scientific knowledge of the biophysical impacts of climate change, and excluded 
or subsumed social forms of knowing into a quantitative, scientific epistemology, 
that coupled w ith a modernist ontology of individualist, rational man. As we shall 
see, the dominance of the techno-scientific frame echoes through the UKCIP's 
problematization of adaptation.
This chapter and the next seek to establish an account of that 
problematization between 2003 and 2009. They identify a problematization of 
adaptation, as risk-based decision-making that is centred on a techno-scientific 
ontology and epistemology. However, this is found to have a series of 
supplementary moments, which add to, but also disrupt, its conceptual cohesion. 
This chapter discusses the epistemology of the 'core' techno-scientific 
problematization. It focuses on the relationship between knowing and time, and 
knowing and uncertainty, to identify how this shapes the political rationale of 
adaptation. It also discusses several epistemic supplementary moments, which
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generally arise from more qualitative and socially oriented forms of knowledge, 
and their implications for the stability of the articulation of the political rationale. 
Chapter 6 w ill follow the same structure of core and supplement w ith regard to 
the ontological moments in the problematization. Chapter 7 w ill then discuss in 
depth the actual and potential development of these supplementary moments.
This analysis of UKCIP's problematization of adaptation uses as its basis 
the technical report, Climate Adaptation: risk, uncertainty and decision-making 
(Willows and Connell 2003]. As explained in Chapter 3, this report framed 
UKCIP's approach from 2003 until 2009, when the interviews and observations 
were carried out. Material from the discourse analysis of this report and the 
interviews and observations is used illustratively: focusing in particular on 
moments that best represent central and frequently reiterated articulations, 
either as connections or lim it points. Power/knowledge relations w ill also be 
discussed where they make these conceptual configurations or alterations in 
those configurations clearer. In the sections that follow, UKCIP's specific 
discourse w ill first be related in emic terms, using its own phrasing, which w ill 
then be unpicked using discourse analysis techniques in order to account in etic 
terms for its problematization of adaptation.
2.0 The (re)problematization of adaptation: first steps
2.1 Genre, macro-structure and Policy narrative: the establishment of the 
problematization of adaptation
Before looking into UKCIP's 2003 report in detail, an overview of how it 
functions as both a policy document and technical report w ill help to identify
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how it is able to effect a problematization of adaptation. At the level of practice, 
policies simply provide a mode of being, and so must provide a clear account of 
how to act and behave if  they are to be easily adopted [Roe 1994, pp. 62-63). 
However, this mode of being itself, and the creation of interventions on its behalf, 
must somehow be made convincing. Some of this is overt, appealing to extant 
identities of the subject (Glynos and Howarth 2007, Laclau and Mouffe 2001). 
But this meaning in itself is established through its specific linguistic 
configuration, the articulation of rhetorical structure, ranging from appeals to 
external authorities to minute operations such as presuppositions or 
exemplarity.
Each genre has its own specific "modalities of authority" that draw on 
particular on "knowledge, power and narrative techniques" (Hansen 2006). This 
section w ill cover the initial rhetorical moves that establish a core articulation 
between adaptation, climate change, and uncertainty w ith risk and decision­
making. This demonstrates that these connections are not objective realities 
simply revealed by science, but through the contingent power/knowledge 
relations established in chapter 4 and re-enacted and resolved here in linguistic 
practices that articulate these different concepts and bodies of knowledge into a 
single account of adaptation to climate change.
UKCIP's 2003 technical report has some hallmarks of a policy paper, 
particularly in its introductory sections of the Forewords, the Executive 
Summary, and the 'Context' section (See Willows and Connell 2003, pp. V-VIII; p.
3). Policy documents tend to utilize a persuasive mode, which is not surprising if  
we consider that a policy is almost by definition an active intervention into the 
ordering of life designed to change the status quo or maintain it  against
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perceived threats (Roe 1994, Hansen 2006). The very act of policy-making in- 
itself already assumes contestation over the form of life and this requires it  in 
some way to justify its existence or its intervention. As such, the linguistic 
techniques used in policy pronouncements and papers not only articulate certain 
elements, but do this in a manner that establishes a form of justification, either 
through rhetorical structure through including elements in an order that 
supports their claim, or through utilizing emotive language that appeals at a 
basic level to fear or hope but also to 'discomfort' and the desire for 'comfort' to 
generate fantasmatic identification w ith its descriptions (Glynos and Howarth 
2007, Hansen 2006).
Several fundamental articulations in the opening pages of the 2003 report 
create a basic problematization of adaptation by connecting the concepts, or 
'elements,' of climate change to uncertainty; uncertainty to risk; and risk to 
decision-making. This chain of articulations ultimately links climate change and 
decision-making to provide a particular problematization of adaptation that 
entails a particular epistemology and ontology. The clearest of these moments 
occurs in the title  of the report itself, which is "Climate Adaptation: risk, 
uncertainty and decision-making." Here, the colon has a syntactic descriptive 
function, where the list that follows it indicates the elements in its set thare 
equivalent to the first term, 'adaptation'. This implies that the concepts of 'risk' 
and 'uncertainty' and 'decision-making' as constituting in full the concept of 
'Climate Adaptation' and of climate adaptation as reducible, or limited to, those 
terms.
Two more substantive narrative accounts follow this basic articulatory 
moment: the foreword and the introductory section labelled 'Context'. The
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foreword explicitly confers approval and authority on the report as a whole, from 
Barbara Young as the head of the Environment Agency, who implies the account 
of adaptation is sufficient and appropriate by referring to its actionability for 
policy and planning, in a manner that emulates existing approaches and 
successes of the Environment Agency, thereby conferring validity and reliability 
to the new report. This is replicated in terms of academic authority through the 
foreword provided by Saleemul Huq and Ian Burton (Willows and Connell 2003, 
foreword}, both scholars of environment w ith development and meteorological 
science respectively, w ith connections to the IPCC. As such they appeal to 
scientists and government alike and serve to reinforce the validity of the each 
w ith the other.
A more substantive problematization of adaptation appears first in the 
'Context' section. This appears in an initial statement that there is certainty that 
climate change is happening, but that "the exact extent and nature of changes in 
our climate remains uncertain” (Willows and Connell 2003, p. 3}. This is 
immediately followed by the claim that "[cjlimate therefore represents a 
changing source of risk. Climate adaptation is about recognizing these altered 
risks, and taking decisions...” The use of the word 'therefore' links the commonly 
accepted claim that climate change is a source of uncertainty to the 
presupposition that climate is a source of risk. In doing so it implies that climate 
uncertainty is necessarily and fully accounted for by the trope of 'risk'. This 
authoritative use of 'therefore' works to obscure the fact that this presupposition 
is not actually justified in the document, making risk appear as the natural and 
sufficient way to understand the uncertainty of climate change. Furthermore, 
characterizing climate change only in terms of uncertainty means that risk also
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appears as sufficient, which would not be the case where climate change to be 
characterized also in terms of losses that would require consideration of 
environmental justice, for example.
The authoritative mode continues for the rest of the sentence: "Climate 
adaptation is about recognizing these altered risks, and taking decisions that 
allow the likely impacts to be reduced or managed, and the opportunities to be 
exploited” [ibid., p. 3} The word 'recognising' implies that this knowledge is 
objective, established, and easy to access and interpret, requiring only to be 
recognised, rather than uncovered, developed, or produced. The use of the 
comma and word 'and' in "and taking decisions" link this clear account of risk as 
the problem w ith an apparently simple follow-on step to 'decisions' as the 
solution. The simplicity of this transition from problem to solution, coupled w ith 
"likely impacts" and the terms 'reduced' and 'managed,' which are at once both 
ameliorative of the level of threat and technical, all imply that the risks are 
knowable. This impression is also set up by the phrase 'altered risks,' which 
implies minimal and therefore accessible knowledge about the risks.
Several techniques of policy genre facilitate the persuasive power of the 
discourse thus produced. First, these representations use a lexis or word choice 
that is non-technical, making it  easily accessible, coupled w ith an authoritative 
mode to produce an easily absorbed and convincing account. This is also effected 
at a rhetorical level through the articulation of the epistemology of risk w ith 
practices of decision-making through the construction of a chronological 
narrative that justifies these in terms of the past/problem as increased 
uncertainty, the present/solution as the application of risk and decisions as 
ensuring a particular future/resolution through the success of these measures
164
(Wodak and Meyer 2001, Roe 1994]. Implicit in this is the promise of outcomes 
that are accounted for or identified w ith as 'good' or 'just,' whereas not following 
the technical advice in the report im plicitly entails negative outcomes. This 
situates the reader by articulating them "with a particular temporal identity 
through themes of repetition, progress, transformation, backwardness or 
development” (Hansen 2006, p. 7); positioning of the reader w ith in a narrative of 
the problem of climate change uncertainty being resolved through basing 
decisions on risk analysis.
In all of this, adaptation is simply articulated in at the sentence level, w ith 
no deeper analysis of: what does it mean to adapt or be adaptable? It should be 
noted here that in the draft version of the report (Willows et al. 2003b], the 
articulation of risk and decision-making as the core referents of the 
problematization is even clearer; the report is headed "Guidance on Decision- 
Making" w ith no reference to adaptation. In part, the policy genre and narrative 
work so effectively in establishing a narrative of adaptation because they allow 
'risk' and 'decisions' to function as a nominalization. That is, the varied and 
complex technical process represented by each term is covered by a proper 
noun, allowing it to be precisely represented whilst also remaining im plicit or 
vague in meaning (Fairclough 2000, pp. 162-3]. This enables an authoritative 
mode that allows the narrative to appear full and accurate because of, rather 
than despite, the lack of substantive explanation.
That the foundational narrative appears internally cohesive, yet is also 
relatively simple and easy to remember combines w ith the fact that it  is 
established so early in the document that it obscures the possibility of a critical 
reading As such, it positions the reader as more likely to accept the
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problematization that is based on this narrative [Johnstone 2008] even before 
they engage w ith the technical detail of the Report and the actual practices it  
describes. Crucially, this makes the technical detail that follows not only easier to 
accept as valid, even where these articulations may be awkward or incomplete. It 
also avoids questions about the exclusion of particular content, because the 
entire frame and lim it of what is relevant has already been established. In this 
way, policy narratives are able to “underwrite and stabilize the assumptions for 
decision making in the face of high uncertainty, complexity, and polarization" 
[Roe 1994, p. 2] to the point that even though they may be "[recognizably] 
representationally inaccurate" they can "still persist, indeed thrive" [Roe 1994, 
pp. 50-1].
Once these situating and justificatory aspects are established, the report 
places itself in two major sections. The first, "Part 1" is most clearly a technical 
report in the sense of creating a precise sequence of procedures and list of 
techniques enabling the direct intervention into the ordering of life. In keeping 
w ith it genre, it has less reliance on narrative positioning or emotive language, 
but more recourse to 'scientized' and 'rationalized' facts and models, which 
provide authority for the practices described. This section combines this w ith an 
educative mode, which at a structural level takes the place of the narrative. This 
is particularly visible in the use of visual cues such as 'summary boxes' of "Key 
Questions for Decision-makers," see for example, [Willows and Connell 2003, p. 
13]. Indeed one of the core authors of the report noted that: "The whole point/a 
big point of how the report was written was to make it  accessible -  this means 
there was a need for concise ideas -  so: boxes" [Interviewee H 2009, p. 3].
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However, this also performs far more fundamental onto-political work. In 
Fairclough's interpretation of a UK Government consultation, he notes that the 
use of these summary boxes appear to be 'reader-friendly' but by the same 
measure necessarily enact “strong unilateral control of the text” (Fairclough 
2000, p. 136). Their sim ilarity w ith the visual lay out of educational textbooks 
"construct the author... as the knowledgeable teacher, and the reader as the 
learner," and also bear a sim ilarity to advertising layouts that have the function 
of reinforcing a message in a clear but also "promotional" manner (Fairclough 
2000, p. 137). This presentational device helps the report to institute its 
problematization w ithout having to justify its account of reality, and to direct its 
audience by appearing educative rather than invasive or controlling.
There are also icons in Part 1 that link to Part 2, and serve "as links to 
deeper theory because [the report] had to be 'robust'" (Interviewee H 2009, p. 6). 
This is because "Part 2," covers all of the bases of the technical report in a more 
academic fashion. Here a more educative mode is assumed, but it  is often 
combined w ith a more explorative approach that creates greater epistemic 
openness. This means that the justification of part one is signalled but deferred 
through these icons; rather than building up to a concrete assessment w ith a 
research report first and recommendations arising from that, we instead see a 
higher degree of epistemic confidence and less detail at the beginning of the 
document, replaced gradually by a higher degree of detail and less epistemic and 
ontological confidence, or rather, greater epistemic openness, towards the end. 
This positioning and balance helps ensure that the problematization of 
adaptation appears to be very solid and straightforward, w ith the academic 
account itself appearing supplementary (in a subsidiary sense), appearing as an
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additional but not essential background report to Part 1. Interestingly, in the 
draft version (Willows et al. 2003b), the order was the reverse, but was changed 
by UKCIP management in order to ensure the report functioned as the 
straightforward guide requested by stakeholders (Interviewee C 2009, 
Interviewee H 2009), which results in a much more closed problematization.
To summarise, in emic terms the narrative that has established the core 
problematization of climate change adaptation is this: Climate Change is a threat, 
characterized by uncertainty; Uncertainty is knowable through risk, and so we 
need to understand climate change in terms of risk; This knowledge w ill enable 
us to make the best decisions about what to do in response. Central to this core 
problematization is an epistemology of climate change impacts based on risk, 
and an ontology that assumes these risks can be known and acted upon. This 
entails a political rationale and resultant practices built on trying to identify risk 
in order to make decisions. Adaptation is decision-making based on this 
assessment of risk, although how that assessment is made, and how decisions 
can be based on it is only gradually revealed throughout the document, leaving 
the substantive meaning of adaptation appearing precise, but remaining unclear. 
As we shall see, this apparently straight-forward narrative enables the 
problematization to be sustained despite subsequent interruptive elements, and 
makes it easier for these to be articulated as supplementary moments rather 
than changing the problematization itself. The precise formation of this 
problematization w ill now be discussed in terms of its epistemology, and the 
supplementary moments that disrupt the core problematization established by 
the narrative discussed here.
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3.0 The risk-based epistemology and its effects on the problematization of 
adaptation
3.1 Overview of the risk-framework process
The Report and its approach, the “risk-framework," as it  is commonly referred to 
(UKCIP Interviewee F 2009], describes UKCIP's account of adaptation. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, one of the core reasons for the establishment 
of the risk-framework was to provide a clear guide to utilizing the climate change 
scenario information. This links to UKCIP's definition of adaptation itself, which 
is defined in the glossary as: “Climate Adaptation. The process or outcome of a 
process that leads to a reduction in harm or risk of harm, or realization of 
benefits associated w ith climate variability and climate change." (Willows and 
Connell 2003, p. 111). In the main body of the report, this process of utilizing the 
scenarios to achieve a good outcome is established through 8 'stages' (Willows 
and Connell 2003). These are:
1) Identify problem and objectives
2) Establish decision-making criteria
3) Assess risk
a. Tier 1: Preliminary climate change risk assessment,







8) Monitor, evaluate and review
In UKCIP's practices observed during 2009, the framework and its stages 
were introduced verbally as follows. First, potential changes in the climate were 
described, and the actual UKCIP'02 scenarios were used, or a verbal overview of 
them was given, in terms of headline messages of most likely scenarios 
(Stakeholder B Observation 2009a, Stakeholder A Observation 2009). Second, 
from the imaginary of climate change produced by these scenario summaries, 
possible impacts on the organization were brainstormed, based on their 
understanding of how their organisation was vulnerable to the described 
changes, which was in part derived from past experience. Where past weather 
differed from projections of climate change in terms of extremity, frequency or 
type (for example, drought rather than flood, or more extreme or frequent 
events), this was pointed out by UKCIP, and the events that resulted from the 
original event were used as a basis to understand how the organization might be 
impacted by the new scenario.
Third, this "impact" was then given a rating in terms of likelihood. Likelihood 
was based on the degree of certainty associated w ith the climatic scenarios and 
im plicitly the exposure of a given unit. Fourth, magnitude was assessed 
according to the level of damage expected, and as a result the level of impact this 
would have on the organization more broadly. What this impact was measured 
against varied for each organisation, being in part determined by its objectives 
and its basic operation. On this basis, the fifth step was to rank the impacts w ith 
the highest overall magnitude and likelihood, and from this to begin devising a 
plan as to how to proceed.
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3.2 Risk and Scenarios: the resolution or occlusion of uncertainty?
The uncertainty of climate change that was established as the threat by the 
narrative is resolved in several ways. As one long-serving UKCIP staff member 
put it, "there was a kind of a shift from climate impacts, [in] quite a deterministic 
sense, to thinking about climate risks, and trying to deal w ith  uncertainty in that 
way" [UKCIP Interviewee F 2009, p. 2). The risk-based problematization applies 
these scenarios to the organization more concretely, building their biophysical 
uncertainty into a wider but situated understanding of the organisation’s degree 
of exposure to particular biophysical changes. In doing so, this appears to resolve 
uncertainty by lessening its vis ib ility by being combined into a larger matrix. As 
the Report notes in Stage 3, "[risk] assessments, including estimates of 
probability, w ill be contingent on the particular scenario or scenarios upon 
which they are based" [Willows and Connell 2003, p. 27). As such, in using risk 
technology as the basis of this process, the framework manages to obscure the 
fundamental question of the uncertainty of the scenarios by making them part of 
a wider calculus, yet a calculus nonetheless based on those same scenarios.
The result of this is not only occludes the epistemic but also the political 
question of how to deal w ith uncertainty. Rather than focusing on questions of 
the scenarios' reliability, the practical nature of the risk framework crucially 
moves stakeholders away from the problem of "can we trust the science 
completely" to "what if  we can trust it  a little  bit?" [UKCIP Interviewee F 2009, p. 
12). It should be noted that this issue is somewhat implicit. In effect, the 
scenarios are, although uncertain in their precise outcomes, assumed at the very 
least to accurately represent the range of possible climate change. In fact, the 
narrative described in the previous section helps gloss over the lack of discussion
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of the validity of scenarios as it paints the scenarios above as actually quite 
accurate, making the claim that the science can be trusted and that incorporating 
it into the risk framework is sufficient for this.
The epistemology of risk not only defines the 'problem' to which 
adaptation must respond, but also the 'solution.' From the previous section, it  is 
clear that risk and risk-technologies also help ascertain on which impact one 
should act and when by providing a calculus of relative risk, depending on its 
magnitude and likelihood. "The objective of these assessments is to help... 
identify where adaptation to climate may be required, the adaptation options 
that could best accommodate the expected impacts of climate change, and the 
uncertainty associated w ith those impacts" (Willows and Connell 2003, p. 70). 
However, the epistemic use of the scenarios has other fantasmatic effects. In 
marrying scenarios to a utilizable account of risk intimately connected to the 
stakeholder, this rendition of adaptation discourse creates a particular vision of 
the future in order to push for action in the present. In Ben Anderson's terms, 
this enables 'anticipatory action' because it creates a geography in the present in 
the name of the future (see (Anderson 2010) for a detailed exploration of these 
logics). In fantasmatic terms, this tangible future enables stakeholders to relate 
to the future and hence more likely to act on it  in the present. As such, the risk 
framework provides an epistemic 'hook' from the scenarios to the present, and as 
such helps enable adaptation to occur at all, whilst of course also governing its 
form.
As discussed in the previous section, linguistic techniques in the opening 
'context' section are used to establish risk as the means of dealing w ith 
uncertainty. Linguistic techniques continue to be used to reinforce this narrative,
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including on the frequent occasions when the agenda to accurately represent risk 
in academic terms actually undermines the validity of this narrative and hence 
the core problematization.
For example, the key supposition in the introduction is that climate 
change is uncertain and therefore necessarily understood in terms of risk. 
However, risk is later defined as probability w ithout exact location and timing, 
whereas uncertainty is defined as not knowing probability or consequence 
(Willows and Connell 2003, p. 44; p. 49]. This definition directly contrasts w ith 
the key supposition if  climate change is assumed to be uncertain. Furthermore, in 
the introduction to Part 2, climate change is in itia lly  categorized as being mostly 
characterized by uncertainty as the lack of probability. As such, the articulation 
of risk and uncertainty functions through obscuring the definitional 
contradiction probability and uncertainty, which is possible in part because these 
definitions come in the second, 'academic' rather than 'practical' part of the 
document. This distance means that they do not appear to undermine the 
narrative, and hence the problematization of adaptation, even though they 
clearly contradict it.
The report also utilizes rhetorical and other linguistic techniques to more 
directly bring uncertainty w ith in an account of risk. In the first instance, this is 
achieved by distinguishing between risk itself and uncertainty, by stating that 
"uncertainty" is "the result of a lack of knowledge of either the probability of an 
event, or its consequences,” which is contrasted to "good knowledge of both the 
probability of an event or its consequences" {ibid., p.50) where only the latter 
enables accurate characterization of risk. These definitions place risk as distinct 
from uncertainty, and indeed almost as its opposite. In fact, the Report makes
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this explicit when it notes that "Uncertainty describes the quality of our 
knowledge concerning risk" [ibid., p. 43). This creates an equivalence (Laclau and 
Mouffe 2001) between uncertainty and risk, defining them as the opposite of 
each other: the implication is that a perfect account of risk is the opposite of 
uncertainty, rendering risk-based knowledge as an epistemic ideal, whilst also 
implying that it  sufficiently and completely reduces uncertainty.
However, this representation is not an accurate account of the wider use 
of risk, nor of its technical usage in the document. It would be more accurate to 
say that risk describes our knowledge of uncertainty, but saying this in reverse 
has the effect that, even as it  uses risk as a concept to demonstrate uncertainty, it 
makes it  appear to provide certainty, and therefore creates it  as an ideal form of 
knowledge. This also enables risk to be assimilated into modernity's desire for 
and assumption that science provides the 'evidence' and certainty on which to 
based policy.
This operation can be seen in the verbal discourse of UKCIP staff in the 
statement below. The use of risk and uncertainty in the first and second 
sentences demonstrates the interchangeability of these terms, and thus the 
implication that they are equivalent, and thus that risk successfully accounts for 
uncertainty:
"[We] came to realize that in trying to engage organizations...that the risk 
approach was quite a useful way in, because people are used to dealing 
w ith risk. [...] you deal w ith uncertainty every day, and actually you can 
handle that fine, so just think about climate change as one other sort of 
uncertainty that you need to factor into your thinking" (UKCIP 
Interviewee F 2009, pp. 1-2).
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The general appeal to risk management is also connected to the 
articulation of uncertainty and risk in the opening narrative that establishes risk 
was sufficient for dealing w ith  uncertainty. This is possible because 'risk' is used 
here as an abstract noun that makes it  appear as if  was a sufficient technology. 
This works effectively because the word 'risk' is also a synonym for uncertainty 
itself, so that claiming stakeholders already deal w ith risk implies they already 
know how to deal w ith (or have the capacity to deal w ith) the uncertainty of 
climate change.
These multiple ways of making risk 'cover over' uncertainty makes it  the 
epistemic focus of adaptation knowledge. This combination of uncertainty as the 
basic threat and risk as the means of knowing that threat creates a rationale 
where the greater the threat, the greater the pressure to quantify its risk. This 
happens in "Stage 3 - Tier 3: Detailed quantitative risk assessment" where there 
is an understanding that the level or complexity and accuracy 'progress’ as the 
transition is made from qualitative to quantitative assessment (Willows and 
Connell 2003, p. 18). In the final stage, "Monitor, evaluate and review" it  is stated 
that "[quantified] targets and indicators against which to monitor the 
performance of a decision should be developed" (ibid., p. 39) In sum, either 
scientifically or linguistically, this problematization of adaptation places risk as 
the core epistemic means to deal w ith uncertainty.
3.3 The fantasmatic function of risk, and implications for the problematization of 
adaptation
In UKCIP's internal narrative about the report's development, the risk- 
framework formed the solution to the problem that impacts-research "wasn't
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necessarily informing any decision-making "[because] it didn't necessarily relate 
to what decision makers needed to know" [UKCIP Interviewee F 2009, p. 9). As 
discussed in Chapter 4, this was a problem not just epistemically, but because the 
Government's liberal agenda of responsibilisation relied on the effectiveness of 
UKCIP's discourse in attracting stakeholders and providing a useable procedure 
so that they were able to act to make themselves more adapted to climate 
change. As such, the problem being resolved by the report was as much one of 
political governance as it  was epistemic.
At the time the report was published, it  was felt that making the risk 
approach accessible or desirable was a difficult task. One of the m inor solutions 
to this was to explicitly reference the institutional authority of the Cabinet Office, 
and stating that the use of risk is "set as a priority  by the UK Government" 
[Willows and Connell 2003, p. V). This appeals to government-based readers not 
only as a legitimatation of the approach but also as a call to action.
However, the fantasmatic mode of articulation operates at a more 
fundamental level. The practical and 'rational' approach to climate change 
adaptation, and a procedural paper tra il provided by the report not only enable 
but also justify decisions as legitimate [Interviewee C 2009]. In effect, this 
provides a resolution to the political uncertainty that accompanies climate 
change uncertainty for both the Government and governance, and for the 
'stakeholders' themselves in their own operations.
As time went on, the increasing normalization of risk as a generalized 
episteme in government and business led to the risk framework sitting more and 
more comfortably w ith the existing epistemology of users. In fact, by the time the 
research interviews were conducted in 2009, the risk framework was presented
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to stakeholders as something they 'already did' in order to make it  more 
attractive by appearing less difficult to engage w ith and use, as the comments 
below make clear:
"I usually try  and suggest [adaptation is] a matter of managing risk [...] 
and you know the senior management and the politicians are already 
engaged w ith that notion of risk. [...] I do th ink that that's been 
moderately effective in sort of getting people... sort of aware of 
adaptation" [UKCIP Interviewee A 2009, p. 4).
The characterization of risk as 'something you do already,' albeit on a more or 
less technical level, was seen by UKCIP as a very effective move in a context 
where people had felt paralyzed to act because of the degree of uncertainty 
associated w ith climate change [Interviewee H 2009, UKCIP Interviewee F 2009]. 
This fantasmatic appeal of risk can be said to function because stakeholders are 
positioned as subjects of risk in the report's problematization, and produced as 
subjects of risk in a wider governance context.
The fantasmatic mode and governance function of the risk-framework 
challenges the lim ited investigation of the "boundary objects" of UKCIP presented 
in [Lorenzoni et al. 2007). This flexible use of risk, and its solidification in the 
2003 report, can be discussed in terms of the flexible application of standardized 
methodologies based on mutable "border objects" to create "allies" in the 
production of scientific knowledge [Star and Griesemer 1989). However, Star and 
Griesemer's also note the political effects of this: actors, in their beliefs and 
practices, must be "disciplined" although w ith in limits, in order to get them to 
engage usefully in the process, but without overwhelming them [1989, p. 407). 
Interestingly, they point out that one way of doing this is to use a methodology
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that replaces the question of 'why' certain procedures are followed and certain 
goals sought, w ith the question of 'how' to achieve these objectives. This is 
strikingly similar to the effect of the structure of the final version of the 2003 
report, that relegated the 'why' to Part 2, and established the problematization 
w ith an account of 'how' in Part 1.
Star and Griesemer also note that these methods were able to act then as a 
"'lingua franca' between amateurs and professionals" [1989, p. 407) enabling the 
expansion of knowledge, but also, it should be added, the creation of particular 
kinds of subjects and the expansion of governance. These effects, regardless of 
whether they were explicitly conceptualized in such political terms, are shared 
by the UKCIP risk-framework: it effects a disciplinary function on the language 
and practices of UKCIP staff and stakeholders, and in doing so invests them in its 
particular problematization of adaptation w ithout having to justify this through 
an argument-based articulation.
The flexibility of application softens the awareness of political 
intervention both discursively and in practice and makes it  more likely to be 
accepted. For Star and Griesemer, as well as for Foucault, this would be not so 
much a demonstration of an 'honest broker' [Lorenzoni et al. 2007, p. 73) as the 
demonstration of a practical, results-focussed one, sensitive to power relations 
rather than inert to them. For example, the willingness on UKCIP's part to accept 
different approaches to risk includes encouraging stakeholders to use their 
existing risk assessment procedures if  they have them. [Stakeholder B 
Observation 2009a, Stakeholder A Observation 2009). See for example, "Key 
questions for decision-makers at Stage 2" [Willows and Connell 2003, p. 16). 
This appears as an extension of the status quo, but it opens the door for a much
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wider application of risk and for a broader range of risk technologies for 
organisations to use in this endeavour (Willows and Connell 2003. See, for 
example, p. 25, and Appendix 3: Summary of tools and techniques, pp. 121-138].
However, the discursive flexibility that ensures greater 'buy-in' to the 
risk-framework also leaves it  open to the politics of the stakeholder, and leads to 
a politics of “tinkering around the edges" (UKCIP Interviewee F 2009, p. 16]. In 
fact, this is a recurring topic where the relation of risk assessment to objectives 
or values is concerned. This w ill be explored further in Chapter 6, which deals 
w ith  the ontology of the problematization and its relation to the political 
rationale.
3.4 Always future never now: epistemological time
The Report's problematization of adaptation as risk-based decision-making 
establishes a temporal account of adaptation through the articulation of these 
two terms. This is clearly expressed in the report: "[climate] adaptation is about 
recognizing these altered risks, and taking decisions that allow the likely impacts 
to be reduced or managed, and the opportunities to be exploited” (Willows and 
Connell 2003, p. 3]. Importantly, this establishes but also lim its adaptation 
practices to focusing on future, "likely impacts". This is rooted in the definition 
and use of 'risk' itself as always referring to the chance of a future outcome 
(Sellke and Renn 2010, Hacking 2006]. This problematizes adaptation as based 
on predictive knowledge. That this creates an outcome and objectives-based 
problematization is particularly clear in the glossary definition of climate 
adaptation. This is defined as: "The process or outcome of a process that leads to
179
a reduction in harm or risk of harm, or realization of benefits associated w ith 
climate variability and climate change" (Willows and Connell 2003, p. 111).
This definition's wording makes two things apparent. First, that 
adaptation -  either as process or as outcome - must 'lead to' a successful result, 
either as a reduction of actually occurring harm, or the risk of harm, or as 
actually occurring benefits. The blurriness here between adaptation occurring in 
the present or pre-emptive adaptation for the future is compounded by slippage 
in the common use of the word 'risk' itself, as both a synonym for a 'threat' per 
se, and as a probabilistic account of the likelihood of that threat occurring in the 
future (Hacking 2006). However, the coupling of'leads to' and 'reduction in harm 
or risk of harm' implies that adaptation is, however, defined as successfully 
reducing harm pre-emptively. Likewise, both the 'process' and the process 
'outcome' are linked to the phrase 'leads to.' The linking of all of these terms to 
'leads to' implies that adaptation is based on the provision of a prescient 
knowledge of, and intervention on behalf of, future outcomes.
This means that adaptation here is characterized more as a noun, as an 
outcome is a state of being. The verb form of adaptation, adapting, is left defined 
in terms of outcome, and thus essentially empty. Thus the focus on outcomes 
works to exclude a substantive account of adaptation as a process. In other 
words, because the outcome is the primary object of knowledge, the process or 
capacity that achieves this is seen as incidental, rather than central, to 
adaptation. This only makes sense if  it  is assumed that knowledge of outcomes 
produces a single, rational, politics and practice of adaptation, or that knowledge 
of such outcomes is the only legitimate basis of action.
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The focus on outcome-based knowledge leads to a mode of adaptation 
that relies on pre-emptive knowledge and responses, obfuscating the significance 
or nature of the present, the ontological implications of which w ill be discussed 
in Chapter 6. The political lim it point that this establishes is made clear when 
UKCIP's definition above is compared to the contemporaneous definition of the 
IPCC. The IPCC definition of adaptation that was current at the time was:
"Adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or 
expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or 
exploits beneficial opportunities. Various types of adaptation can be 
distinguished, including anticipatory and reactive adaptation, private and 
public adaptation, and autonomous and planned adaptation:
• Antic ipa tory Adaptation—Adaptation that takes place before 
impacts of climate change are observed. Also referred to as proactive 
adaptation.
• Autonomous Adaptation—Adaptation that does not constitute a 
conscious response to climatic stimuli but is triggered by ecological 
changes in natural systems and by market or welfare changes in 
human systems. Also referred to as spontaneous adaptation.
• Planned Adaptation—Adaptation that is the result of a deliberate 
policy decision, based on an awareness that conditions have changed 
or are about to change and that action is required to return to, 
maintain, or achieve a desired state.
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• Private Adaptation—Adaptation that is initiated and implemented 
by individuals, households or private companies. Private adaptation is 
usually in the actor's rational self-interest.
• Public Adaptation—Adaptation that is initiated and implemented by 
governments at all levels. Public adaptation is usually directed at 
collective needs.
• Reactive Adaptation—Adaptation that takes place after impacts of 
climate change have been observed.
See also adaptation assessment, adaptation benefits, adaptation costs,
adaptive capacity, and maladaptation.” (Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change 2001, p. 982)
Despite the claim that the report’s account was based on that of the IPCC 
(Interviewee H 2009, p. 11), these definitions are clearly very different. UKCIP's 
definition, particularly as borne out in the central narrative that establishes their 
problematization, is much more limited, approximating only the 'anticipatory' 
and 'planned' adaptations in the IPCC definition, but occluding the 'autonomous' 
and 'reactive' adaptation, which are listed in the IPCC account. Second, it  
obfuscates the public/private distinction and related self-interest and collective- 
interest distinction raised in the IPCC definition. These occlusions allow UKCIP to 
avoid their political content, which offer very different problematizations of 
adaptation. However, avoiding these issues also enables it to sidestep the need to 
justify its own account. It is certainly not the argument here that UKCIP should 
necessarily have followed the IPCC definition exactly, particularly as some of the 
kinds of adaptation it described might be mutually exclusive. However, observing
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the difference highlights the content and contingency of UKCIP's 
problematization.
UKCIP's definition more clearly places the 'outcome' at the centre of the 
problematization, even though, as we have seen, they use the term 'process' in 
their definition. Levina and Tirpak (2006) also note this change, and point out 
the implication that "[expectations] from adaptation as an outcome might be 
much higher than expectations from it as a process" (Levina and Tirpak 2006, p. 
7), in terms of its ability to deliver concrete goals.
Avoiding an account of the present in adapting to climate change, and 
leaving the specific 'products’ of adaptation open (alleviation of harm, risk of 
harm, or benefit) provides a gap that begs to be filled by a substantive account of 
each of these terms and how to achieve those results. The mention of "risk of 
harm” helps the entrance of the UKCIP risk- framework, as it  provides an account 
of how to enable adaptation, in a manner that fits w ith their outcome-oriented 
definition. Risk is thus established as the fundamental epistemology of 
adaptation.
3.5 Epistemology and political rationale: Discrete, pre-emptive decisions and linear 
time?
The impacts problematization was shaped by the time frames of climate change 
scenarios as a future period averaged over th irty  years. In creating a risk- 
framework that utilizes climate scenarios, it seemed natural to adopt the existing 
epistemic-temporal frame. As we have seen, the risk epistemology also works 
entails a problematization of adaptation that is pre-emptive, for the future (or 
range of futures) that can be 'seen' from the current moment of time. As one
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UKCIP staff member explained: “So there's a number of different time scales on 
which you operate, some of which are quite long, and obviously it's the longer 
ones which are -  w ill be more important when we come to look at the future 
climate and its impacts” (Stakeholder A Observation 2009, p. 1].
This pre-emptive, long-term focus makes certain objects and subjects 
appear as the focus of the problematization. A clear example here is one of the 
report author's description of her imaginary of the relation between decision­
making and time: “And so I have in my head the fact that [...] industrial assets 
tend to have a kind of twenty five year life time, and I describe that as a long term 
decision" (Interviewee H 2009, p. 13). Another representation of this was the 
main author's example that “ [roads] have to be designed not to melt when its too 
hot, and not to break up when its too cold [...] But of course if  you're rebuilding 
every five or six years then you can probably change [...] gradually. If they're 
lasting th irty  years, then you need to think about [making that decision now]” 
(Interviewee C 2009, p. 7). These examples demonstrate the fundamental 
assumption that given the long time-scales of climate change, that large 
infrequent decisions matter the most, placing the focus on objects that have a 
long life span.
In these and nearly all the examples given in the interviews, the use of 
physical infrastructure generates a particular imaginary of where adaptation 
applies: when a road is laid, or a building or bridge is built. This is particularly 
because these examples are not only temporally but physically inflexible objects, 
for which decisions are necessarily not only pre-emptive, but also discrete. This 
arises from the epistemology of risk itself as requiring the identification of 
discrete objects or defined events against which to create an assessment: Sellke
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and Renn describe these as "specific targets;" "risks describe the potential effects 
that these hazards are likely to cause on specific targets such as buildings, 
ecosystems or human organisms and their related properties" (2010, p. 298].
In part, it  seems that this pre-emptive rationale also arose from the desire 
to make the scenarios useful to stakeholders. The main report author was 
concerned to note that the approach taken in the report was not based on science 
driving adaptation decisions, but rather, because decisions were being made that 
needed to take the science into account: "we saw [adaptation as] a need to alter a 
decision to take account of changing climate risk" (Interviewee C 2009, p. 7). 
Although this is very different from operating from a deterministic account of 
climate change impacts, it is still a somewhat circular argument, in that whilst it  
purports to operate from the 'decision' view-point, this is only in question 
because of scientifically established 'changes' in climate 'risks,' and whether 
these are taken into account depends on the level of threat established by the 
climate change scenarios, marked in part by the time frames these introduce. 
Nonetheless, the concern w ith existing decision timetables means that the 
temporality of adaptation is not decided by knowledge about climate change, at 
least in the first instance, but rather by existing schedules. This combines w ith a 
very limited account of the actual implementation, monitoring and review of 
decisions in the report to produce a sense that adaptation is not responsive to 
actual climate change, but whether initiated by climate science or existing 
decision time-tables, remains essentially as a pre-emptive rationale.
This discrete and linear account of time occludes an emergent, socio- 
contextual account of the problem and thus occludes emergence in response to 
actual change in its account of a rationale for adaptation. One staff member noted
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that this established a political rationale that focussed on actual decisions rather 
than as the capacity to make or implement decisions as a result of the epistemic 
origins of the risk approach:
“ [the risk framework] was probably written in a particular kind of manner, 
because that does effectively come out of the types of methodology that 
the Environment Agency and others use when they have to make big 
decisions. About, sizing a flood defence, or renewing the Thames Barrier 
or stuff like that, so in fact, even though it is [...] a strongly process based 
methodology, then its actually framed [...] w ith the assumption that [at 
some point] you w ill make a decision” [UKCIP Interviewee A 2009, p. 17).
W ithin the 2003 document, one way in which this temporally 
discrete account of the decision is established is through the distinction 
between "Stage 7: Implement decision" and Stage 8: Monitor, evaluate and 
review. It is easy to understand that this helps break down the steps of 
applying an adaptation strategy, but this distinction also introduces an 
ontological account of linear time, or at best cyclical time, rather than 
emergent time determined by events. This account is associated w ith  the 
decision being rendered as 'discrete.' The lack of detail in "Stage 7: 
Implement decision” is perhaps the most important indicator of this. In 
fact, the account of this stage, together w ith an account of "Stage 8: 
Monitor, evaluate and review" lasts just more than one page [Willows and 
Connell 2003, pp. 39-40). By contrast, "Stage 3: Assess risk” is divided into 
three subsidiary "tiers" and lasts for 12 pages [ibid., pp. 18-29).
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This lack of focus is replicated at the micro-scale. In Stage 7 there is a 
warning paragraph that implementation may be difficult if  "the option is 
technically or managerially complex, [or] is not subject to agreement w ith 
stakeholder groups...” [ibid., p. 39]. However, despite recognizing this, there are 
no "key questions" or "tools" to aid in the conceptualization of these risks and 
how to deal w ith  them, even though such guidelines accompany all the previous 
assessment based stages. What description there is of implementation focuses on 
ensuring the communication to the public of the assessment itself in order that 
the decision appears justified. This makes clear that the process of adapting in 
the rationale seems to be focussed on the risk assessment process itself and the 
relatively discrete moment of decision.
The imaginary of adaptation as discrete moments is also established 
through the word choice of 'the' decision, and the focus on 'decisions’ as the 
cumulative metric of adaptation. The effect of this as an ontological category w ill 
be discussed further in the following chapter, but in epistemic terms this is 
important because it limits the ability to look w ith in the "interval of decision” 
that accounts for the creation and implementation of the decision itself, and how 
it  unfolds as an emergent sequence of accounting for and intervening in the 
development of the event and its gradual, also emergent, resolution [Adey and 
Anderson 2011].
Crucially, in late 2005, UKCIP staff noted that "much activity so far" had 
focussed on assessing risk, and that this "partly reflects the evolving role of 
UKCIP" [Harman, Gawith and Colley 2005, p. 254]. In other words, their own 
change from impacts to adaptation discussed in Chapter 4, and the fact that 
stakeholder cases were in their early stages meant there had been limited
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pressure to develop the later stages of the report. Interestingly, they indeed note 
that the last two stages in their framework, to 'develop and implement a climate 
adaptation strategy' and 'monitor and review' had yet to receive much attention. 
The new collocation of adaptation and strategy, rather than adaptation and 
decision, is particularly interesting here. The distinction between strategy and 
tactics implies adaptation strategy deals w ith an overarching objective made up 
of interlinked, and indeed contingent, subsidiary decisions. However, this is still 
not developed in the 2005 review; the final stage that it lists, "Monitor and 
review,” calls for reviews of decisions when new climate information is provided, 
and stresses UKCIP's role in ensuring new information is distributed. As such, it 
reinforces the core problematization based on objective, predictive knowledge 
and linked to pre-emptive, discrete decisions.
The pre-emptive decision mode is somewhat supplemented by the 
political ideal of building adaptation measures into the existing decisions and 
timetables of the stakeholder. Although this is discussed as combining w ith  the 
lim ited focus on the implementation and monitoring stages to reinforce the 
epistemic and ontological assumption of a pre-emptive decision, it nonetheless 
places the knowledges that produce these timetables as prior to the use of 
scientific knowledge, a dual function that recalls Foucault's rules of the double 
conditioning of strategies, and the openness of this ambiguity to polyvalence. 
Connected to this existing decision structure is a supplementary moment, in the 
political rationale, as the needs of stakeholders existing processes are established 
as epistemically and morally prior to the adaptation knowledge arising from 
climate science. This drastically limits the political effects of scenario-based 
knowledge by preventing it  from reshaping an existing political structure and
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strategy. However, this preservation of the validity of existing decision timelines 
actually works against increasing their v is ib ility by accepting them. In doing so, it 
occludes the question of whether these are still appropriate in the context of 
climate change. The result is that there is almost no questioning of whether the 
frequency and dispersal of decisions makes sense under the 'changing risk' 
presented by climate change.
In sum, the concept of decision-making as it  is used in most of the report 
reflects that classical decision theory, where "decision making is forward looking, 
formulating alternative courses of action extending into the future, and selecting 
among alternatives by expectations about how things turn out” (Dessai et al. 
2009, p. 65, quoting Lasswell and Kaplan, 1950). The centrality of climate 
scenarios coupled w ith  the technology of risk, ensures predictive knowledge is 
the basis of adaptation as a pre-emptive practice. In combination w ith  the 
acceptance of existing decision schedules, this results in an occlusion of political 
engagement w ith how decisions are made or implemented, their frequency, the 
"interval of decision" or its emergence.
4.0 Supplementary moments: uncertainty and emergence
4.1 From scenarios to variability, and outcomes to vulnerability?
The section above has already demonstrated some significant points of tensions, 
where supplements are articulated as moments of the 'core' problematization 
based on pre-emptive risk-based decision-making. Further examples of these 
supplementary moments have more far-reaching implications for the 
problematization's epistemological basis, particularly w ith regard to the meaning
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of uncertainty that the risk narrative worked so hard to resolve. For example, the 
report authors do nuance the account of climate change from being just a th irty- 
year average, producing the need for long-term prediction and related long-term 
decisions by including current variability. The origin of this lay in the shift from 
considering climate change impacts to considering the risk to the stakeholder, 
"which then brings in natural climate variability as well [...] and then we thought 
[including variability] probably doesn't actually change [the risk framework] 
massively, [...] [as] you experience [all climate events in the same way]” 
[Interviewee H 2009, p. 12] It seems this was likely the reason that the report 
title  and definition of adaptation are referred to as 'climate adaptation' rather 
than 'climate change adaptation' [Willows and Connell 2003, p. 111]. The merger 
of the orientation to future climate impacts and current vulnerability resulted in 
the inclusion of "short term decisions, but ones which are climatically sensitive...” 
[Interviewee H 2009, p. 12]. However, the focus on climate lim its the wider focus 
on vulnerability, allowing the problematization of adaptation as based on climate 
science to maintain its priority, even if  it is modulated according to exposure.
Nonetheless, the statement that both climate and weather are 
experienced in the same way by the stakeholder, points to a shift to seeing the 
social experience as an acceptable form of knowledge in addition to that of 
climate science. This is intimated in the document in the sense of identifying 
"exposure units" and "receptors" [Willows and Connell 2003, p. 14]. Yet both 
terms imply that the main threat lies outside of the stakeholder, lim iting the 
degree of focus on its internal system and reinstating the core problematization.
The social nature of the stakeholder unit as the subject that knows, and 
im plicitly then as the object of knowledge, is picked up much more through the
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Local Climate Impacts Profile [LCLIP) tool for assessing current vulnerability, 
which, by the time of the observations in 2009, was somewhat integrated into the 
use of the "risk-framework" as a technique used together w ith  the climate 
scenarios to assess the level of risk. Vulnerability as a concept has a lim ited 
mention in the 2003 document, and where it does occur is premised on the 
identification of particular scenarios and is determined through being articulated 
to specific risk [Willows and Connell 2003, p. 49; p. 70). By contrast, the LCLIP 
approach asks participants to imagine climate impacts through drawing on 
experiences of weather variability and extremes and extrapolating from this 
potential vulnerability to longer term or more frequent changes as a result of 
climate change [Stakeholder B Observation 2009a, Stakeholder B Observation 
2009b, Stakeholder A Observation 2009). Interestingly the version of the 
Adaptation Wizard 2.0 introduced in January 2008, a year prior to the 
observations, makes vulnerability as a concept much more explicit, breaking 
down the framework originally established by the risk document into 5 steps, of 
which Step 2 asks "am I vulnerable to the current climate?" This is followed by 
step 3: "how w ill I be affected by climate change." Adaptation Wizard 3.0 in 2010 
reinforced the move to vulnerability even further, rephrasing these two 
questions to: "assess vulnerability to the current climate," and "assess 
vulnerability to future climate change" [UK Climate Impacts Programme 2010).
Indicative of this shift, one staff member interviewed noted that, rather 
than take the risk framework at face value: "[I] would be more fuzzy in terms of 
[the] way I'd think about it  in terms of capacity building in an institution because 
you do make decisions, but those decisions w ill very often not be one-off ones. 
Um, and sometimes we don't make that particularly sort of specific -  and maybe
191
we should do” [UKCIP Interviewee A 2009, pp.17-18). It seems clear then that the 
supplementary notion of a needing to know the social system, im plicit in the 
2003 report, became increasingly prominent. This seems to have been linked to a 
vulnerability-based account of adaptation between 2008 and 2010, resulting in 
the gradual re-problematization of adaptation away from the use of risk as the 
core referent and towards the use of vulnerability.
The increased visib ility of the 'social' character of the organisation w ill be 
discussed further in the next chapter on ontology. This increased v is ib ility  of 
social forms of knowledge raises the questions of whether the focus on scenarios 
and forecasts w ill shift, and whether this w ill move the time of knowing away 
from a predictive mode and its related pre-emptive rationale of discrete 
decision-making. As w ill be discussed in Chapter 7, this supplementary 
epistemology has a 'dangerous' potential to undermine the wider rationale and 
problematization of adaptation established in 2003: it shifts to projecting system 
vulnerability forward, rather than future impacts backwards as the basis of the 
account of threat, making the internal system and its characteristics the focus of 
the solution rather than trying to account for externally created impacts.
4.2 Robustness: recognising the limited validity of outcome-oriented knowledge?
The second major supplementary moment occurs in the concept of robustness. In 
a substantive sense, robustness is defined as "The ability of a system to continue 
to perform satisfactorily under load" [Willows and Connell 2003, p. 117). 
However, the validity of this in epistemic terms is more clearly expressed in the 
report's glossary definition of "Robustness analysis" which:
"may be used to help determine the robustness of the answers w ith in an 
options appraisal to possible uncertainties as to the values of key
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sensitive variables and parameters (as identified from the sensitivity 
analysis]. It identifies the extent to which the decision-maker might be 
exposed to potential costs and errors i f  some uncertain eventualities 
regarding those parameters should arise in future. Robustness analysis is 
sometimes used to investigate the impact on the decision of a 'reasonable' 
range of input values for the key parameters identified by the sensitivity 
analysis, or a range of values that are considered plausible." [ibid., pp. 
134-5]
Under 'sensitivity analysis' it  notes that "[where there is sensitivity] seek 
alternative and better options, which could better accommodate uncertainties 
regarding these variables (see Robustness analysis]" [ibid., p. 136]. So 
robustness is determined by a decision that is able to accommodate 
uncertainties, although those uncertainties are lim ited to a range that is 
'considered plausible' in its account of the future, on the basis of current 
knowledge.
"...the whole approach is about understanding more about the decision 
and how it might pan out, [...] it's about understanding ... the range of future 
possibilities and how a commitment to a certain approach might give you 
problems in the future which might be avoided if  you put in -had a more flexible 
option" (Interviewee C 2009, p. 5].
The difference between the quotes from the 2003 report and from the 
interviews in 2009 demonstrates an increasingly heuristic rather than precise 
interpretation of the scenarios. Heuristic use fits w ith the interpretation of 
robust decision-making as when "non-predictive information from climate 
models can also help decision-makers identify and assess actions that may
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reduce their vulnerabilities to future climate change" [Dessai et al. 2009, p. 73). 
This clearly nuances the core epistemology based on prediction that has been 
demonstrated above. However, in supplementing the predictive model based on 
the scenarios, they also enable it  to continue by justifying its basic components 
and lim iting the exploration of climate change to the boundaries it sets.
The tension between the supplementary account of scenarios as an 
explorative heuristic and the core account of the reliability of climate scenarios is 
repeated in the report's multiple references to “maladaptation" and adaptation 
"mistakes" [Willows and Connell 2003, p. 23). This language gives the impression 
that there is a 'right' decision. When asked about this, one of the core authors 
affirmed this basic position, but clarified that a 'right decision' was one that was 
"robust in the face of those uncertainties [...] whether it w ill be proved to be right 
or wrong ... it's the best decision you can make at the time given this uncertain 
knowledge, but knowledge that is pointing in some directions more strongly than 
others" [Interviewee H 2009, p. 13). 'Some directions more strongly than others' 
returns the problematization to an underlying reliance on scientific predictive 
knowledge, and accepts fa llib ility  in order to ensure pre-emptive decisions can 
be made.
Moreover, when pre-emptive decisions are connected to the imaginary of 
physical infrastructure projects that pervades UKCIP's discourse, particularly in 
the early years, the almost literally concrete nature of these decisions does allow 
an imaginary of adaptation as located in pre-emptive discrete decisions and thus 
as being finitely 'right' or 'wrong.' In reference to building reservoirs, and other 
major works, one author noted that:
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"[To] my knowledge [nobody] has actually made any decisions that 
actually are the difficult choices, where there's a trade-off between doing 
too much [and] over-adapting, [or] doing too little..." (Interviewee C 2009,
p. 10).
In the context of the interview, this quote referred to major physical 
infrastructure such as building reservoirs and the Thames Barrier. The concept 
of "under-adaptation and "over-adaptation," which occur in the report (Willows 
and Connell 2003, p. 11) are clearly based on this understanding. They are 
defined as "consequences of poor decisions." Under-adaptation is said to occur 
where "insufficient weight is attached to the need for adaptation. This may tend 
to lead to under-adaptation." The terminology here of 'consequence' and 'lead to' 
places these concepts in an imaginary of knowledge as "outcomes" and imply the 
prescient knowability of climate change effects in principle, an epistemic 
assumption which is strengthened by the focus on pre-emptive decisions w ith in  
the report.
This prescient and pre-emptive function of robust decisions renders them 
as optimum decisions, in the sense that they must be appropriate for the range of 
possible outcomes. In this sense they soften but nonetheless remain w ith in the 
modernist, techno-scientific framing of adaptation. Dessai et al. (2009) critique 
this use of climate scenarios and probabilistic scenarios as the basis of 
knowledge for decision-making where this leads to optimum decision-making 
that seeks to ensure optimum utility. Although this is not explicitly UKCIP’s 
intention, the dominance of prescient knowledge in the 2003 report means that 
conceptualisation underlies their discourse. However, as discussed above, the 
increased presence of vulnerability means that this position was changing by
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2008 towards a more socio-contextual account of knowledge.
The conceptual tension in the report that marks 'robust decisions' as 
supplementary moments appears in the fact that robust decisions are 
distinguished from, rather that contained within, the concept of 'avoiding 
maladaptation' or 'ensuring headroom.' Maladaptation is defined as the 
"[actions] taken that reduce the options or ability of decision-makers now or in 
the future to manage the impacts of climate change. Such actions are sometimes 
described as reducing climate headroom” (Willows and Connell 2003, Table 1, p. 
11). This implies an emergent form of knowledge and resultant rationale of 
ensuring headroom, whereas robust decisions are seen as finite actions.
This distinction is reinforced by the fact that 'maladaptation' appears as 
the final, distinct, category in a list that includes 'under-adaptation' and 'over­
adaptation' w ith their implications of prescient knowledge as independent 
categories in a table entitled "Maladaptation and other climate change decision 
errors” [ibid., p. 11) . These distinctions and the use of the word 'other' means 
that the tensions between predictive and emergent knowledge are not resolved 
into a single rationale in the problematization of adaptation.
4.3 'No regret' decisions
A similar kind of supplementary moment of emergent knowledge/time and 
resultant rationale appears in the concept of 'no regret' or 'low regret' options 
(Willows and Connell 2003, p. 30). In Stage 4 it is stated that no and low regret 
options "should" be identified "at the outset" [ibid., p.40). In the 2003 Report's 
glossary, no regret options are defined as:
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“Adaptation options (or measures) that would be justified under all 
plausible future scenarios... A no regret option could be one that is 
determined to be worthwhile now (in that it  would yield immediate 
economic and environmental benefits which exceed its cost), and continue 
to be worthwhile irrespective of the nature of future climate. (See also 
Limited or low regret options.)" [ibid., p.40).
Low regrets is presented as a slightly softer version of no-regrets, which operates 
on the basis that " if you're making a decision now [...] then maybe tweaks in the 
design [which] you can make are quite low cost that w ill build in capacity" 
(Interviewee H 2009, p. 15). In terms of being appropriate for all "plausible 
future scenarios," no regrets decisions on the one hand rely on the predictive 
knowledge of scenarios to determine the limits and characteristics of future 
climate events, but on the other hand imply a strategic approach that allows for 
emergence. In relation to the latter, the value of these options is that they are 
non-constraining decisions that improve the adaptation of the organization w ith 
very little  cost to present or future selves. This could be interpreted as building 
general capacity in recognition of an epistemology of irreducible uncertainty, 
rather than seeking an optimum option for a defined range of scenarios, as is the 
case w ith 'robust' decisions. However, the absence of the concept of capacity here 
and throughout the document is testament to how limited this im plicit account of 
socio-contextual knowledge and rationale is. Further, the focus on the external 
climate may render invisible particular no-regret options, particularly where 
these relate to social characteristics. This w ill be discussed in more detail in the 
next Chapter on ontology.
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The focus on 'low hanging fru it' or immediate and easy benefits that don't 
reduce and perhaps even build future capacity arose for several reasons. One 
was that there was a concern that people simply would be paralysed by 
uncertainty into being unable to make any decisions at all. 'No regrets' were good 
at dealing w ith this uncertainty in a positive way (Interviewee H 2009, p. 14]. 
This indicates a power/knowledge and fantasmatic explanation for the quite a 
strong emphasis on these kinds of options w ith in the report as arising because 
robust decisions resolve the uncertainty of decision-makers about the validity of 
decision-making itself: "because it's basically something [the stakeholder] should 
be doing now anyway because it w ill help [them] deal w ith current climate 
variability..." (Interviewee H 2009, p. 14]. Robust decisions, where these are 
characterized as low regret, no regret or low-hanging fruit, also avail themselves 
of a fantasmatic appeal to current identity, by making adaptation 'easy' through 
targeting the options do not represent any significant changes or cost in 
implementing. There is a power/knowledge element to this for UKCIP too, as in 
appealing to stakeholders it  is better able to encourage take-up.
However, this has a significant impact on the problematization's rationale, 
making the central question: how do we fit adaptation to our existing agenda, 
rather than the things that might be essential for adaptation to substantial risks, 
or for improving adaptive capacity. This rearticulates this supplementary 
moment to the core problematization's concern w ith existing decision-structures 
and limited change. This makes it  clear that in practice although these 
supplementary moments allow the entrance of a slightly more socio-contextual 
account, they are still tied into political rationale of "tinkering at the edges" 
(UKCIP Interviewee F 2009, p. 16]. This limits the pressure to engage w ith a
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more emergent account of knowledge and a political rationale that takes this on 
board in a transformational sense, as discussed in Chapter 1. The role of'existing 
objectives' and the problem of 'tinkering at the edges' w ill be discussed in much 
more detail in Chapter 6 on the ontology of adaptation, and the effect of these 
lim its in Chapter 7.
4.4 Adaptive Management and reiterative decision-making
All of the supplements discussed so far are in a limited fashion responsive to the 
problem of irreducible uncertainty. In the report, the most explicit moment that 
deals w ith this occurs in the concept of 'adaptive management.' Adaptive 
management is understood as “the process of making the best decision at each 
decision point, and reviewing the performance of previous decisions” (Willows 
and Connell 2003, p. 30). The process of changing existing decisions to 
incorporate climate change is reinforced here by the sudden appearance of the 
phrase "at each decision point." This adds a new temporal division within the 
epistemic unit of 'the decision,' allowing for a new ontology of the "interval of 
decision” pointing to a heightened inclusion of the irreducible uncertainty in the 
means of knowing and acting (Adey and Anderson 2011). However, no 
explanation or epistemology is introduced for knowing these 'intra-decision' 
points.
Nonetheless, adaptive management as a more emergent, less-linear 
approach is supported by the report's statement that: "the emphasis of this 
framework on adaptive management strategy supported by post-decision 
monitoring and appraisal is essentially a defence against uncertainty, recognizing 
that for many aspects of climate change adaptation, uncertainty w ill be
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significant" {ibid., p. 53]. This problematization of adaptation to climate change is 
in stark contrast to the account of risk and uncertainty in the opening narrative. 
Here it  is again clear that, instead of climate impacts being the threat, the 
uncertainty about those impacts is itself the threat. The resulting 
problematization, if  this is drawn out, is that adaptation here is not the actual 
decisions that are made, but is rather the adaptive process of making decisions. 
As a result, instead of focusing on decisions as outcomes, the object and subject 
of adaptation becomes the process of making, implementing and changing 
decisions.
However, the brevity of the 'Monitoring and Review Stage' detracts from 
the significance of this supplementary rationale. Monitoring is stated to be useful 
for the "detection of trends which require a new problem to be resolved and the 
decision-making process to be initiated...and [can be used for] supporting 
emergency and other rapid adaptation responses" {ibid., p. 39). These represent 
a supplementary political logic that is responsive to irreducible uncertainty, 
through knowledge approaching real time or surveillance modes of knowing. 
However, there are no tools or questions listed here to give any indication of how 
to practically build this into the account of adaptation, undermining their 
conceptual contribution. In fact the terms "new problem" and "initiated" create 
the understanding that rather than seeing the same decision as emergent this 
iteration is imagined as being a different problem. This reinstates a pre-emptive 
rather than responsive imaginary, although it may be cyclical rather than simply 
linear. In a similar way, the colocation of 'rapid adaptation' that follows implies 
this understanding is different from 'normal adaptation', again reinstating the
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core problematization of adaptation as pre-emptive over a much longer time 
frame, and occluding a fuller investigation of the supplement.
A further supplementary moment resonates w ith  this supplementary 
rationale, and contributes to the flexibility not only to the type of decision but 
also its temporality. One of the five "Key questions for Stage 4" asks:
"Can the options be defined in a flexible manner to allow for sources of 
uncertainty? E.G. can adaptation options be identified that could be 
increased at a later date, or implemented separately or in combination or 
in sequence to provide flexible levels of response to risk?" [ibid., p. 31).
No direct explanation of this is given in the page dedicated to the explanation of 
these questions, and it  is certainly not part of the narrative about adaptation. As 
such, by omission of further articulation, this idea remains as a supplemental 
moment of the core problematization.
However, a substantive rationale of adaptation which fits w ith  the 
supplementary moment above appears in the report's claim that: "[the] adaptive 
management process] should be directed towards an overall strategic objective. 
In all cases an objective must be to keep open possible future options, that is, 
avoid decisions that constrain future options for adaptation” [ibid., p. 30). The 
phrasing "must be" implies that it is central to successful adaptation. Yet very 
little  focus is given to explaining this, undercutting the strength of this statement 
and its place in the problematization. This statement is further mitigated in its 
imperative mode by the use of "an objective," which makes it  unclear what the 
relative importance of this objective is, as opposed to any others the organisation 
might have. Furthermore, 'Stage 5: Appraising options', barely considers the 
value of keeping options open [ibid., pp. 32-35).
201
When asked about the significance of these moments one of the key 
authors replied: "there is no sense that we are saying 'this is more important 
than anything else you're doing' [...] It's meant to be 'when you're doing what 
you're doing, th ink about these things, and integrate them into what you're 
doing" (Interviewee H 2009, p. 15]. The second reply was: "No, I th ink we're sort 
of saying you should have -you should give that [idea] more weight or this is 
something you really ought to think about and um, rather than rushing in to you 
know, some very inflexible decision..." (Interviewee C 2009, p. 14]. Whilst there 
is still a variation here, both authors agree that it shouldn’t  imperatively change 
the existing objectives of an organisation. It seems likely that there was a political 
tension here between the desire to push this idea conceptually, but concern at 
making too high a demand. The result of walking this line is the appearance of 
these supplementary moments as supplements, in the crucial area of political 
rationale of the problematization of adaptation, and it  leads to a lack of 
investigation of the problematization into how to realize these ideas, thus 
lim iting the account of adaptation even as it  opens it  up.
5.0 Supplementary moments: social knowledges
5.1 Socio-Economic Scenarios
The tension between quantitative and qualitative forms of knowledge is a 
recurring theme in UKCIP's problematization of climate change. As discussed in 
the previous chapter one social mode of knowing occurred through the use of the 
Socio-Economic Scenarios but it  was subsumed into the epistemology of a 
scientific approach through the tendency to quantify its results, and prioritize
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climate-scenario based knowledge. In Hulme and Dessai's (2008) terms, the 
statistical use of the SES epistemology undermined its intended heuristic 
function, and made its epistemic mode quantitative and hence product-based 
rather than qualitative and hence process-based. These same epistemic tensions 
are repeated as supplements w ithin the 2003 document.
The first point to discuss then is the general exclusion of qualitative, social 
forms of knowledge. Whilst there are references to qualitative risk and scenario 
techniques, these are not built into the overall methodology of the framework. 
The key authors were aware of this occlusion at the time, but the need for a 
guideline that was calculable, easily replicable, and ultimately held stakeholders 
responsible created a drive for a 'rational' and broadly quantifiable response. As 
Interviewee H put it:
“ [One author] used to quite casually say to me when we were working on 
this, was, 'well of course this framework assumes that decision makers are 
rational, and clearly they're not,' and so we -tha t was always a kind of 
underlying unsaid comment -well, it  does get mentioned in [the 2003 
document], but it doesn't really get much air time, and there is obviously 
loads of literature on, on actually how decisions are made, so this is very 
very rational, how you 'should do it', but er [laughs] real life 'ain't like 
that'” (Interviewee H 2009, p. 20).
This is a remarkable statement. It recognizes a whole area of knowledge about 
the nature of decision-making as a process that is central to the approach but not 
included at all in the document. In failing to discuss the notion of 'rationality,' it 
excludes the area of knowledge to do w ith the social or organisational norms and 
assumptions on which adaptation strategies are formulated, including the
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previously mentioned issue of whether they are collective or self-interested. It 
furthermore excludes an investigation of the social structures and norms that aid 
adaptation, however this is conceived. This w ill be discussed in further detail in 
Chapter 6 as this epistemic occlusion is in part based on the ontology at the core 
of the report's problematization.
The exception to this is the limited appearance of the Socio-Economic 
Scenarios w ith in the report, which were not explicitly marked in Part 1 in the 
account of risk assessment, and receiving only half a page in the account of the 
role of scenarios in risk assessment in Part 2 (Willows and Connell 2003, see 
section 3.7, p. 85], as opposed to the five and a half pages on climate scenarios 
and their various statistical supplements. This balance is reproduced in their 
lim ited use in UKCIP practices and stakeholder take-up as confirmed through the 
interviews (UKCIP Interviewee E 2009, Interviewee H 2009, UKCIP Interviewee F 
2009]. This confirms the supplementary function of the SES, and limits the extent 
to which they can trigger any examination of the stakeholder's own social 
relations and capacities that animate its adaptation decisions and responses.
5.2 Social-knowledge based “tools"
Despite the limited use of the Socio-Economic Scenarios, the 2003 report makes 
several attempts to include other social forms of knowledge. Crucially, these are 
tied in as supplements to the core problematization's techno-scientific 
epistemology through being introduced as alternative means of accounting for 
risk. One key articulation of these elements occurs is in the concept of 'risk 
assessment.' Risk assessment is defined as involving:
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“either quantitative or qualitative techniques and information to describe 
the nature of the probability component of the risk... Qualitative 
techniques are particularly useful in circumstances where we lack 
knowledge of the probabilities” (Willows and Connell 2003, p. 44).
Here, the clouding of the different meanings of risk as both statistical probability 
and a more general account of threat enables this definition of risk to meet its 
"truth condition.” In etic terms, this claim could be represented as: the use of 
non-probabilistic information to provide information for probabilistic 
assessment where probabilistic information is lacking. This re-articulation of 
qualitative knowledge into probabilistic knowledge does not make it  more 
accurate. It simply makes it  fit, for example, through equating of subjective 
descriptions to numerical probabilities and the 'pedigree scores' given to 
qualitative descriptions of risk so that their 'reliability' can be factored into a 
quantified risk assessment [ibid., p. 26). The assigning numerical values 
obfuscates the lack of probabilistic accuracy, and at the same time simplifies the 
depth of descriptive and relational knowledge present in the original qualitative 
form. The epistemic difficulty this poses is overtly recognized later, in Part 2, 
which assumes a more open mode: "[it] is generally...best for the risk assessor 
to present outcomes in terms appropriate to the receptor, using multiple 
attributes where necessary”  {ibid., pp. 45-6). However, this would disrupt the 
political rationale of calculability and clarity in Part 1, and raises the prospect of 
a very different epistemic approach which is easier to leave unresolved in the 
'additional' nature of Part 2, exemplified by the more open, educative mode it 
assumes.
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The use of qualitative knowledge to 'cover over' the gaps in quantitative 
knowledge is repeated in the assertion that lim its to risk might be as vague as 
“worst- and best-case scenarios” and that "[these] bounds should reflect the 
extent of our uncertainty of the risk." (ibid., p. 45]. As discussed above, this allows 
scenarios to function in a heuristic manner, rather than offering precise 
alternatives and lim its [let alone accurate ones], according to the epistemic 
norms of the techno-scientific core problematization. However, again we see the 
unwillingness to accept social knowledges on their own terms. In this particular 
case, it  is suggested that the uncertainty of scenarios can be masked by expert 
judgement, but the uncertainty which arises from subjectivity as a result can be 
given a value by "canvassing the expert judgment of a larger sample of people 
w ith  similar expertise” (ibid., p. 45]. This demonstrates an attempt to use 
quantitative epistemology to assess a qualitative one, and misses the deeper uses 
of these opinions in a heuristic sense. The lack of development leaves entire 
swathes of tacit and im plicit knowledge un-recognized and un-tapped, and filters 
out elements of those knowledges that are not easily adapted, meaning that only 
a shadow of these epistemic elements remains while they are articulated as 
supplements, preventing them from re-shaping the core problematization.
In 2003, this mode of approach is intimated in a very basic supplementary 
form as a way of gaining an image of the type of threat itself, rather than 
accounting for its degree or precise nature. This occurs for example in a list of 
tools that include: 'brainstorming,' 'consultation exercises,' ‘focus groups,' and 
the 'Analysis of Interconnected Decision Areas' [AIDA], amongst others. These 
are modes of knowing whose objective is to establish the core normative and
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social aspects of the decision-making process, from identifying objectives, 'risk 
assessment endpoints' or thresholds, and the 'exposure units' or systems at risk 
{ibid., see pp. 17-18, for example). However, these social modes of knowing 
which form the account of the system are not explained in any detail in terms of 
why they are useful for ensuring an accurate knowledge of the system, although 
it  is nonetheless made clear that they are necessary for knowing the system that 
responds and for avoiding knock-on effects, which w ill be discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 6.
Crucially, in the 2003 report, these tools are used in Stages 1 to 5 but 
when combined w ith  the pre-emptive mode of knowledge that arises from the 
scientific framing, this limits the degree to which they shape the 
problematization. As such, they are not deployed in stages 6, 7 or 8, which cover 
making, implementing, and monitoring and reviewing the decision. See 
"Summary of tools and techniques" (Willows and Connell 2003, pp. 123-4). And 
yet, it  seems fairly clear that the social forms a major part of knowing how these 
unfold (Adey and Anderson 2011, Anderson 2010, Pelling et al. 2008). This raises 
the question: how are decisions actually agreed and made as a social process? 
How are they communicated during their formation, as well as in their emergent 
implementation? How is monitoring communicated, valued and assessed? The 
failure to integrate these particular knowledge techniques throughout the 
adaptation process means that they remain as supplementary moments, and 
through their exclusion help maintain the sense of linearity that ensures the 
prescient, pre-emptive rationale of the problematization.
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One crucial aspect of these supplementary forms of knowledge is the 
'tacit' and social rather than technical organizational knowledge that enables a 
stakeholder's organization or institution to function, and make decisions. In the 
observations of stakeholder meetings, this knowledge is drawn on during the 
brainstorming exercises at the beginning of the risk assessment, p rio r to any 
detailed quantification, in order to produce an account of the likelihood of a 
particular impact on the organization occurring. So if, for example, the scenarios 
predicted the general increase in hot weather during summer months and a 
radically increased incidence of heat waves, the impact on the organization might 
be air-conditioning failure and the need to close offices. The likelihood of this 
occurring was established through tacit knowledge of the system's 
vulnerabilities according to past experiences of failure, and the likelihood of 
these environmental conditions as established by the scenarios.
This demonstrates a significant difference between the place of this 
supplementary moment in 2003 and the increasing role of social forms of 
knowledge through the practice of the collective assessment of vulnerability 
demonstrated in the stakeholder workshops that were observed in 2009, as part 
of the LCLIP approach. The place of this form of assessment at the beginning of 
the process demonstrates that the risk assessment was heavily dependent on 
what the individuals present had actually experienced, or knew -  tacitly or 
otherwise -  to be areas of vulnerability.
However, the dominance of the core epistemology is (re]established in the 
utilisation of these forms of knowledge as products, rather than as processes, in 
the later stages of assessment. This meant that, despite how crucial they are to 
the effective functioning of the risk assessment and decision making process (and
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potentially implementation and monitoring and review stages as well), their 
exclusion from the problematization means that building the capacity to create 
and act on these forms of knowledge is also occluded.
This section has argued that different forms of social knowledge w ith in 
the document and in UKCIP’s practices act as supplements to the core 
epistemology. This reduction of the full v is ib ility and validity of social modes of 
knowing lim its their exploration for a rationale of adaptation and account of 
adaptation practices. They are, particularly in the early years, articulated 
'subsidiary' supplementary moments that add to the core, techno-scientific 
problematization based on risk, by providing additional sources of quasi- 
quantifiable risk, and additional means for imagining potential impacts. In this 
way they are able to 'cover over’ the irreducible uncertainty of climate change 
itself and the inability of risk to be tru ly  probabilistic, whilst leaving the core 
problematization apparently intact. However, their increasing presence 
im plicitly threatens to supplant the core problematization because they imply 
recognition of the limits of prescient knowledge and preemptive decisions, as 
well as revealing the inability of techno-science to account for the range of social 
practices that have a bearing on adaptation strategies and practices. The 
implications of this w ill be discussed further in Chapter 7.
6.0 Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that the 2003 document is premised on the 
objective of making scientific knowledge useable by stakeholders, and does this 
prim arily through the use of risk-based technologies. It argues for a
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problematization of adaptation that sees the lack of reliable climate change 
knowledge on which to base a planned decision as the problem. It resolves this 
by on the one hand noting the usefulness of climate change scenarios and their 
reliability, and on the other hand by resolving the lack of certainty produced by 
uncertain climate change (and im plicitly by uncertain climate science) through 
the use of risk. This is established in an authoritative narrative form that effects 
the exclusion of uncertainty and the validity of its approach first by creating a 
narrative and syntactic equivalence between uncertainty and risk, such that risk 
is held to account for uncertainty in full, and second by relegating more nuanced 
and lim ited accounts of risk's real ability to do this to Part 2 of the report. This 
particular 'covering over' of the lack is sustained throughout the report through 
the articulation as supplementary moments of any alternative accounts of 
uncertainty and its resolution.
Knowing through risk as part of the solution assumes a rationale of 
seeking risk-based knowledge as the first order of business, but is articulated to 
the concept of ‘the decision' and 'decision-making' as the account of political 
action. This is also established in the opening narrative, and enabled through the 
theoretical association of 'risk' and 'decision.' Accounting for the practice of 
adaptation as 'a decision,' and linking this to the necessity of defining objects and 
scenarios in risk analysis, limits the account of adapting to an essentially discrete 
moment both in space and time.
This shift changes the object of knowledge from the actual climate and 
abstract environmental impacts to the direct impacts of the climate and climate 
change on the stakeholder. It is given epistemic meaning through risk's role in 
dealing w ith the inherent uncertainty of these scenarios. As such, climate change
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scenarios still remain the core means of knowing climate change, but are 
mediated through risk to reproblematize the impacts from the point of view of 
the individual stakeholder. In part this pre-emptive, planned rationale arises 
from the long term mode of the scenarios, and the historical origin of 
environmental management w ith regard to long-term physical infrastructure. 
Together, these elements and their particular articulation in moments produces a 
techno-scientific prescient epistemology and pre-emptive political rationale 
w ith in  the problematization of adaptation.
There are supplementary moments to all of these conceptual points, 
however. These occur in the concepts of 'robust' and no-regret decisions, which 
open up the possibility of an emergent account of time and of political rationale. 
However, the understanding of linear time w ith  pre-emptive, planned decisions 
is more fundamentally disrupted by the concepts of "flexible decisions" and 
"keeping options open" and "avoiding knock-on effects." These create a political 
logic that responds to the assumption of irreducible uncertainty that is not held 
to be resolved through risk.
However, even though these approaches are articulated into the core 
problematization because they are not explored in any depth. The result is that, 
although these decisions are smarter and more flexible, they are used to 
reinforce the assumption that adaptation is essentially based on prescient 
knowledge and pre-emptive decisions. Similarly, the failure to develop a more 
integrated account of implementation, monitoring and review, and the reluctance 
to intervene in the timetables of decision already extant in stakeholder 
organisations, serves to reinforce this pre-emptive, non-flexible relation between 
the times of decision and the process of adaptation.
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As such, the articulation of social forms of knowledge as supplementary 
moments only expands the problematization so far; their articulation as 
supplements means they are also lim it points that leave the systemic capacities 
which enable the production of this knowledge, and especially its possibilities in 
the implementation of decisions implicit, rather than explicit. The exclusion of 
social forms of knowledge means that decisions are also understood as discrete 
in space, which w ill be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
However, the interviews and observations in particular demonstrate 
some developments and intensifications of these moments, particularly in the 
increasing use of vulnerability in the problematization of adaptation. However, 
during the active research window the fundamental configuration of systemic 
knowledge and awareness remained subsidiary to outcome-based risk as the 
primary problematization of adaptation as its techniques were directed at 
supplementing the risk approach.
This subsidiarity is ensured linguistically in several ways. In the report, 
qualitative knowledge is represented as a sub-optimal proxy for probabilistic 
risk where no quantitative data is available, or where quantitative data is too 
costly or time consuming to provide. Second, although social means of knowing 
offer a way of accounting for the nature of the system at risk -  its qualities and 
capacities, outcomes are nonetheless prioritized. Crucially, this means that while 
collective knowledge-making and other social forms of knowledge have come to 
be utilized in the opening stages of UKCIP's approach to adaptation, they are 
lim ited and non-explicit in the later stages of making a decision, implementation, 
monitoring and review.
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However, when taken out of their linguistic articulation to the core, the 
supplementary moments also present epistemic elements that rupture its 
cohesion by prompting alternative ways of knowing and responding to the 
irreducible uncertainty through shifting the object of knowledge from climate 
and technological risk as outcome to socio-contextual knowledge and capacity. 
This potential to supplant the core problematization w ill be discussed further in 
Chapter 7.
In sum, the problematization of adaptation is tied to an epistemology 
based on outcomes, making its political rationale one of pre-emptive and discrete 
decisions, rather than capacity and emergence, likening it  to the techno-scientific, 
linear model of adaptation presented in Chapter 1. The next chapter w ill discuss 
the ontology of UKCIP's problematization in more detail, and develop the effects 
of prioritiz ing discrete and pre-emptive decisions rather than emergent systems 
or processes for the account of the subject and object of adaptation, and the 
account of action or agency that this entails.
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Chapter 6: Ontology and its supplements: space, actors and 
agency
7  don't think we ever really bottomed [...] that one out really, [ if ]  some 
people lose out but society as a whole has gained, then is i t  a bad decision?"
Interviewee C 2009, p. 4
1.0 Introduction
The previous chapter identified the way in which the application to climate 
change of a techno-scientific mode of knowledge, particularly as risk, produced a 
particular relationship between knowledge, time, and action. This predictive and 
objective epistemology structured how climate change was imagined as a threat, 
w ith  the result that the political rationale, or strategy, of adaptation tended to 
premise its assessment and response on scientific or quantitative knowledge of 
the 'external' biophysical threat. This predictive knowledge was then used pre­
emptively in planned adaptation. The epistemology at the base of this rationale, 
and the pre-emptive, decision based rationale itself, respond to and reinforce a 
particular ontology of the subjects and objects of adaptation and how they are 
assumed to be able to act or have agency, adding the final layer to the political 
rationale of the problematization. As w ith any discourse, these are particular: 
what is rendered visible makes other aspects invisible, resulting in the projection 
of certain strategies and the occlusion of others.
This chapter w ill examine how these ontological moments are articulated at 
the macro and micro level, observing basic inclusions/exclusions enabled by
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power/knowledge relations and the smaller linguistic operations that justify 
these. It breaks these ontological moments down into their place in the 
problematization. First, observing how the 'time' of adaptation established in the 
last chapter generates a particular moment and 'space' of adaptation, in Part 2. 
Then it  goes on to consider how scenarios generated an imaginary of the threat 
of climate change as biophysical and external, and how this helps constitute an 
account of the objects that need to adapt in Part 3. Part 4 considers the account of 
the subjects that 'do' this adaptation, which in Part 5 is developed into the 
account of agency im plicit in UKCIP’s discourse, and the implication of this for its 
political rationale. The second half of the chapter, Parts 6, 7 and 8, demonstrate a 
range of supplementary moments to this ontology, both in terms of time and 
space, and the very different imaginary of subjects and their agency as a result. 
Each section also demonstrates how these supplementary ontological elements 
are (re)articulated to the core problematization so that it  remains in place. The 
next Chapter w ill explore how all of the supplementary moments -  both 
epistemic and ontological - together suggest a supplementary problematization 
of adaptation as a whole.
2.0The time of adaptation: Future, outcome-based account of threat
The previous chapter on epistemology discussed how a techno-scientific account 
imagined knowledge as a product, rather than as an emergent process, and 
discussed the imaginary of action this produced as sim ilarly product based. This 
is an ontological as well as epistemic account, and serves to locate the time and 
nature of adaptation in planned, pre-emptive decisions. A representative
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statement from UKCIP in their meetings w ith stakeholders would be: "I was 
making the case for a planned approach to this" (UKCIP Interviewee E 2009, p. 1) 
which tends to combine w ith a negative account of a 'reactive' adaptation 
response, such as this: "one of the things that is a slight concern from our 
perspective is that there's a tendency to be very reactive, which is often not the 
most cost-effective way of dealing w ith things" (UKCIP Staff Member in 
Stakeholder B Observation 2009a, p. 11].
UKCIP is clearly representing an ontology of adaptation as planned. In the 
last quote, this is established in particular through distinguishing adaptation 
from a reactive response. 'Reactive' adaptation is articulated in negative terms 
w ith  'concern' and 'not...cost effective,' which although it  positively situates a 
planned approach and justifies it, also works to occlude reactive or real-time 
responses, and establishes planning as the core ontological account of 
adaptation's political rationale.
This in turn links back to the temporal framing established by the scenarios 
discussed in the previous chapter. The fact that these account for climate change 
in 30 year time-spans means that resilience or real-time approaches, as "virtually 
by definition, wouldn't be looking at the impacts of climate change, because over 
a five year period you can't make any reasonable expectation of change" (UKCIP 
Interviewee A 2009, p. 5]. As such, the combination of the time frame established 
epistemologically and the concern to ensure adaptation is acted on pre-emptively 
combine to lim it the temporal location of adaptation, excluding the event itself.
Critically, this prevents any explicit imaginary of adaptation action and 
agency as occurring at the time of the event, or emerging as the event unfolds. As 
a key staff member noted: "I don't really use the term resilience much. I th ink
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more in terms of sensitivity [...] or how robust one is" [UKCIP Interviewee F 
2009, p. 18). This reflects a common assumption in all of the interviews that 
robustness and resilience were equated in the sense that they were seen as 
preconditions for adaptation, and as inherent, fixed measures of vulnerability 
[for example, Interviewee H 2009, p. 18). As such, they were not investigated in 
terms of how they related to the temporal unfolding of climate change in relation 
to specific phenomena or events.
As we shall see, this limited window of action drastically reduces the amount 
of discursive investment in the subjects and structures that enable adaptation to 
happen. However, another reason for the lim ited account of the subject is 
because of the focus on climate change itself as an externally generated threat. 
This w ill be discussed further in the following section.
3.0 The space of adaptation
3.1 Account of the threat in the problematization of adaptation
The climate change scenarios played a major role in constructing and lim iting the 
'time' of adaptation through their account of the threat of climate change. One of 
the clearest examples of this ontology occurs in the maps produced of climate 
change scenarios in the report. These are highly detailed images and graphs of 
prospective climates. So it is perhaps unsurprising that "[stakeholders] find it  
easier to accept the climate [scenarios part] of it in some ways, because they're 
being given maps and data and numbers -  and they go 'oh yeah, I can see what it 
looks like’" [Interviewee H 2009, p.21). The physical representation of these 
possible effects helps bring them to presence in the present [Anderson 2010).
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This tangibility makes them part of the ontological reality in which decision­
makers operate. It should be noted that this clear imaginary was subsequently 
made much more complex by UKCP'09, the climate projections that were 
published at the end of the research period. Although these were intended to 
demonstrate uncertainty more effectively, they did this by providing more rather 
than less data in the form of images and statistical data sets, and increasing the 
tangibility of climate change through detailed tools, such as the Weather 
Generator, for example (Defra 2012a). As such, the demonstration of uncertainty 
was prevented from appearing as an ontological condition of ' irreducible 
ignorance' (Luhmann 1998) because if  anything the information was more 
precise in nature even if  it  was not more accurate (Dessai et al. 2009).
Climate impacts scenarios thereby appear to bring the excess or the 
'divine' into the 'profane' through the act or representing it, or 'naming' it  in 
Ranciere's terms (Ranciere 2007b, Ranciere 2001). However as these events 
haven't actually 'happened' it glosses over the void or the gap in our ability to 
fully know irreducible uncertainty. This raises the temporal question of when is 
adaptation said to happen? Is adaptation the actual response to the event when it 
happens, or is it  the response to the 'event' before it happens, and which really, 
never happens? These are colossal differences in the problematization of social 
order. Transformation in not seeking to account for the excess is able to emerge 
w ith it  at the event horizon, whereas a problematization based on pre-emptive 
knowledge prepares at a self-imposed event horizon in lieu of an actual event, 
leaving the event itself beyond the purview of adaptation, and remaining at that 
point of 'coping.' As such not merely the social response but the knowledge to 
which that responds is a key part of the account of adaptation.
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By contrast, as described in the previous chapter, there was simply not as 
much visceral substance given to the socio-economic scenarios, and they 
received far less practical guidance to their use from UKCIP staff. This meant that 
these, and alternative social imaginaries were much less tangible than their 
biophysical counterparts, and being less easily adopted were less used. In fact, by 
the time of the research, they received no reference whatsoever in any of the 
opening presentations observed or recorded (Stakeholder A Observation 2009, 
Stakeholder B Observation 2009a, Stakeholder B Observation 2009b]. The 
significance of this is that it removes from consideration the whole raft of social 
being as significant either in accounting for external sources of threat.
However, it  should be noted that by the time of the observations, climate 
impacts were being accounted for in terms of 'indirect impacts' on the 
stakeholder (Stakeholder B Observation 2009, p. 8). This imaginary of the 
location of the problem to which adaptation responds clearly steps away from a 
purely biophysical threat and intimates that it plays out through systemic 
connections of which the organization is part, locating the threat in the nature of 
those connections. However, the phrasing, "indirect impacts,” nonetheless 
reinstates 'impacts' and the connection to the techno-scientific core.
When the most organization-focused UKCIP staff member was asked 
about whether she felt constrained by UKCIP's climate change remit, she 
commented "maybe that is one of our messages: that you cannot separate 
[climate change from other risks], it is not useful to separate it ” (UKCIP 
Interviewee B 2009, p. 6]. The same member went on to note "sometimes I 
think... we have [the] perception that [scientific information] is more influential 
than it actually is [...] You know, we produce these scientific scenarios -
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projections, and I th ink it  would be useful to have a better understanding of the 
decision-making processes...” [ibid., p. 7). These different renditions of climate 
change's place in the account of the threat to which adaptation responds makes it  
clear that far from being resolved, the tension identified by the original report 
authors was being given increased verbal recognition in stakeholder meetings 
and internally at UKCIP, and as such was becoming more central rather than 
supplementary. The question that this raises is at what point does this alter the 
starting point of adaptation from climate change impacts to an internally- 
generated account of wider threat, or indeed start instead from an internal 
account of vulnerability and capacity.
3.2 Location of adaptation: at the edge of the internal system
The ontology of the climate change threat as originating externally and as a 
properly long-term concern had significant implications for the imaginary of 
what was at risk; it  led to a focus on physical objects that were directly related to 
the biophysical environment, such as major infrastructure. In their 
representation of adaptation, UKCIP staff and report authors tend to have such 
examples as their first recourse: Interviewee H gave the example of building a 
bridge, Interviewee C of the Thames Barrier, and Interviewee F of building a 
reservoir (Interviewee H 2009, UKCIP Interviewee F 2009, Interviewee C 2009). 
This may also be due to the environmental management origin of the discourse 
discussed in the previous chapter, or it may be that these represent simple 
examples to quickly communicate the concept of adaptation. Regardless of 
reason or origin, these articulate the objects of adaptation in a very 'object' like
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form, as physical, quantifiable, and external as 'products', rather than as social, 
qualitative, or internal characteristics as 'processes.'
Although the infrastructural objects that are acted on are external 
products of the stakeholder system, the recalibration of the threat itself from 
external climate to the risk to the organization means that the location of 
adaptation happens at the interface of the stakeholder system and these external 
events:
"[One] of the challenges we had was whether [the report] should just be 
about using the UKCIP climate forecasts [...] we said absolutely not, so, 
um, what we said was you're better to understand what level of climate 
risk you can tolerate, what level of rainfall, you know is... is sufficient to 
cause harm that's actually important to you, [...] Ah so you know you plan 
for -to  manage your risk, so understand the risk evaluate it" (Interviewee 
C 2009, pp. 25-26}.
This quote makes clear that adaptation is to external events, taking the possible 
changes in climate as a starting point, identifying impacts on the system, and 
deciding what level of event is actually significant before designing a response to 
those specifically identified threats, rather than seeking generalized capacity. 
This articulation presents an ontology in which the location of the threat is a 
combination of the nature of the stakeholder where it interfaces w ith biophysical 
climate change.
However, this ontology is characterized in terms of the elements most 
valid for the risk-based epistemology. Stage 2 Part B of the report characterizes 
social space through the technical terminology of 'exposure units' ‘receptors' and 
'risk assessment endpoints' (Willows and Connell 2003, pp. 14-15). However,
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there is no terminology or narrative that requires an account of the internal 
system in terms of the connections that create those units, or the flows and 
dependencies internally that create these points as significant in the first place.
In this way, the system is assumed to be static, external points are 
considered but their contingency on the internal nature of the system is not part 
of the analysis. The depth of the imaginary of the social body that adapts is 
somewhat lim ited as a result, and excluded from being a core object of 
adaptation knowledge itself. The result is that, although there is a transition from 
the focus on explicitly environmental systems to the interface of the stakeholder 
and environment via risk, there is little  consideration of non-physical relations 
w ith  climate change, and in particular of the internal relations of social or 
organisational systems. Rather, the products of these systems, in their most 
tangible forms, seem to be the focus of attention.
A further side to this exclusion appears not only in the description of the 
threat but in the resultant political rationale and account of the solution. This is 
apparent in the lack of exploration of the social infrastructure that enables a 
decision, and the contrasting focus on the technology of decision analysis in the 
report. Asked whether, in terms of scenarios, "the knowledge that you're gaining 
about the decision making process is more to do w ith the internal system or the 
responses to the external system?” Interviewee C responded:
"Well I th ink it's both. I mean I -scenarios are always more about trying to 
identify the things you don't have control of, so they're around the 
externalities. [...] I always make quite a clear distinction between [...] 
scenarios [...] and the things that you can do about [them] which are 
effectively the options that you could control. [...] It's not black and white,
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but it's a useful way of sort of structuring decision problems" (Interviewee 
C 2009, pp. 5-6).
This account clearly locates the threat outside of the social system that responds, 
and in doing so assumes that climate change adaptation happens at the interface 
of the stakeholder system and the external system. As such, the 'options' of 
response tend to assume internal stasis, and in doing so exclude this as a location 
of adaptation.
3.3 The social as external threat and condition
Although it  was largely excluded in the account of the 'internal' subject, the social 
does appear as an external threat in a limited form. In the report this occurs in 
several ways, but occurs first when climate change is listed as one of multiple 
threats, and that these "non-climate risks" should also be taken into account 
(Willows and Connell 2003, pp. VI-VII; p. 17). As discussed in Chapter 4, the 
significance of this statement is curtailed in the report itself in order to present a 
strong case for climate change adaptation at all. It seems that in practice this did 
not fall away as climate change became more accepted. In one 2009 observation 
of a stakeholder meeting, one UKCIP staff member reflected on this ontology of 
threat as: "climate change is one of those drivers, and we're looking at this 
[adaptation] in the context of everything else [...] so it's a case of almost 
mainstreaming the idea of climate change w ith in all the other challenges" (UKCIP 
Interviewee E in Stakeholder A Observation 2009, p. 13).
However, as one report author noted, "taking account of non-climate 
factors and their interaction w ith  climate factors [is] in there, [but] nothing's 
mandatory" (Interviewee H 2009, p. 21). This is understating the case slightly.
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Although included, the lack of conceptual integration of social sources of threat 
into the problematization means that 'other threats' are only included insofar as 
the stakeholder organization is aware of them or prioritizes them, rather than 
developing an explicit method of linking the two together, leaving social sources 
of threat as subsidiary supplementary moments in UKCIP's problematization. 
This certainly seems to resonate w ith the occlusion of social forms of knowledge 
(Willows and Connell 2003, p. 50] in understanding these as threats, and 
ultimately for the rationale and solution, as discussed in chapter 5.
In a sense, this limited presence of the social is a hangover from the 
previous problematization, which was founded on determining biophysical 
scenarios and spreading the message that they were a threat. However, while the 
focus on climate appeared a natural continuation of the previous 
problematization, it  was also a deliberate political strategy aimed at addressing 
the core threat to which that problematization responded: lack of knowledge and 
acceptance of climate change itself, rather than precisely how to adapt to it. 
There was a tension in the production of the report over how this balance 
between climate and non-climate factors should be represented. Whilst the main 
authors of the report were keen to present non-climate factors as potentially 
more important that climate factors, it was felt by some at UKCIP that this would 
undermine the climate change agenda itself.
Moreover, external social threats were often represented as social 'impacts.' 
UKCIP asked people to consider not only "[impacts on] buildings [but also] more 
intangible things like impacts on people's lives, in the context of perhaps some 
changing expectations" (UKCIP Interviewee E in Stakeholder A Observation 
2009, p. 2). The word 'impacts' here seems to echo the previous
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problematization, and brings w ith it  the sense that the threat is external; after all, 
the impact occurs “on" something, rather than 'through' or 'w ith ' it, w ith  the 
implication that the thing impacted is inert or lacks agency. This heritage and 
articulation helps keep the investigation of the social, although included, at a 
superficial and therefore supplementary level, rather than seeing climate change 
as emerging through its interaction w ith the social body, and the social body as 
itself also emergent and contingent.
The reasons for the weak inclusion of the social do not fall entirely to the 
report or UKCIP practice. UKCIP found that stakeholders themselves “struggled” 
to accept and use the Socio-Economic Scenarios effectively, and “find it  easier to 
accept the climate bit" (Interviewee H 2009, p. 21]. In part, this was because of 
the degree of quantification and precision that accompanied the Climate 
scenarios, as discussed earlier. The ontological result is the lack of 
characterization and attention paid to the social context of the organization and 
therefore little  exploration of its relationally established and enabled agency, or 
the socially contingent nature of their objectives.
However, there also appears to be a power/knowledge origin in the liberal 
episteme in which UKCIP's ontology is couched, which allows for 'the social' to be 
legitimately collapsed into the economic. This appears in the report at several 
points, for example: "A no regret option could be one that is determined to be 
worthwhile now (in that it would yield immediate economic and environmental 
benefits which exceed its cost]...” (Willows and Connell 2003, p. 114]. Here the 
entire account of the social can only be said to be represented in terms of 
economic benefit, if  it can be said to be represented at all. Thus by direct 
occlusion and through using the economic as proxy for the social, there is a
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general exclusion of the real characteristics of the socio-contextual aspects of the 
organization and the account of threat or solution that therefore structures the 
problematization of adaptation. However, as we shall see in the second part of 
this chapter, this account is nuanced by several supplementary moments, which 
intimate the significance of the internal capacity of the organization, as well as 
the systemic capacity of the wider sector or region in which it  is situated.
4.0 The subjects of adaptation or the subjects that adapt?
So far, we have seen that the object of adaptation is generally represented as 
occurring through decisions that result in changes to physical, often 
infrastructural objects. This raises the question of who enacts these decisions, 
and more generally how the subject is accounted for in this problematization of 
adaptation. Unsurprisingly perhaps, the term 'decision-makers' is essentially the 
only term used to describe subjects of any kind. This arose directly from Defra's 
brie f for the report, which was somewhat vague in terms of the actors that 
should be targeted, but did use the term 'decision-makers' was a key pronoun to 
describe such actors (Interviewee C 2009]. As that author explained, the 
assumptions about what constituted such a decision-maker also arose in part 
from Defra's brief: ''[We] tried to explore what ['decision-maker'] meant, and ...I 
remember [Defra] saying [...] they wanted [the report] to be relevant to 
individual farmers, to small-medium enterprises" (Interviewee C 2009, p. 2].
Despite this brief, and also because of UKCIP's experience w ith  regional 
climate change partnerships, the report authors drew out of Defra's particular 
concerns that: "...effectively [the report should be useful] to anybody who was
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making a decision that might be er, influenced by climate change [...] so in 
developing the guidance we saw it as having to be relevant to a broad range of 
decision-makers in the public and private sector, and then to policy makers 
nationally but also thinking about what individual people might [need]" 
[Interviewee C 2009, p. 2].
This breadth meant that the use of this term in the report seems to have 
been left deliberately vague, although it is associated occasionally in the text w ith 
policy-makers and top management, and occasionally policy advisors to these 
positions [Willows and Connell 2003, p.V) The im plicit imaginary of a decision­
maker that enables these particular accounts was influenced by the existing 
stakeholders already working w ith UKCIP at the time the report was written. 
These were Regional Climate Change Partnerships, who were made up of 
Regional Assemblies, Local Authorities and regional power and water companies, 
amongst others [Interviewee H 2009].
The account of the subjects that adapt was also influenced by Defra's 
concern w ith  its own stakeholders at the time, including farmers in particular, to 
whom Defra had lost a major political battle w ith previously over 
insurance/farming losses, and against whom it was keen to insulate itself from 
responsibility for failed adaptation to climate change [Interviewee C 2009). 
These historically specific connections seem to have combined w ith a wider 
sense w ith in  Government that they couldn't afford to be "responsible" and 
therefore needed to make these individual entities responsible for the impacts 
and resultant costs of climate change [UKCIP Interviewee F 2009, p. 8). This 
seems to have structured the exclusive focus on the stakeholder-based decision-
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maker, as this deliberately moves the subject who adapts from Government or a 
centralized bureaucratic system to the responsibilization of disaggregated extant 
socio-economic entities.
The imaginary of the individual farmer on the one hand and the sectoral 
and regional partnership networks on the other may also account for the origin 
of the tension between the discrete account of the subject in the report and its 
more network-based account in practice, which w ill be discussed more in Part 7 
of this chapter. This immediate origin of this latter approach was in the 
MacKenzie River basin study (Cohen 1997) that UKCIP's bid was based on 
(Interviewee H 2009). However, partnerships were also constituted as subjects 
in the Foucaultian sense by neoliberal governance through the 'corporate' 
responsibility that occurred at the height of New Labour's 'th ird way' approach 
to governance as a 'partnership' of government and 'stakeholders' (Fairclough 
2000, p. 141).
The adoption of the identity of the adapting subject must work through 
either an appeal to extant identity or through the creation of this identity. 
Crucially for Defra, the shift in responsibility is cast as in the best interests and 
rational self-interest of the decision-maker (in the report) or stakeholder (in 
UKCIP's practice), a subject position which is produced, at least in part, by 
UKCIPs own discourse. The first way this occurs is through the overt way in 
which the report is addressed to "decision-makers" in the foreword discussed in 
Chapter 5, and the way in which this assumes itself to speak for them through the 
educative mode it assumes. Placing the reader in the subject position of a 
'decision-maker' through addressing them as such, encourages them to apply the 
concerns the report identifies to themselves (Fairclough 2001), including the
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scenario information, to themselves, and in becoming the threatened subject, 
they are placed w ith in the narrative that seeks its resolution through the risk- 
framework. This is even more visually dramatic in UKCIP's meetings w ith 
stakeholders, where graphs and tables and images demonstrate the effects of 
climate change for the local area in which the stakeholder is located.
In sum, moving responsibility to stakeholders through providing them 
w ith information was a very logical step w ith in a liberal problematization of 
governance. The report and UKCIP's later practices and publications 
demonstrate increasingly focused and specific renditions of this 
problematization. This 'top down' account was matched from the bottom up (as 
in all successful enactments of liberal governmentality) by 'stakeholders' 
accepting themselves as such, accepting the account of the problem and their 
positioning w ith in that problem, and therefore asking for themselves 'what do 
we actually do and what does this mean for us' once biophysical scenarios were 
understood. In this sense, stakeholders, however defined, are the subject that 
seeks knowledge -  subject here in the linguistic sense of the actors that do the 
work (Fairclough 2010), yet also 'subject-to' a particular form of governance 
(Foucault 2009). In sum, the 'decision-makers' and 'stakeholders' appear as the 
subjects of adaptation, im plicitly discursively constituted and in turn acting on 
their own process implicitly, in order to act overtly on objects that tend to be 
physical or processes and products at the interface of the stakeholder's 
operations and biophysical climate change.
In seeking to marry Defra's individualist brief w ith this longer-term and 
systemic view, the liberal norms in which the report was couched usefully 
occluded this tension through lim iting the need to account for this complicated
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array of subjects in any substantive way: 'this is really a challenge that UKCIP has 
always faced is that it  has such a broad set of people that it  aiming to reach out to, 
um, and it's trying to be all things to all men in many ways" (Interviewee H 2009,
p. 10)
The authors avoided the question of actors to some extent by 
"...[approaching it  through] the question, what decisions need to be made about 
what, where would you need to take about -th ink  about climate change, and 
when w ill you. So we very much took it  from the decision making view-point, not 
from the science view point" (Interviewee C 2009, p. 2). Here it seems that 
decision-ma/dng rather than decision-makers becomes the key focus of who in 
fact is a decision-maker. As such the whole identity of users is left somewhat 
obscure.
The discrete nature of the decision in time that was discussed in Chapter 5 
seems to entail a discrete account of the subject in space. This happens in several 
ways. First, the requirement to identify future objectives and outcomes for the 
organization assumes and thus creates a 'solidification' or centralization of space 
through the need to define this objective in advance through both defining the 
objective per se and thus describing the nature of the organization and its lim it, 
and through the determination of the 'decision-maker' required to act on this 
risk. Second, this solidification of the subject is projected forward in time. This 
assumes the validity of a projection from current values to a future state, a 
practice which also helps to ensure the longevity of the current state, at least in 
terms of political rationale. This results in the essentialization of the subject in 
space and time.
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The general assumption that the decision is discrete in time means that 
the emergence of the decision is occluded, is both temporal and (socially) spatial. 
This implies an imaginary of a single, and presumably isolated, decision-maker. 
The term 'decision-maker' itself implies that this is a position occupied by a 
single person and moreover that this is an exclusive or executive function. 
Consider, for example, the very different account that would emerge from the 
term 'decision-making body' or 'body that makes decisions.' These examples 
would much better represent a socio-contextual connection of decision-making 
in both space, and, in the latter example, time. As a result, the core pronoun that 
permeates the appeal to, and account of, the subject quietly but continuously 
reinforces an imaginary of the subject as discrete, centralized in time and space. 
In doing so it  occludes an understanding of agency as fragmented and contingent, 
and thus also occludes the making and enacting of decisions themselves as 
contingent and emergent.
5.0 The means of adaptation: the centralization of agency
5.1 'The decision' and the centralization of agency in time and space
Taking such a liberal approach to the subject, together w ith the epistemic focus 
on 'the decision' resulted in a particular kind of political rationale. As a result, 
adaptation as presented in the report is based on: "Do I need to modify the 
decision I'm going to make to take account of climate change" which is "slightly 
different to what comes out of the climate change community which is 'how do I 
adapt to climate change" (Interviewee C 2009, p. 3).
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As such, UKCIP's object of adaptation is extant decisions, and how they 
relate to climate change. This means that the decision is ontologically p rio r to 
adaptation, and is based on existing objectives rather than objectives that might 
arise from the threat of climate change impacts and uncertainty. This shows that 
UKCIP's problematization of adaptation is based on the extant structure of the 
stakeholder, and therefore in terms of climate change, a series of disaggregated 
adjustments, which is very different to the more comprehensive and strategic 
socio-contextual to socio-emergent problematizations of adaptation discussed in 
Chapter 1.
Further, the imaginary of the acts that constitute or demonstrate agency 
seem to be located prim arily in the decision itself, or in the act of making a 
decision. Thus primacy is given to the decision as a product, rather than the 
process through which it is made. This is w ith the major caveat of course of the 
process that occurs through following the report itself. However, that is a 
generally technical process, leaving excluded from the overt problematization 
the account of power and agency that goes into creating that process of 
assessment and decision, although as we shall see, in practice they become more 
apparent.
In sum the account of agency only appears in the concept of decision­
making, and this in effect makes it appear that agency only occurs either through 
following the risk framework, or through the act of decision itself, by a discrete 
actor at a discrete moment of pre-emptive decision. The ontology and 
epistemology of pre-emptive decisions leads to the exclusion of emergent 
responses, short-term responses and actual applications of a decision in the 
account of adaptation. The exclusion of agency here is clear from the limited
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concern for the process of monitoring and review in the report. It also occludes 
an understanding of how, organizationally, decisions are made and what effect 
this might have on the problematization of adaptation in terms of capacity.
When asked about the extent to which the reports' authors had an 
imaginary of adaptive capacity, and how to secure it, Interviewee H responded 
that "probably not at a societal level I wouldn't have said we did [...] I would have 
had in mind myself, probably a couple of key UKCIP stakeholders, and they would 
have been probably somebody writing, yeah, a regional policy document, [...] 
probably someone more at the project level like a water resources planner" 
(Interviewee H 2009, pp. 11-12]. This doesn't exclude adaptive capacity from 
being included in such policies, but it  does demonstrate that social adaptive 
capacity, nationally or institutionally, is not an objective of adaptation. This 
occlusion applies to both the account of threat and of its solution, as there is no 
substantive account of what an adaptive society might look like, or what strategic 
rationale its capacities might enable.
5.2 The objective of adaptation: 'your own objectives'
The primacy of the decision and the exclusion of critical engagement w ith 
socially-based adaptive capacity is linked to the political prio rity  given to existing 
objectives of the decision-maker. In the report, decisions are distinguished 
between 'climate adaptation decisions' and 'climate-influenced decisions’ where 
the former might be "informed or constrained" by a specific adaptation policy, 
whereas in the latter "climate adaptation may be peripheral to the decision­
makers in itia l objectives" but still pose a risk that requires these to be altered so 
that "modified objectives that can be achieved" (Willows and Connell 2003, p.
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14). This reflects the limited effect of climate established as "altering" decisions 
in the opening narrative. This again clearly places existing objectives as 
ontologically and politically prior, in the sense that adaptation is generally 
represented as a 'constraint,' which has a negative connotation, on their ideal 
form.
Further, in disaggregating decision-types, this also lim its the system-wide 
account that considering adaptation as a primary objective might entail. This 
leads to a politics of 'tweaking at the edges' where adaptation is related to very 
specific and lim ited existing decisions. This crucially occludes a focus on the 
prelim inary or intermediary step of ensuring adaptation capacity in the core 
problematizaion.
The report explicitly notes on several occasions that the risk approach is 
based on the objectives of the decision-maker (Willows and Connell 2003, p. 10). 
This results from and reinforces a liberal, laissez-faire ethics, and has a key 
strategic impact on the problematization of adaptation, as it allows its primary 
objectives to be determined by not only the existing objectives of the stakeholder 
organization, but also the internal structure that gives rise to these objectives, 
and carries them out. This aspect is also explicitly noted when the report accepts 
institutional 'constraints,' as a reality of the adaptation process. Crucially, it 
characterizes these positively, although perhaps somewhat euphemistically, as 
giving "focus" to decision-making (Willows and Connell 2003, p. 14). In practice, 
this meant that UKCIP could provide technical assistance, but certainly could not 
tell a stakeholder how to run their organization even though this might radically 
curtail its ability to make 'good' adaptation decisions.
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This is not to say that this liberal unwillingness to account for the nature 
of the social directly meant that there were no effects on social practices or 
political objectives. On the one hand, UKCIP certainly fail to intervene in 
organizational structure and practices directly, although there are some minor 
exceptions which are discussed in the second part of this chapter on 
supplementary moments. However, as discussed earlier, they also employed that 
characteristic of liberal power that Foucault called disciplinary 
power/knowledge, functioning sometimes through a biopolitical governance 
(Foucault 2008, Foucault 2009], where engagement w ith the risk approach, 
whilst appearing to enable you to act in your own interest, also shapes how you 
act in a particular way.
One of the ways liberal responsibilization took effect was through the 
fantasmatic appeal of risk can be said to function because stakeholders are in fact 
already subjects of risk. Within this, as the report is at pains to point out, 
stakeholders are able to choose between being more or less 'risky' subjects, as 
long as they perform a detailed assessment, and make some kind of climate- 
aware risk based decision. Engaging w ith the risk assessment, even w ith no 
commitment as to how they should respond to this, situates the stakeholder into 
a discourse of threat for which UKCIP is able to offer the very colourful, detailed 
and impressive climate scenarios.
This enters the stakeholder into a power-relation that is rational on the 
surface but which also contains fantasmatic appeals to their sense of 
responsibility and fear of uncertainty or of climate events. Although the report 
notably plays down the threat of climate change, it is still represented as a threat. 
The use of terms like 'no regrets' (Willows and Connell 2003, p. 30) is not only a
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rational account but also an emotive metaphor that establishes a sense of 
responsibility for adapting to climate change 'properly' in order to avoid negative 
consequences. Of course, what constitutes 'properly' is the approach established 
in the report. As a result, the problematization is given traction because it  is 
connected to identities at the fantasmatic level. This also helps shield the 
problematization from dislocatory events, increasing its longevity. However, as 
discussed above, appealing to extant objectives appeals to extant identity, and in 
doing so drastically lim its the possibility that the organization emerges, and 
occludes transformation from the problematization of adaptation.
6.0 Supplementary moments: Emergent time
6.1 Non-constraining adaptation decisions and emergent time
The previous chapter discussed how the risk framework re-problematizes 
climate change adaptation through considering the threat from the perspective 
of the stakeholders. Accordingly, a social entity, rather than a biophysical one, 
begins to take centre stage, despite the fact that there is little  exploration of the 
social as an object of knowledge. This opens up the possibility that the 
stakeholder becomes not only the subject but also the object of adaptation. 
Indeed, beyond this basic conceptual opening, this section now goes on to discuss 
several supplementary ethical and strategic moments noted in the report which 
imply an ontology of the subject as systemic, or networked, contingent and 
emergent, and importantly connect to the supplementary epistemology 
discussed in Chapter 5 of irreducible uncertainty.
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In the report, the basic concept of 'non-constraining' adaptation decisions 
occurs under several titles, including as 'keeping options open'. The latter term 
in particular reflects this principle in relation to time. As discussed in Chapter 5 
this appears as: “an objective must be to keep open possible future options” 
(Willows and Connell 2003, p. 30]. However, as discussed there, it  is is unclear is 
how much strategic weight this articulation intends to provide, and whether this 
trumps other, extant objectives. When asked about this, the core authors had 
slightly different responses. From a more theoretical view, Interviewee C replied: 
“I th ink we're sort of saying you should have -you should give that more 
weight or this is something you really ought to th ink about and um, rather 
than rushing in to you know, some very inflexible decision... [it's better to 
have a cheaper,] low tech solution which [...] is very flexible -its  why we 
have caravan sites next to rivers -  in the end you can move the people and if  
caravans get washed away they don't cost very much" (2009, p. 14].
However, these epistemic moments and political rationales have certain 
ontological implications, as the other author's comment makes clear: "So it would 
be more adjustments to the way that they would make their decision than um, 
y'know over-taking anything else in terms of its importance" (Interviewee H 
2009, p. 15]. Such changes to how decisions are made, so that they remain open, 
im plic itly entails different decision-making structures and procedures as well as 
'objectives' and values that accept irreducible uncertainty.
However, while it  remains articulated to the rationale of decisions, 
‘keeping options open' functions as a conceptual limit-point. On the one hand, it 
recognizes the limitations of the decision-making approach in its need to select a
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particular course of action, and on the other hand, it  reinstates the discrete, 
product focus of the risk-framework by calling them 'options.'
Another example occurs in Stage 2, where it  states that in order to 
complete a risk assessment, stakeholders must establish decision-making criteria 
which "should reflect uncertainty about the future and future climate, and w ill be 
influenced by the organisation’s decision-making culture and attitude to risk” 
(Willows and Connell 2003, p. 14). However, 'should' is applied to the strategic 
ideal of the report authors whilst 'w ill' applies to the extant culture of the 
organization. This is at once a realistic assessment of UKCIP’s lack of power to 
structure stakeholder organizational norms, as well as an attempt to impress the 
need to pursue a robust approach. However, as there is no further attempt to 
ensure this or build it  into the core narrative, it remains as a supplement, 
subsidiary to the core ontology of individual objectives taking ethical and 
strategic precedence over systemic capacity to deal w ith irreducible uncertainty 
through emergence.
Accepting existing time scales of decision is sim ilarly ambiguous. On the 
one hand, if  predictive knowledge is taken for granted it  makes sense that 
stakeholders 'work backwards' from a predicted threshold or event and build 
adaptation in to their existing schedule, as was suggested in one stakeholder 
meeting (Stakeholder A Observation 2009, p. 3). However, w ithout perfect 
knowledge and when thresholds simply do not fit the existing schedule, then this 
would be a case of severe maladaptation. There was an interesting exchange to 
this effect in the same meeting, w ith a stakeholder asking “when these [climate 
impacts] kick in might be a different time scale again, mightn't it?” (Stakeholder A 
Observation 2009, p. 3). Crucially it was glossed over by UKCIP staff to reinstate
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the pre-emptive, long-term, existing schedule mode. The discussion itself is 
clearly a necessary one, and neither answer is right or wrong, but the 
unwillingness to consider changing decision schedules points to how entrenched 
respect for existing decisions is in UKCIP's discourse, and solidifies the exclusion 
of responses to emergent accounts of the event.
This returns us to the question of organizational change in terms of 
whether organizational structures and frequencies of decision need to be altered 
to successfully adapt. UKCIP's fear of scaring of stakeholders prevents them from 
investing in the investigation of this question w ith in their problematization of 
adaptation. To the extent that it is explicitly discussed, it appears in terms of 
adaptive management and reiterative decision-making, discussed in the 
following section.
6.2 Adaptive Management, reiterative decision-making, monitoring and emergent 
time
One of the core modes that the report suggests using to deal w ith  irreducible 
uncertainty is 'Adaptive Management.' This is described substantively as simply 
revisiting decisions at regular intervals, [Willows and Connell 2003, p. 30). 
However, the fixation w ith long-term decisions and the long-time frames of 
climate change together undermined the validity and focus on adaptive 
management, as any post-project appraisal had a limited value for climate 
adaptation because of the long return period of the projects, and the fact that the 
events would already happen by the time the learning could be done. As 
Interviewee C noted in a different context, it wouldn't make sense to create a 
choice of options "and then evaluate which one works best in fifty  years-time and
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then [decide] we'll go for that [option]" (2009, p. 20]. As such, the valid ity of 
review and learning is undermined by the principle of preemptive, long-term 
decisions at the heart of the core problematization of adaptation.
The concept of reiterative decision-making also has an ambiguous 
position in the document. It does not appear at all in the opening narrative of 
adaptation, which we have discussed in Chapter 5, although it does appear in the 
summary of the report, and gives the impression that at best it  installs a review 
process working in periods of at least 5 years. Nonetheless, the understanding of 
decisions as iterative implies a supplementary account of the subject because it 
entails an organizational structure that is able to achieve this. Although implicit, 
this is a significant conceptual move that begins to re-problematize adaptation in 
terms of the stakeholder as both subject and object of adaptation, and as a 
particular kind of subject, capable of revisiting decisions and changing track, as 
such the nature of the subject and its processes also become the object of 
adaptation.
This challenges the core ontology discussed in the first half of the chapter 
that existing decision-making timelines and structures remain valid for 
adaptation. As UKCIP gained greater experience of stakeholder practice it 
became clear that this was sometimes a completely untenable position. From the 
perspective of a decision maker that was 'too short' instead of'too long,' one staff 
member recalled, "one of the [...] issues that we used to explore in many 
workshops were what are the drivers and barriers to local authority action. And I 
think, most of them did not sit well with adaptation work because they’re 
typically short term in as much as they tend to have one or three year budgetary
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cycles, they've got a four year electoral cycle, [and so] typically planning horizons 
are fa irly short" (UKCIP Interviewee A 2009, p. 2).
The response of UKCIP was to work w ith local government to produce 
National Indicator 188 which rendered adaptation in terms of a 'process-based 
indicator' as opposed to targets, which rewarded local authorities for taking 
steps down a much longer road than their usual time horizons, and which 
rewarded them w ith in the 'target culture' and political structure that had become 
so pervasive under New Labour (UKCIP Interviewee A 2009, p. 9).
However, w ith in UKCIP's own direct discourse, what keeps reiterative 
decision-making as a supplementary moment is that although it  assumes 
decisions should be revisable it does not assume any need to increase the 
frequency of decisions or build structures to enable this, in response to increased 
uncertainty in general, or the likelihood of increased changeability. Furthermore, 
as decisions are 'pre-emptive' it does not consider the structure or process 
necessary to emerge w ith in the event itself (Adey and Anderson 2011) as an 
object of adaptation strategy. This is related to the marked absence of 
considering monitoring and real-time sensing and responding. The following 
section w ill discuss this in more detail.
As a new staff member noted, "[UKCIP] do the first bits [of adaptation] 
very well, you know, the raising awareness, beginning to get an understanding of 
what that means for an organization" however, they are unsure whether they 
should do "the real change management stuff [...] that's the kind of conversations 
we're having at the moment" (UKCIP Interviewee B 2009, p. 2). As such this 
demonstrates the beginning of a shift and the clear adoption of more emergent
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terms and disciplines, but in a nascent stage, w ithout reworking the core 
problematization, although w ith increased visibility.
There is a very brief mention of monitoring in Stage 8 (Willows and 
Connell 2003, p. 39]. This is exclusively tied to monitoring environmental and 
physical effects, but not linked to social or systemic capacity to sim ilarly emerge. 
In all uses then, the dominance of the techno-scientific, linear, physically focused 
problematization trumps knowledge and means of knowing that are emergent, 
and contingent rather than predictive and pre-emptive. This is particularly 
interesting given that the assertion which excluded the social as an object of 
knowledge was based on the claim that it was too hard to predict. As such, it  is 
clear that the core epistemology of predictive knowledge is so entrenched that 
even where concepts like adaptive management and monitoring are included, 
they are very lim ited and occlude the detailed engagement w ith organizational 
change or organizational management associated w ith them | and therefore lim it 
the social not only as a subject that adapts but also as the object that adapts too. 
This enables a conservative form of socio-contextual adaptation whose political 
rationale is really one of resilience, and excludes a socio-contextual to socio- 
emergent problematization whose rationale of adaptation is transformative.
7.0 Supplementary moments: Emergent 'external' space
7.1 Non-constraining adaptation decisions and emergent space
The concern w ith systemic capacity raised by emergent time is matched by a 
concern w ith ensuring non-constraining decisions in space, w ith in and between 
stakeholder organisations. Interviewee C's account of the origin and significance 
of avoiding adaptation-constraining decisions also demonstrated this
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supplementary ontology, but was articulated in a sim ilarly loose fashion. When 
asked why avoiding such decisions was essential, Interviewee C responded:
"I th ink we saw it as being good for society as a whole. [...] I always had in 
the back of my mind [that] if  you're a developer, building houses in the 
flood plain, you don't really care what's [going to] happen in fifty  years- 
time, a hundred years-time to those houses [...] so then who's interested 
in the [long-term]? [...] [In] the end does it  matter in eighty years-time 
that the houses are worth nothing because they're being flooded every 
three years [...] -  but it  matters to the people who happen to be in them at 
the time, but if  there's been a net benefit to society over the whole period, 
does it  matter to society as a whole? And I don't th ink we ever really 
bottomed [...] that one out really [...] it  depends on the criteria you're 
using to make all those judgments" [2009, p. 12].
This raises not only a question of the overarching political strategy of adaptation 
over time but also its relation to a communitarian or individualist ethos. 
Interviewee C goes on to note that the objective of the report was to enable 
individual stakeholders to assess their risk (2009, p. 13], and as such, it  seems 
that the brief of the report acted as a lim it point for the investigation of this topic, 
which echoes out into UKCIP practice, leaving this crucial question of temporal 
and spatial strategic objectives as a supplement.
Interestingly, the origin of these partnership forms was in part simply 
normative, arising from established modes of liberal governance, rather than 
rather than from the account of climate impacts as a product of irreducible 
uncertainty. As Interviewee H recalled, decisions "wasn't really coming from 
climate change [but instead from] how you make a good decision, that a good
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decision needs to have the buy-in of those that are involved, and that are affected 
by it, so that sort of stakeholder emphasis that we put in" (Interviewee H 2009,
p. 16).
However, non-constraining decisions do “have a kind of a climate change 
dimension because [...] adaptation actions that people take w ill also affect other 
people, and [...] because the issue of climate change is so invasive, and is so cross- 
sectoral [...] all of these interactions w ill be changing because of climate change, 
then that really means that it is really important that you th ink about those 
interactions as part of your adaptation planning" (Interviewee H 2009, p. 17). All 
of these aspects reflect an ontology of the social and physical world as a complex 
system.
This was tied in to an ontology of a complex social system through the 
concern w ith  the individual stakeholder: "it was about trying to help people 
identify where other people's decisions were affecting their ability to deliver 
their objectives and that was really what we meant by an adaptation constraining 
decision" (Interviewee C 2009, p. 13). This is a liberal ontology in a Foucaultian 
sense: how can the myriad of individual concerns be asked to self-govern so that 
they can function smoothly as a population? Were there specific strategies built 
into the problematization of adaptation as a result? When asked about this, 
Interviewee C responded:
"I think it  goes back to the government issue [of who has responsibility for 
overseeing adaptation]. I mean we recognised that decisions are, you 
know, taken in... constrained blocks, whether by individuals or by 
institutions, and of course we have stakeholder engagement and dialogue 
which is about sort of reconciling those things, but in the end they're not
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all reconcilable, so the best thing you can -you know you've got to be 
aware that it's a risk to you to try  and influence it. But that influence is 
quite complicated [so at least] one needs to be better informed, and part 
of that was about better understanding where other decision makers 
were affecting your ability to manage your responsibility to deliver 
climate change adaptation in the future..." [2009, p. 13).
As such, it  is clear that the report does establish a basic political logic that deals 
w ith  a systemic ontology of knowing and building the trust necessary for such 
non-constraining decisions. However it  characterizes these as merely adding 
complexity, rather than as foundational to the problem of adaptation or its 
political rationale.
7.2 External, sectoral networks
In the report, there are multiple references to external networks, including 
techniques for identifying these. "Whatever mechanism is chosen, it  should 
involve a full range of stakeholders, including the decision-makers effecting or 
affected by the decision [see IEMA, 2002)” [Willows and Connell 2003, p. 19).
Crucially, Interviewee H notes "I wouldn't have said any of that 
[partnership activity] was driven by a specific tool [such as the risk framework], 
that was much more driven by the general activity of UKCIP" [2009, p. 9). 
Similarly, at the end of the research period, Interviewee F noted that "working in 
partnership is fundamental to UKCIP's approach" [2009, p. 7). The complexity of 
what this means in practice had been explored through the Regional Climate 
Change Partnerships that were established prior to the 2003 report, which were 
deliberately cross-sectoral in their approach, based on the formation of UKCIP in
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1997 largely on the model of the stakeholder based 'MacKenzie River Basin 
study' in Canada (Interviewee H 2009; UKCIP Interviewee F 2009). As 
Interviewee H noted, "From day one at UKCIP the thinking was that we needed to 
be looking at integrated assessments of climate risks... I mean one of the first 
studies that got going under the programme called REGIS was deliberately an 
integrated assessment. So, the knowledge of cross sectoral issues was very firm ly  
there from the word go and then it  kind of spilt through here mostly in terms of 
talking about adaptation constraining decisions..." (2009, p. 18).
However, the organizational approach of the regional Climate Change 
Partnerships also addressed the 'solution' part of the problematization of 
adaptation in terms of social networks by im plicitly creating a body capable of 
cross-stakeholder communication and knowledge production, and collective 
decision-making. Here the operation of UKCIP itself functioned in a facilitatory 
role to enable these networks to form and communicate.
The partnership model that was developed in the Regional Climate 
Change Partnerships was used elsewhere, for example in sectoral or Business 
Partnerships, as "it's a model for bringing people together, them understanding 
each other's needs, understanding or articulating their needs, and from time to 
time bring other people to actually hear those messages as a unified voice, which 
is obviously a partnership activity," and of course "negotiating" a combined 
approach too (UKCIP Interviewee G 2009, pp. 13-14).
As such, the partnership established the need for external links and 
coordination, and effected changes internally in as much as communicating to 
and coordinating w ith the partnership placed certain demands on the internal 
aspects of an organization. Local Authorities also tended to function in terms of
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strategic partnerships (UKCIP Interviewee B 2009]. In its latest manifestation, in 
a submission to the Climate Change Act's risk assessment function, UKCIP was 
clear that this required decision-making communities as a 'sustainable' way of 
adaptation, crucial to making tenable decisions (UKCIP Interviewee D 2009, p. 
15]. W ithin this they were concerned that stakeholders get “the right 
communities together," based on UKCIP's "principles of good adaption" getting 
those involved who are "interested and affected" (UKCIP Interviewee D 2009, p.
15]. While UKCIP pose these questions, they can't impose them, but also 
recognize or assume that stakeholders tend to have this knowledge anyway. As 
such, there has been a fairly organic emergence of partnerships into affecting 
UKCIPs general mode of working and its principles of good adaptation which 
im plic itly enable capacity. However, they still seem to fall shy of making capacity 
an explicit corner stone of adaptation. When asked about this, one author 
replied:
"did anyone recognise that they needed to kind of change their 
organisational structure [?] certainly not to use [the risk framework]... 
[but] the much bigger picture about 'how is climate adaptation work being 
taken forward in the UK' [...] started with these regional groups [...] and as 
the groups got more complex and active they recognised that if  they were 
actually going to make progress, they needed a coordinator of the group 
and a full time post in order to do that. So, that's when, if  you like, 
organisational change started happening..." (Interviewee H 2009, p. 9]
However, UKCIP didn't work this into a particular account of the 
discourse of adaptation. One UKCIP staff member and former coordinator for the
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South East Climate Change Partnership pointed out their lack of 'governance' at a 
substantive level: "[from] to 2001 to 2007... there wasn't a very strong
understanding of adaptation. [Because] UKCIP was focusing more in the early 
days on understanding the impacts. And kind of leaving the next question to 
people to make up their [own] minds on [...] I can remember sort of a lot of head 
scratching really, at meetings at the Partnership [...] what kind of response is 
always quite difficult because, there weren't any examples” (UKCIP Interviewee 
G 2009, p. 6]. Thus, while there is no denying that the interconnectedness of 
different stakeholders and their capacity to adapt as a result w ith in and across 
sectors is picked up in the report in several ways, these are not developed, and 
are certainly not articulated closely with the concept of adaptation, either as a 
practice to reduce 'maladaptation' or respond to irreducible uncertainty.
An example of this limited account of the social aspects of adaptation 
occurs in the definition of 'system' and 'threshold' in the glossary -  whilst these 
are included in the im plicit account of the social, there is no definition or practice 
that works to recognize this explicitly. In the definition of 'system', the language 
is very scientific (Willows and Connell 2003, p. 111]. The lack of an imaginary of 
social power and action means the report falls far short of providing a 
meaningful account of how to make the social elements of a system adaptive.
The exception is a comment in the report that "some tools are useful for 
identifying other decisions that could be affected by the decision under 
consideration (i.e. potential knock-on effects]" [ibid., p. 13]. It should be said that 
systemic considerations such as the number of decision-makers and 'knock-on 
effects' are noted in the brief 'Tools and Techniques section that follows, but this 
is lim ited to a couple of short sentences and a list of tools in Table 5. This is very
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different to the level of detail provided in the section that follows on 'Stage 3: risk 
assessment', which has twelve pages dedicated to outlining the stage as opposed 
to an average of 3 to 4 pages per stage, w ith only half a page for stages 7 and 8. 
Furthermore, 'Knock-on' effects is a cognitive metaphor, conjuring up the image 
of rows of dominos falling, representing the 'kinetic' linear effects rather than 
'chemical' emergence implied by complex power-relations.
The tool that most clearly responds to this latter imaginary this is AIDA 
the Analysis of Interconnected Decision Areas [ibid., p. 13); this produces an 
image where connections are substantial. However, this receives no description 
in the main parts of the document and as such has no tangible effect on the 
problematization. In sum, whilst there is a sensitivity to network impacts, this is 
imagined as linked but still discrete areas.
The 'outsideness' of adaptation is also established through the title  of the 
first sub-section, 'constraints,' refers to constraints on decision-making are listed 
in institutional terms, as criteria established through legislation or regulation by 
bodies that oversee the organisation or as the criteria of decision-making used by 
stakeholders. Crucially, awareness of these linkages is introduced in negative 
terms as a 'constraint,' and decision-makers need to be aware of these in order to 
make appropriate decisions, including the implication that they should question 
their appropriateness if  they feel overly constrained by them, {ibid., p. 14). What 
each of these moments, knock-on effects, AIDA, and ‘constraints' do is establish 
systemic relations as negative limits, rather than as substantial and constitutive 
connections that enable action and change, and therefore adaptation as a process 
itself. This reinstates the basic modern linear ontology of the techno-scientific
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problematization of agency, even as it draws on a socio-contextual ontology -  or 
perhaps merely taxonomy - of the subject.
8.0 Supplementary moments: Emergent 'internal' space
8.1 Non-constraining adaptation decisions and internal emergent space
The non-constraining adaptation decisions discussed above, and the emergent 
time of events also resonate w ith an ideal of networked, emergent social space as 
an internal characteristic of a stakeholder organization. However, this does not 
occur even slightly w ith in the report. Here the ontology of the discrete decision­
maker discussed in the first half of this chapter seems so entrenched that the 
internal characteristics and complexities of the stakeholder body is simply 
occluded.
Changing one's existing objectives was also not mentioned in UKCIP's 
opening presentations to stakeholders in the observations. Whilst "altering” 
decisions as expressed in the report is far more acceptable and easily adoptable 
and therefore more politically and rhetorically astute, it  was nonetheless 
recognized by some UKCIP staff during the interview that altering may simply 
not be sufficient. In stark contrast to the report and the official line, one member 
noted that "to be adaptive you also have to question whether...the original 
objective, the original business, is actually the appropriate one, and it  might need 
to change, which is where the organizational change comes in" (UKCIP 
Interviewee G 2009, p. 17). Here, it  seems that the internal ability to adapt 
entered UKCIP's discourse through the term 'organizational change,' which 
seemed in the interviews to be closely related to the addition of a new member of
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staff whose focus this was, but who was not employed to work on that approach 
to climate change at the time. As such, the new conceptualization seemed to be 
seeping through indirectly, but was being taken up into discussion because it  
resonated w ith  UKCIP experience. Although as we shall see in Chapter 7, by 2010 
this had begun to be codified in a UKCIP report submitted to the Adaptation Sub- 
Committee (Lonsdale et al. 2010].
In all, a concern w ith internal social networks would imply an account of 
adaptation in terms of capacity, and as capacity to deal w ith  irreducible 
uncertainty. However, whilst there is a definition of adaptive capacity in the 
glossary, this is not linked to the definition of climate adaptation itself, and 
furthermore capacity barely appears in the report's main sections or in the 
observations.
8.2 The current vulnerability approach
However, while capacity was not of explicit concern, understanding adaptation in 
terms of vulnerability was opening the door to making the stakeholder system 
the object as well as subject of adaptation and as such it  was beginning to bring 
into focus its systemic capacity of communication, decision-making and action. 
As Interviewee F noted:
"there have been a number of changes, methodologically in thinking in the 
whole field, and I think the whole issue of vulnerability is one that I th ink 
has come to the fore far more now, [...] if  you have a vulnerability 
approach and look at people's current vulnerability which is kind of what 
UKCIP is endorsing, really, we're saying 'have a look at your current 
vulnerability and think how that might be affected, and also look at your
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current level of adaptive capacity, th ink how well you can deal w ith  these 
issues” (Stakeholder B Observation 2009a).
This signaled a shift from adaptation problematized as 'the' Adaptation (of a 
discrete moment of decision) to Adaptation as practice and as process, making 
how adaptation is done, rather than what decision is made, the potential focus. 
Such comments imply a nascent systems-based ontology that recognizes the 
specificity and contingency of each stakeholder system both externally and 
internally.
In particular, this occurs through the connection of the risk framework to the 
LCLIP approach, as discussed in Chapter 5. This experiential imaginary works 
from the perspective of the stakeholder, and engages their experience of trying to 
respond to a problem, as well as the climate event that may have initiated the 
problem. This moves the ontology of the problem from an external/future object- 
based event to an internal, present, experience-based process. In using Local 
Climate Impacts Profile (LCLIP) as a way of establishing current vulnerability 
'plus' climate change through the risk framework, the subject as object is brought 
into the ontology of adaptation in a far more substantial way than occurs in the 
report.
The vulnerability approach, in tapping into recent experience, brought a 
much greater depth of understanding of the social contingency and system- 
awareness crucial to understanding not only the multiple, non-linear effects of 
climate, but also the complexities and contingencies of response, and the 
capacities needed to help ensure adaptation. As such, this introduces a much 
more substantial, experiential account of the internal system as UKCIP engages 
w ith stakeholders in the course of following through the risk approach. In
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conjunction w ith  the development of the location of the problem, there was also 
a realization that knowledge of the problem was likewise not necessarily 
concentrated in information about the climate but along the networks that 
caused/perceived/responded to the problem.
However, in practice, this was commonly discursively represented in this 
way: " if you've got a good understanding of how your current operations relate 
to the weather and the areas in which it's sensitive [...] you've got a much better 
chance of then being able to look at information about the future and having 
some sense of how that might affect you" (UKCIP staff member, Stakeholder B 
Observation 2009; p. 5; see also UKCIP Interviewee E in Stakeholder A 
Observation 2009, p. 1). This ties a present vulnerability account to the 
predictive, preemptive core problematization of adaptation, utilizing systemic 
capacity to account for the threat, but not necessarily developing it  into a 
strategic account of the solution.
8.3 Networked space: internal characteristics of an adaptive organisation
If the stakeholder system becomes in part the object of adaptation, then the 
question is whether particular characteristics of this are problematized as 
beneficial for adaptation. There are a series of examples where such 
supplementary moments occur: 'Key Questions for decision-makers at Stage 2' 
(Willows and Connell 2003, p. 16). As a whole, this section comes closest to the 
question of 'strategy' that might be implicit in a generic account of adaptation or 
adaptive capacity. This is a text box that covers the "rules for making the 
decision, given the uncertainty in climate change" which includes "the decision­
making culture of the organization," how "open and explicit" this is, the role of
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"different stakeholders" and "'consensual' over 'demonstrably rational"' choices; 
whether the decision might "constrain" adaptation elsewhere, noting that it  
would then be ideal to include these stakeholders in the process at this stage; the 
valid ity of any existing strategic decisions about climate change given climate 
change uncertainty (Willows and Connell 2003, p. 16). All of these are colossal, 
politically fundamental issues that radically shape the overall adaptation strategy 
of an organisation, and thus its account of adaptation as such. However, in 
avoiding dealing w ith  these questions in detail, specifically in terms of any 
processual guidance, is a testament to UKCIP’s evasion of these issues in its core 
problematization of adaptation.
As is highlighted in the 2005 internal review, risk assessment, or Stage 3, 
formed the core of their practice prior to 2005, and steps 6-8 which focus on 
making and implementing and reviewing decisions, remained largely under­
investigated (Harman et al. 2005, p. 254). Implicitly, both risk assessment and 
adaptive management lead to good decisions through learning and education 
about the system as an object of knowledge, but this is not investigated at all, and 
as such it's clear that there's been little  thought put into organizational learning 
and change up until 2009 in the report or in UKCIP practices.
When discussed w ith the key report authors, the major lim it to the 
inclusion of these concerns was noted as: "the problem for us was that none of 
these problems are specific to climate change adaptation, [so our concern] was 
getting the balance between the focus on climate adaptation and [...] the more 
general business of making good decisions" (Interviewee C 2009, p. 20). It is clear 
that this balance was resolved by 'signalling' several issues, but not investigating 
them at all, and certainly not integrating them in a thorough way. This explains
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their presence as supplementary moments, but as such also has the effect of 
lim iting their validity and impact on the problematization of adaptation as a 
whole.
However, there is a different level of engagement w ith the internal nature 
of the organization in the report and in practice. In the observations of UKCIP- 
stakeholder engagements, it was clear that UKCIP staff deliberately set up 
meetings in order to encourage a wide variety of decision-makers w ith in an 
organization to participate in a 'flat' way, in order to maximize the information 
available to all of them.
All the stakeholder meetings observed or recorded functioned through 
the use of a kind of open brainstorming session of a "steering group" of top 
management. In a sense, this is the internal reflection of the partnership 
approach -  ideal is to generate shared objectives, clarifying the same objectives 
(Interviewee F, Stakeholder B Observation 2009, p. 3). This overtly is to ensure 
that the risk assessment is as precise as possible, and to allow for priorities to be 
set, but this process is essential in achieving that, and as such is an im plicit aspect 
of the problematization, but without focus. Although increasingly overt in UKCIP 
practices: "the key question is to make sure that we’ve got all those people 
involved in the process" [ibid., p. 4). This is linked rhetorically to the need to 
identify drivers and barriers to adaptation work [ibid., p. 9], implying an 
awareness that the actors involved play a key role in ensuring the capacity to 
adapt, thus an im plicit social systems awareness as the basis of the 
problematization of adaptation as a practice.
The wide representation of operational heads to get a sense of how the 
organization works as a whole, functions through the practice of the actual
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meeting itself, the sitting and communicating together. As one staff member 
stated to a stakeholder steering group "there's a really wide range of different 
things included in this [risk assessment], and that's partly why we’ve got this 
range of people around the table so hopefully you've all got some experience and 
knowledge to bring to it" [UKCIP Interviewee E in Stakeholder A Observation 
2009, p. 2). Similarly, Interviewee F notes that " it would be great if  [each 
business area representative] could each [complete the assessment] w ith  a little  
sub-group w ith in their own organization" [Stakeholder B Observation 2009b, p. 
1). This higher-resolution social information that was created through the 
vulnerability approach coupled w ith these practices to create a broad and 
detailed picture of organizational complexity and contingency. Although not 
explicit, this enables better communication and understanding of adaptation as a 
social problem.
Chances to make this explicit were not taken up. While the Business and 
Climate Change Assessment Tool, BACLIAT [Metcalfe et al. 2009) approach does 
break down a business into key areas of logistics, people, premises and finance, 
the internal organizational aspects of these areas and how they relate to each 
other or can be communicated to each other are hardly acknowledged or 
invested in, evidenced in the lack of terminology or tools staff have to describe 
these parts of the process. This means that although these comments are present 
and the meeting format jumpstarts the process, the values based on the systems 
ontology behind them, are not enabled to work effectively to elicit information 
and ensure communication. As such, it is assumed that the information brought 
to and expressed in the meeting is objective, accurate and comprehensive,
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without understanding the power/knowledge effects of the meeting and its 
participants and context.
Another supplementary aspect of these collective exercises is that a 
collective account of the problem is produced. For UKCIP, this is represented as 
generally being about ensuring accuracy, although it  recognizes complexity as 
the reason for inaccuracy. As Interviewee F put it, "some of the more interesting 
and challenging impacts or consequences [which are] the indirect ones[,] you'll 
probably only pick up working in consultation w ith other people" [2009, p. 7}. 
This is couched as a means to an end in UKCIP's discourse, in terms of enabling 
an accurate sharing of knowledge for the risk assessment. As such, UKCIP asks 
for a broad spectrum of decision-makers w ith in an organization. For example, 
asking for existing 'steering groups' and is concerned w ith how broadly based 
these are [Interviewee F in Stakeholder B Observation 2009b, p. 2}.
A supplementary value of this is that when individuals move out of the 
group, they have the common understanding of what it  is they are trying to 
achieve, and a stake in that collective enterprise [Stakeholder B Observer 2009b, 
p. 2). This builds trust and collective endeavour, essential to building and 
maintaining systemic adaptive capacity [Adey and Anderson 2011}. Moreover, 
this search for clear and common goals is something that can often be drawn out 
more effectively in an informal, verbal, collective process, such as that 
established by UKCIP's stakeholder meeting format during the risk-assessments 
observed.
This appeared to be a largely implicit ethos of adaptation management, 
and seemingly resulted from the practice of UKCIP engagement w ith stakeholder 
organizations over time. However, it may also have been a reflection of the
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difference between official and unofficial forms of communication. Where UKCIP 
was unwilling to put an organization off by appearing too invasive, but, having 
got an organization to 'bite' was then prepared to advise in a more unofficial way 
that as many components of the organization as possible be present in order to 
ensure better information sharing, collective decision-making and hence better 
decision-making.
This implies a supplementary ontology of the subject and its agency as 
systemically enabled, which is very far removed from that of discrete decision­
makers making a decision at a discrete moment in time. Here, adaptation agency 
is seen as a distributed property of numerous actors in a network and their 
relations w ith  one another which therefore need to be coordinated for a good 
decision to be made. A frequent offshoot of problematizing in this way is that the 
complexities of implementation become part of the decision-making and 
decision-option itself in a much greater level of detail. This was observed 
particularly clearly in one of the stakeholder meetings (Stakeholder B 
Observation 2009a, Stakeholder B Observation 2009b). This moves the systemic 
ontology from the account of the problem to the account of the solution, and 
makes the subject also the object in the problematization of adaptation.
In the interviews, it was clear that there was also a formal distinction 
made at UKCIP between adaptation actions and capacity building. In Part 1 of the 
report, when mentioned, capacity building had been tied to knowledge-sharing, 
largely in the form of one-way dissemination of knowledge about climate change 
from UKCIP to stakeholders, although it does receive a more substantive review 
in Part 2 (Willows and Connell 2003, p. 70). However, when pushed about the 
difference between process and capacity, the same interviewee noted: "I do see
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the main thing about adaptation as being prim arily as it  were an institutional 
capacity building issue to [...] engage in that process rather than [do] particular 
things. Crucially when questioned about how this related to the risk document, 
which could be read as reiterative but nonetheless quite piecemeal, it  was agreed 
that "I th ink I [...] would be more fuzzy [...] about it  in terms of capacity building 
in an institution because you do make decisions, but those decisions w ill very 
often not be one off ones. Um, and sometimes we don't make that particularly 
sort of specific [...] and maybe we should do." [UKCIP Interviewee A 2009, pp. 16- 
18)
However, the concern for who is involved in internal networks discussed 
above intimates a growing concern w ith the way in which agency w ith in  an 
organization functions to produce capacity. What is interesting however is that 
this was beginning to manifest as an awareness at UKCIP that internal agency 
and structures and culture mattered to adaptation. Despite the non-intervention 
policy, it was suggested that " if there are any significant things where the 
solutions seem to be outside your influence then it  becomes more about working 
w ith  the right people, and finding the points at which you do have influence" 
[UKCIP Interviewee E in Stakeholder A Observation 2009, p. 6). This was 
followed by the comment: "that might not change where [the risk] appears [...] 
but it  would change what you can do [about it ] ” [UKCIP Interviewee G, 
Stakeholder A Observation 2009, p. 6). Crucially, both of these quotes 
demonstrate not only an awareness of the need to utilize and alter internal 
relations to ensure capacity, but the fact that the risk assessment does not 
provide the answers to where or how to do this, despite the necessity of these 
actions for adaptation to be carried out.
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UKCIP's questions to 'Stakeholder B' participants demonstrates a 
particular concern w ith this, partly arising from the nature of the stakeholder 
itself: "what are the features [or] characteristics of your organization that have 
allowed so many actions and so many responses to happen so quickly?" 
[Interviewee F in Stakeholder B Observation 2009, p. 10]; "you're [...] a very 
responsive organization that can deal quickly w ith things that happen to you, and 
you've got a pretty good handle on what you need to do to respond to these 
weather events, one would hope that that would give you quite good capacity to 
respond to the impacts of climate change" [ibid., p. 10]. This is the first time in 
either the observations or interviews that the words 'responsive' and 'capacity' 
surface independently and where they are also linked to climate change, albeit 
via weather events. As such, it is the first time that the nature of agency, and 
implicitly, how to ensure or produce that, becomes an object in the 
problematization of adaptation, rather than seeing it simply as a characteristic of 
the subject that either enables or constrains adaptation as a precondition.
As such, it seems clear that capacity has been limited by the report's risk- 
based problematization of adaptation as discrete in space and time. However, 
although it is being imagined more broadly by UKCIP staff, and im plicitly 
underpins how they assume the process to function, capacity is it is far from 
being overtly recognized, much less the core referent of the problematization of 
adaptation itself.
This tension over the flexibility in decision-making structures was 
demonstrated across the organization and seems to be best summed up here by 
the head of the Science Team:
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" if you look at some of the barriers to adaptation, they are often [...] 
related to the organizational structure [...] There are a lo t of people who 
believe that one of the barriers that we have to adapting well is the fact 
that our policy and our decision-making frameworks are insufficient to 
deal w ith  [...] the rate that we're going to have to change [at]. [This arises 
because] the expectation is that policy is structured as if  we're in a static 
environment and the need [to] change the way we evaluate that and the 
nature of that policy [...] because it's not flexible enough [...]" [UKCIP 
Interviewee D 2009, p. 5).
This clearly suggests that UKCIP was beginning to grapple w ith institutional, 
organizational structure and capacity issues by 2009, but that it  had yet to 
establish this in their problematization directly, and codify this in policy and 
their tools. Where this had become part of its discourse, it seemed to be lim ited 
to the account of the threat, but not necessarily worked through into the political 
rationale, w ith  a substantive account of capacity as established through trust, 
communications and flexibility as the solution.
Again, this hesitation in intervention is related to the same liberal 
principles and government remit that structured UKCIP's role: "We cannot do 
more than identify when we're working with people [...] some of the barriers [...] 
to try  and help them to understand [their] existence, [but] we don't consider it 
our job to say, 'ok, you've got to eliminate that barrier,' they have to decide 
[that]" [UKCIP Interviewee D 2009, p. 5]. This awareness of a role in 
organizational change but tension in its extent was thus clearly coming to the 
surface in 2009. If the links are followed between organizational accounts of the 
threat established in terms of vulnerability, and the need for flexibility in time
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and space indicated by non-adaptation constraining ideals which crucially is 
understood to entail an account of capacity as the solution, this begins to posit to 
the possibility of a supplementary problematization of adaptation in terms of 
organizational capacity.
9.0 Conclusion
The ontology that is produced in the report, and which to a large extent remained 
in the core problematization up until 2009 demonstrated a generally centralized, 
discrete account of the social in time and space, although w ith  clear awareness of 
the stakeholder as located w ith in a wider system. The climate science based 
origin of the problematization of adaptation had clear implications for the 
ontology of agency in relation to time. The 30-year forecast of the scenarios 
generated a norm of pre-emptive responses, or 'planned adaptation' as the ideal 
form of adaptation, particularly when this emerged out of an environmental 
management origin that focused on ecosystems and major physical 
infrastructure.
However, although this mode was dominant it  clearly is in tension w ith 
the supplementary epistemology based on irreducible uncertainty and calls for 
an emergent mode of adaptive management and non-constraining decisions. 
What is interesting is that there is almost no substantive account of the subject to 
enable this at an ontological level in the report. The interviews make clear that 
after the report there is the emergence of an account of adaptation as a process, 
signaling a shift from adaptation problematized as 'the' moment of decision to 
adaptation as practice and as process; in other words, how adaptation is done,
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rather than what decision is made, starts to become the focus, particularly in the 
Local Authority field under the remit of National Indicator-188, and in the 
practice of risk assessment through the LCLIP vulnerability-based approach.
To understand why temporal emergence remains as a supplementary 
moment, the account of the subject and agency as it appears in the report and in 
the wider UKCIP discourse needs to be considered. In the report, subject and 
agency are made fairly discrete in several ways. First, through the lim ited 
investigation of what constitutes a 'decision-maker' and how decisions are made 
and implemented. Here risk-based decision-making is seen as a science rather 
than a social phenomenon, and as such ignores its embeddedness in social 
practices, which provide normative meaning or values.
Second, through the general exclusion of the social as an object of 
knowledge, particularly as an emergent object of knowledge. That is, the social is 
seen as a static or unknowable variable to be added into the equation, rather 
than structuring the form of the equation itself. Third, the subject and agency are 
left discrete though the classical liberal norms of non-intervention and UKCIP's 
desire to appeal to stakeholders by being non-invasive. Together, these mean 
that the internal nature of the stakeholder system, and to some extent its 
external imbrication in other networks, is not officially investigated. Crucially, 
the result is that although the decision maker and the stakeholder organization 
are overtly the 'subject' of adaptation in the sense of acting on it or for it, they are 
not brought into the core problematization as a 'problem' or object of adaptation 
themselves. The result is that the problematization of adaptation tends to be 
located at the surface of the stakeholder system, and lim ited to direct
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engagement w ith physical impacts and objects, such as floods and flood defences, 
or flood damage to infrastructure, buildings or goods.
However, by the time of the interviews and observations these 
supplementary moments implied in non-constraining decisions and keeping 
options open clearly were being extended, most importantly to the account of the 
internal characteristics of the stakeholder organisations. This intimated 
consideration of organizational capacity to account for both threat and capacity 
for organizational change to account for the political rationale and solution.
In sum, there is clearly a very stable presence of supplementary moments 
here that if  anything increases in visibility over the research period. If taken 
together, these supplementary moments of the emergence of time as a product of 
(social) networks, and the emergent nature of these networks themselves, clearly 
offer the foundations for a very different problematization of adaptation based 
on irreducible uncertainty and emergence, where capacity and communication of 
the social as both subject and object of adaptation become the central strategic 
objectives. This is particularly so if  they are taken together w ith  the 
supplementary epistemic moments noted in Chapter 5. This supplementary 
problematization as a whole, and its implications, w ill be explored next, in 
Chapter 7.
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Chapter 7: The complementary or dangerous supplement? 
UKCIP's emerging problematization of adaptation
"Uncertainty is the only certainty there is, and knowing how to live with insecurity 
is the only security." ~John Allen Paulos
1.0 Introduction
This chapter draws together the analysis of UKCIP’s discourse of adaptation that 
was established in the last three chapters and develops an account of the 
significance of the supplementary moments for the core problematization of 
adaptation. First, the following section, 2.0 summarizes the findings so far and 
frames them in terms of the general problematizations established in Chapter 1. 
Section 3.0 then uses the discourse theory and analysis introduced in Chapter 2 
to develop an account of whether UKCIP's combination of a hazards and 
vulnerability approach is in fact complementary as Fussel suggests (2007, p. 
270). Section 4 develops the implications of the 'dangerous supplement's' 
inherent potential to create a supplementary problematization and challenge 
UKCIP's problematization as a whole. It then discusses the political implications 
of this and the potential for the emergence of a supplementary problematization 
at UKCIP in 2009. Finally, Section 5 discusses the effect of the continued 
occlusion of the supplementary problematization on the wider UK discourse of 
adaptation, particularly in light of the fact that UKCIP no longer delivers the 
official government adaptation programme. As such, it questions whether the 
lessons learnt by UKCIP on the need to supplement its problematization might
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become lessons lost to the wider UK discourse, and what the implications of this 
are for adaptation in UK. Section 6 then summarizes this chapter.
2.0 Summary of thesis argument in preceding chapters
2.1 The relation of UKCIP's problematization to established adaptation frames
To return to the theoretical approach defined in Chapter 2, adaptation, like 
anything else, is a mirage of reason (Derrida 1976). There is no accounting, no 
presence to find and define, no single name that would account for adaptation. So 
in defining adaptation, one begins the chain of signification that constitutes the 
meaning of the sign 'adaptation.' While this thesis has moved beyond the concept 
of a 'sign' to the broader concept of a 'problematization' the point remains the 
same: what in UKCIP's problematization is seen to constitute 'nature' or an 
account of the essential 'truth ' of this sign 'adaptation.'
This account of the 'truth' has been called the 'core problematization' 
here. Once this is identified, it is possible to distinguish what functions as the 
'supplement.' It is important to note that the presence of the supplement allows 
the core problematization to retain validity when its own content cannot do the 
work the sign is meant to do, thus enabling the continued validity of the concept 
(Derrida 1976) or problematization. As discussed in Chapter 2 the supplement 
only remains as such so long as it is articulated as subsidiary to the core, through 
being referred to, for example, as temporary, exceptional, additional or even as 
included through being overtly excluded. If it is not maintained as subsidiary or 
excluded completely, the supplement’s presence undermines the purity and 
validity of the core, threatening to supplant it.
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The core and supplementary moments are more easily identified in their 
conceptual distinctiveness through the use of the theoretical framings of 
adaptation that were established in Chapter 1. These were divided into three 
basic accounts. The first was 'techno-scientific', deriving from a hazards and 
impacts-based approaches that identify biophysical environmental threats, 
which was based on objective scientific knowledge and physical objects of 
concern (Burton et al. 2002, Fussel 2007, Fussel and Klein 2006, O'Brien et al. 
2007), w ith a political rationale that was resilient in the sense of seeking 
functional persistence (Pelling 2011).
The second was called 'socio-contextual' and drew on the wider social and 
economic sources of threat identified by a vulnerability-based account (Eriksen 
and O'Brien 2007, O'Brien et al. 2007), and found its solution and political 
rationale in the improvements to existing systems enabled through 'transition' 
(Pelling 2011). The th ird account, called here a 'socio-emergent' account has 
received the least engagement to date. It takes as its source of threat not the 
lim its to the existing system or the known biophysical threats, but instead the 
system itself as the source that constitutes and mediates all threat. As such, its 
political rationale functions on an ontology that explores and demands the 
willingness and capacity of the system to change itself fundamentally, and works 
to constitute the potential for 'transformation' (Pelling 2011) or emergence from 
one system state to another.
The preceding chapters have identified UKCIP's 'core' problematization as 
clearly based on a techno-scientific problematization. In the account of the threat 
to which the political rationale responds the focus on scenarios demonstrates a 
hazards and then impacts-based ontology, which includes the stakeholder only
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insofar as they directly interface w ith these events. This is established 
epistemically through the risk-approach, exemplified through terms such as 
'receptors' and 'risk-assessment endpoints.'
W ith such an outcome-oriented ontology and epistemology, much of the 
focus of adaptation action comes in the form of the risk assessment itself. 
However this assessment is geared towards inclusion in the existing decisions 
that need to be made by the organisation. As such, the political rationale of this 
problematization is the alteration of existing decisions to take account of 
scientific information. Crucially the making of this decision is assumed to be 
discrete in space and time, owing to the exclusion of the consideration of the 
complexity and contingency of social formation. The decision made has as its 
objective the unexamined existing objectives of decision-maker as the 
representative of the stakeholder, and is fundamentally conservative, fitting the 
'functional persistence' account of resilience discussed by Pelling (2011, p. 55).
This framing was represented by one UKCIP staff member as follows: "we 
tended to treat adaptation as a fairly kind of value neutral activity, i.e. as a sort of 
mechanistic -  well, [...] systematic approach to evaluating risks an responding to 
them, and we have tried as it  were, to steer clear of the implications of it  [...] we 
have said that [...] effectively, that adaptation doesn't have objectives in itself [...] 
adaptation is to enable you to achieve your existing objectives, or perhaps your 
on-going and changing objectives...” (UKCIP Interviewee A 2009, p. 7). This 
clearly demonstrates a conservative political rationale of resilience in the sense 
of maintaining existing values, occluding any deeper consideration of the value 
ethically or in terms of pure efficacy.
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In some senses, UKCIP could be said to barely fit  into the resilience model 
of climate change, particularly at the level of the individual organization. While 
there was some concern for connections to other organisations, this was largely 
understood in a kinetic sense, represented through the cognitive metaphor of 
'knock-on effects.' Here again, the problem is represented as an outcome rather 
than a process. As such, there was limited conceptual room given to these 
relations as multi-directional, constitutive flows of power and knowledge.
The occlusion of these elements was even more marked internally, where 
there was lim ited cognizance of the social relations that constituted the 
stakeholder organization itself, meaning that the basic 'systems thinking' 
approach of "social learning and self-organisation" was a side effect of the risk 
assessment, rather than integrated or central objective, and thus not included 
w ith in  the core problematization (Pelling 2011, p. 55}. In fact, Peking's 
summation of the contribution of cybernetics to adaptation effectively sums up 
the core problematization exhibited by UKCIP: "Analysis of adaptation was 
trapped at the level of information access, transmission and decision-making 
apparatuses. Deeper social relations of production and power were not included" 
(Pelling 2011, p. 27).
However, this core problematization was supplemented by a series of 
moments that effectively introduced elements of a socio-contextual 
problematization. Specifically, these included the articulation of a vulnerability- 
based epistemic mode to the risk assessment, through the use of the Local 
Climate Impacts Profile. This used socio-systemic information for the assessment 
of risks. However, it  was only used in conjunction w ith scenarios in order to aid 
their imaginary and not vice versa.
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Nonetheless, the use of the LCLIP had ontological ramifications, 
represented by some references in the meetings w ith stakeholder organisations 
to the need for wider inclusion in the risk assessment process, implying a 
systemic account of the organization. There were also direct indications of the 
need to enable communication and trust to form capacity to assess and develop 
decisions. However, this did not extend into a formalized account, and as such 
these moments remained supplementary through their vague, informal 
articulation. This minor level of inclusion did not extend to a need for a 
transformational account of adaptation except in the few occasions were UKCIP 
staff remarked that this was in fact what their problematization stopped short of, 
that is, that they avoided any overt or deliberate intervention into the 
organizational structure and did not push for organizational change either to 
enable certain decisions or as a central principle of adaptation itself.
The most significant of these supplementary moments appeared in the 
concepts of "flexible decisions” and "keeping options open” and "avoiding knock- 
on effects." These not only implied a social, qualitative epistemology, but the 
assumption of irreducible uncertainty, which undermined the assumption of 
prescient and objective knowledge and its access to essentially linear time. This 
disrupted in turn the pre-emptive, planned political rationale that assumes 
decisions that were temporally discrete.
As such, although they increased in appearance from the report in 2003 
until the observations in 2009, the supplementary moments were nonetheless 
still resolved by being rearticulated linguistically into a conservative 
problematization that is, at its core, techno-scientific. Although it  incorporates 
some socio-contextual elements, its political rationale is fundamentally resilient
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in sense of maintaining existing objectives. Thus it is only incidentally 
transitional, as some staff members put it  'tinkering at the edges' while ensuring 
functional persistence. In sum, the core rationale of the problematization is 
'altering decisions’ pre-emptively (on the basis of scientific-based risk 
information] to ensure functional persistence.
By contrast, the alternative problematization suggested by these 
supplementary moments has a political rationale that is transformational and 
based on an ontology of irreducible uncertainty. Here the subject is understood 
as able to change and the solution to the threat of uncertainty lies in this capacity, 
such that capacity to change becomes the core referent of the problematization of 
adaptation. The table below demonstrates this range of actual and potential 
problematization w ithin UKCIP's discourse, in relation to the frames identified in 
Chapter 1. UKCIP's core problematization is marked out in bold, and its 
supplementary moments are included in bold but appear in grey to demonstrate 
their lim ited articulation. Most significant here for determining the core 
problematization is the political rationale, which helps identify w ith  which 
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2
In the period that was actively researched, 2002-2009, the supplements 
indicated above clearly served a subsidiary function to the core, usefully 
extending it  when it  couldn’t  'cover over' the epistemic and ontological 'gaps’ in 
order to account for or enact adaptation. In doing so, they appeared to 
demonstrate par excellence the complimentary use of hazards and vulnerability 
approaches that Fussel referred to. However, as indicated above, the articulation 
of these alternative elements as supplements limited their substantive meaning 
and their effect on the problematization as a whole, particularly in terms of its 
political rationale. This makes the assumption of complementarity open to 
question, which w ill be discussed further in Section 3.0.
2.2 On the supplement and practices, and limitations of the research
One particular realm in which the supplement seemed to emerge and play-out 
most easily was in UKCIP's practices. Within a Foucaultian account of discourse 
practices are as important a facet of discourse as the linguistic. The example 
given above and in Chapter 6 of the request to involve as many staff as possible 
also made clear that w ithout these supplementary moments, the objectives of the 
core problematization would be harder to reach. There is a clear resonance here 
w ith  the tension in rationale demonstrated between 'shadow systems' and 
formal policy where the former nonetheless are essential to enabling the success 
of the latter, in this instance by providing informal adaptive capacity through 
their social networks (Pelling et al. 2008].
It is precisely because meetings, in their more intimate and immediate 
performance, lack overt codification that they become useful entry points for the 
supplement, as this makes them much more 'open' discourse events. These are of 
course still shaped by disciplinarily power/knowledge that is produced through
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UCKIP products, such as the tables which stakeholders fill out for their risk 
assessments, which direct them towards answering a specific set of questions. 
However, to be supplements, discourse events must be 'sedimented' to some 
extent, as Laclau and Mouffe might term it (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, Torfing 
1999]. This could be established through disciplinary practices, such as staff 
training. In the context of UKCIP's use of its technical literature to frame its work, 
and the wider dispersal of this material beyond UKCIP's own practices, such 
codification seems most significant where it  is established in written form in 
UKCIP's reports and other literature. Of course, this does not preclude that 
UKCIP's supplementary moments might not sediment w ith their stakeholders 
who see their meetings as a representation of their problematization (Star and 
Griesemer 1989p. 393], although this direct audience is far more limited than 
that of UKCIP's published material and therefore its wider discursive effects are 
also more limited.
Nonetheless, this returns us to a more general theoretical question 
broached in Chapter 2 as to the validity of linguistic and particularly written 
discourse events in assessing UKCIP's problematization. It is noted here that the 
engagement w ith these practices, such as UKCIP's work w ith stakeholders, was 
lim ited in the research, both over time and in its range of organisations. As a 
result, a thorough representation of UKCIP's problematization of adaptation is 
impossible here. As discussed in the methodology chapter, the objective of this 
research was to account for UKCIP's own problematization in linguistic terms: 
first because of its central place in the discourse network as discussed in Chapter 
1, and second because at the stage the research was being carried out this was 
really the only form it  took, and the limited material practices such as the format
274
of interactions and presentations was taken into account, and furthermore the 
material impact of the risk-assessment is that it  is in itself a structure that guides 
behaviour.
As such, UKCIP's central place made its own problematization the focus of 
research, w ith the result that further practices at local sites fell outside of the 
research project as the imbrication of power/knowledge relations at particular 
stakeholder sites would inevitably shift the problematization of adaptation to 
some extent. Clearly however, a full account of the problematization adaptation 
would require engagement with these 'local sites' (Foucault 1998) including the 
governance effects of UKCIP's tools, particularly now that those projects have 
reached a much more developed stage. As they were only in their in itia l phases at 
the time of research, this demonstrates a clear direction for further research 
which could take advantage of these newly completed case studies.
3.0 Complementarity and the function of the supplement
The discussions of the constituent elements of UKCIP's problematization as both 
core and supplementary moments recalls Fussel's comment that many climate 
change adaptation programmes, including UKCIP's, combine a "complimentary" 
hazards- and vulnerability-based approach (Fussel 2007, p. 270). Reading the 
function of the supplement together w ith the categories and rationales of techno- 
scientific resilience and socio-emergent transition provides us w ith a much more 
precise set of tools through which to unpick the specific elements and how they 
are articulated together. This is because supplementary moments are 
(re)produced as such by the manner of their articulation to the core
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problematization. Therefore the nature of this articulation determines the nature 
of the 'complementarity' of the general problematizations of adaptation that they 
might reference, such as vulnerability, transition or transformation. This enables 
us to investigate precisely how this complimentary use is achieved at the 
conceptual level, and whether 'complementary' use equates to the 
'comprehensive' or 'coherent' use of both frames. The answer w ill not only 
identify which problematization type is most influential, but w ill also indicate 
what effect this complementary use, enabled through the articulation of the 
supplement, has on the stability of UKCIP's problematization of adaptation and 
its potential for change.
We have learned in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 that the articulation of elements 
from a techno-scientific frame and a socio-contextual frame into a single 
problematization was contingent upon historical power/knowledge relations. In 
Chapter 2 is was established that, in order to articulate the supplement to the 
core to give it  'fullness,' the manner of that articulation meant that certain 
aspects of the supplementary moment were shut down, such that they also 
functioned as 'lim it-points' (Derrida 1976) for the problematization as a whole. 
In this respect, the different frames certainly cannot be regarded as 
complimentary i f  this is assumed to mean both are included equally and fully, as 
through being articulated together the epistemology of one trumps the 
epistemology of the other. This was seen in Chapters 4 and 5 w ith the rendering 
of social knowledges from qualitative into quantitative terms, as well as through 
the tension and ultimate failure of the socio-economic scenarios to function as a 
heuristic device in the context of the desire for qualitatively calculable outcomes.
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At an ontological level, we saw that the epistemology of the 2003 report 
entailed an imaginary of the subject as a discrete decision maker, whose actions 
and agency were defined by the moment of decision. This restricted the room 
available for the exploration of both agency and decisions as emergent in 
formation and implementation, and limited the concept of adaptive management 
to a cyclical imaginary rather than an emergent one. However, the advent of the 
LCLIP-vulnerability approach indicated that a more socio-contextual imaginary 
was forming. While this was primarily directed at an epistemic level of better 
accounting for the impacts of an external threat, it  entailed an awareness of the 
systemic function of the stakeholder systems and also implied changes to this 
system to make it 'flatter' for the purposes of sharing information more 
effectively. As such, this adopts elements of a socio-contextual and even socio- 
emergent account of adaptation, but crucially articulates them to the service of 
the core techno-scientific problematization based on a hazards/impacts 
approach that sees the origin of the threat as external, rather than internal. As 
this indicates, it  is the articulation of the political rationale that is the crucial 
determinant of whether these different frames are fully complimentary. As 
Pelling (2001) points out, there is a crucial difference between an account of 
adaptation that seeks functional persistence and one that is prepared to change, 
identifying its own nature as part of the problem.
Nonetheless, the introduction of aspects of a vulnerability approach 
entailed awareness of the social body, use of social forms of knowledge, and the 
need for particular capacities to gather and communicate this knowledge. 
Although this was not UKCIP's intention, this entailed a re-thinking of the 
political rationale whereby the subject of adaptation also became the object of
277
adaptation: as vulnerability as the account of the problem implied a political 
rationale of creating capacity of the social system, which in turn rendering 
transition and possibly even transformation, as logical objectives. Although this 
was not formally adopted by UKCIP, this implication emerged most clearly in 
their internal discussion over whether it was right to intervene in organizational 
practices. The lim ited intervention that arose through the process-based 
National Indicator 188 also created an alternative political rationale based on 
building capacity without having to retain entrenched objectives.
However, the tension over whether such interventions should occur 
demonstrates that organisational change and deliberately building systemic 
capacity was clearly at odds w ith the 'functional persistence' rationale 
demonstrated by UKCIP's entrenched regard for 'existing objectives.' This 
tension resulted in practice in differences between what staff felt able to write 
formally and what they felt able to say informally and between explicit 
instructions to stakeholders and implicit ones. This in turn recalls Foucault's rule 
of the 'tactical polyvalence of discourses,' but what we have seen is that this 
tactical polyvalence as a representation of 'complementarity' that is far from 
comfortable or easy, that only works through articulations that lim it even as they 
connect, which in turn must constantly be re-harnessed in order to function 
together. In UKCIP's specific case, we have seen this process means that this 
complementarity is established through the articulation of the techno-scientific 
account of adaptation at the core of the problematization such that socio- 
contextual elements are articulated in a subsidiary form as supplements, which 
lim its the values they can introduce as well as their validity and reach.
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This function of the supplement as extending core yet being lim ited from 
achieving 'fullness' itself, is demonstrated in the diagram below, in figure 7.1. It 
shows the specific supplements that extended UKCIP's original, hazards-based 
problematization to the wider, techno-scientific problematization via risk 
(indicated by the upward grey spiral), and the subsequent function of other 
supplementary moments including vulnerability elements (indicated by the 
upward grey spiral). It also shows how the latter element was rearticulated (the 
red arrows, deeper in colour for stronger re-articulations) as a supplementary 
moment to the techno-scientific 'resilient' core through limitations of the socio- 
contextual elements that could be included, particularly regarding internal 
capacity. This last aspect is even more strongly rearticulated when an attempt is 
made to move beyond a socio-contextual approach to socio-emergence, in a 
series of dramatic rearticulations which occurred outside of the research period, 
but which w ill be briefly discussed in section 5.
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Figure 7.1: The emergent problem atization of adaptation at UKCIP: the function o f the supplement 
and its (re)articula tion as such
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This constant puling in and away of the suplement is precisely what 
renders it not only useful but also ‘dangerous/ as Derida put it (Derida 1976, p. 
163), as every action to render it subsidiary must recognize its potential to 
suplant the core moments of the problematization, and therefore the 
problematization as a whole. Thus ‘complementarity' is marked by constant 
tension, and the constant potential of being undone. The next section wil discus 
this later aspect, and the potential of these suplementary moments in UKCIP's 
discourse to become dangerous and posit a suplementary problematization of 
adaptation. This is folowed in Section 5 through the acount of how this actualy 
hapened through the development of guidance that suports a suplementary 
problematization that is at least socio-contextual with a political rationale of 
transition but which verges on being socio-emergent with a political rationale of
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transformation. It then tracks the subsequent limitation, and re-articulation 
through occlusion of this supplementary problematization to the core 
problematization.
4.0 The dangerous supplement: from supplementary moments to a 
supplementary problematization
The increasing visib ility of supplementary moments between 2003 and 2009 has 
demonstrated the flu id ity of UKCIP's discourse and its potential to change. We 
have seen that around 2009 UKCIP were beginning to discuss internally whether 
climate change was, rather than being a unique threat, in fact an application of 
general adaptability, such that capacity for organizational change might become 
its conceptual core. This basic point had existed since 2001 in the writing of the 
in itia l technical report but was deliberately suppressed and as a result made an 
extremely constrained appearance in the final version in 2003. This clearly 
demonstrates Derrida's principle that it is because of this potential to disrupt the 
core's validity that supplement is considered as 'dangerous' to the original 
(Derrida 1976, p. 163), as it threatens to turn the original term into the new 
supplement. At the level of a full problematization, this happens when 
supplementary moments are articulated more strongly w ith each other, w ithout 
being integrated through the framework of the original or 'core' elements. As a 
result they are not limited by these terms and can work to displace these. The 
most crucial marker of their success occurs at the level of a political rationale, 
which sets the framework for the problematization and orients the subject's 
behaviour w ith in it.
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4.1 Irreducible uncertainty, new ways of knowing and resultant rationales
Let us explore then the potential of UKCIP's supplementary terms to form an 
alternative problematization of adaptation. As we have seen above, UKCIP's 
epistemic supplementary moments entail an assumption of irreducible 
uncertainty which rejects the implicit principle that hazards or risk accounts are 
sufficient to know climate change. As Dessai etal. note: "By avoiding an approach 
that places climate prediction (and consequent risk assessment) at its heart, 
successful adaptation strategies can be developed in the face of this deep 
uncertainty" (2009, p. 75). This re-problematizes adaptation away from the 
premise of objective linear knowledge based on Global Circulation Models and 
climate projections, and towards emergent knowledge based on the current 
system status and real time observation.
It is not the objective of this research to explore the pros and cons of a 
particular take on adaptation but rather to identify the contingency and 'partial' 
nature of any problematization has come into being. However, in pointing out 
this necessarily partial nature, it should be signalled that there are substantial 
concerns about rallying a problematization of adaptation around climate 
predictions, even if  these are 'upgraded' and rendered as probabilistic 
projections as was done w ith the UK Climate Projections of 2009. Most notably, 
Mike Hulme and Suraje Dessai (Dessai and Hulme 2004, Dessai and Hulme 2008, 
Dessai et al. 2009) see such projections as inherently reinstating the rationale of 
'predict and provide' or an 'optimization approach' however dressed up this is in 
statistical representations of uncertainty. This effect is particularly apparent in 
public use in the UK, where the norm of utilizing science as an indisputably 
objective basis for policy (Jasanoff 1987, Jasanoff 1996, Jasanoff 2012b).
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Admittedly this account skims the surface of a very complex argument 
about the use of projections in a risk-framework, but at a fundamental onto- 
political level it  comes back to the principle of being able to plan pre-emptively 
on the basis of pre-determined outcomes (however moderated by likelihoods 
and magnitudes) as discussed in Chapter 5. As such there is substantial critical 
pressure for the adoption of a critical vulnerability based approach and a 
rationale generated out of this to deal with irreducible uncertainty, which we 
have explored as a supplementary problematization of socio-emergence which 
has transformability as its political rationale. As Hulme and Dessai put it: "We 
believe... that society w ill benefit much more from a greater understanding of the 
vulnerability of climate-influenced decisions to large irreducible uncertainties 
than in seeking to increase the accuracy and precision of the next generation of 
climate models" (Dessai et al. 2009, p. 76)
Without the assumption of predictability an alternative rationale of 
response is derived that extends UKCIP's supplements from 'robust decisions' 
and 'keeping options open' to not merely acting pre-emptively, but seeing 
decisions themselves as emergent. This would require the substantial 
development of UKCIP's account of 'monitoring' as engaging w ith emergent 
knowledge from being something of an 'add-on' to becoming a central part of the 
political rationale for ensuring adaptation. This applies to both external and 
internal systems, as well as their interactions, and indicates the requirement for 
faster and clearer communication in the analysis and performance of change 
(Dillon 2002, Welsh 2013).
In this respect, although NI-188's lifespan expired in March 2011 (Defra 
2010), its principle of a process-based approach to adaptation which
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transcended the lim ited sitting periods of local government offered an in itia l 
basis to re-account for the time of adaptation by building adaptive capacity. The 
nascent problematization of the emergent time indicated by such an approach is 
far more developed in other parts of the UK governance. A good exploration of 
this occurs in Adey and Anderson's discussion of UK Civil Contingencies (Adey 
and Anderson 2011). They identify a socio-emergent problematization of 
adaptation as moving "beyond the idea that the decision is a singular moment 
abstracted from the context w ithin which it  takes place and undertaken by a 
discrete actor or set of actors. Instead the decision is understood as 
differentiated, affectively registered, transformative, and on-going actualization 
of potential against a horizon of undecidability in which past, present and future 
fold together in complex ways" (McCormack and Schwanen 2011, p. 2801).
4.2 A supplementary ontology and rationale based on capacity for emergence
At an ontological level we have seen that UKCIP's supplementary moments 
indicate the need to re-problematize from a discrete, linear, materialist account 
of the climate threat towards an emergent and complex, social-capacity based 
account of threat. This shifts the primary object of concern and action from 
specific external products to general social constitution and capacity.
One minimal extension of UKCIP's problematization in this direction can 
be seen in the work of Sellke and Renn on another risk-framework which 
requires the inclusion of "the structure and interplay of the different actors 
dealing w ith  risks, how these actors may differently perceive the risks and what 
concerns they have regarding their likely consequences" (Sellke and Renn 2010, 
P. 296). Of course, UKCIP does this in their risk framework too -  but only 
externally of the stakeholder, whereas this particular report makes the step to
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including in its problematization the internal characteristics of a stakeholder 
organisation: "the socio-political impacts prevalent w ith in the entities and 
institutions having a role in the risk process, their organizational imperatives and 
the capacity needed for effective risk governance” (Sellke and Renn 2010, P. 
296]. This demonstrates operation of this particularly supplement w ith in  the 
political rationale in a very similar framework to UKCIP's.
However, the ontological supplement does not become part of the core 
problematization w ithout an epistemological technology to make it operational. 
In order to boost the supplementary socio-emergent ontology, supporting 
methods for making visible socio-contextual elements through participative 
decision-making and across wider systems would need to be continued and 
extended, particularly in the direction of overtly and deliberately building the 
capacity of these networks to act as more open structures w ithin organisations. 
This would require the additional presence of expertise in representing an 
alternative social imaginary, resources for futures and scenario work, and 
expertise in organizational change.
However, the interconnection between ontology and epistemology is even 
more fundamental than this. The crucial strength of a political rationale of 
'capacity to change' is its ability to be articulated more coherently w ith 
irreducible uncertainty (Dillon 2002, Inderberg and Eikeland 2009, McCormack 
and Schwanen 2011]. This is because the 'irreducible ignorance' presented by 
climate change is recognized as a condition rather than the threat to be 'covered 
over' (Glynos and Howarth 2007, Adey and Anderson 2011, Anderson 2010, 
Luhmann 1998]. Placing capacity at the core of the rationale governing an
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adaptation problematization takes the onus off predictive knowledge and actions 
as referenced above [Dessai and Hulme 2004, Dessai et al. 2008], and posits the 
need for these to be responsive instead, through maximum capacity to sense, 
respond and change in order to absorb the effect of the event.
In the context of enabling fundamental change, flat decision structures, 
that is to say ones whose lines of communication and power do not centralize 
control, are considered to be better able to transform, and to do it more quickly 
[Adey and Anderson 2011, McCormack and Schwanen 2011, Dillon 2002]. In this, 
the UK precedent again seems to be best identifiable in the UK Civil 
Contingencies approach [Adey and Anderson 2011], although this limits itself to 
single extreme events rather than frequent systemic changes, it offers a model at 
a Governmental level for an emergent political response in the space-time of the 
event in a clearly allied field.
For Pelling, such emergence is ensured then through "beliefs and 
capacity" which for leads to the conclusion that "culture and governance" are the 
roots of adaptation [2011, p. 167]. The supplementary problematization of 
adaptation returns us then to the need to consider critically what is meant by 
governance and how it operates through means of power that, although not 
necessarily immediately visible, and disguised in the form of ‘positive freedom' is 
nonetheless pervasively in operation [Foucault]. The point here is that, the use of 
governance as a mode of extending the problematization of climate change 
adaptation would be better read w ith tools to engage w ith it  critically, 
particularly to ensure that its sometimes immanent, quiet forms of disciplinary 
power/knowledge and biopolitical power are also considered w ith in the 
question of ensuring a flat power structure.
286
However, questions of capacity can also be extended in more practical, 
material ways. This direction was demonstrated by a former coordinator for the 
Southeast Climate Change Partnership who commented that, rather than being a 
"talking shop," a Partnership "should be, really, about the direct exchange of 
resources" to supplement each other’s capacity (UKCIP Interviewee 2009, p. 16]. 
Crucially this comment arises precisely from a problematization of climate 
change as a threat of irreducible uncertainty: "climate change is a gift for that 
kind of [...] thinking. Because it's an issue which no one organization can deal 
with, and no one organization could ever develop the resources to deal w ith it. 
Therefore [...] Find someone else who's got that [item you need], who's prepared 
to trust you and exchange that and build it up together ... and I think the mode is 
there [...] but I don't see much evidence of it" [UKCIP Interviewee 2009, p. 16]. 
Although this is a personal opinion about the direction that the Climate 
Partnerships should take, it is particularly interesting coming from an 
experienced member of a Partnership, which also helped UKCIP spread the 
Partnership mode of operation to other regions and to sectoral partnerships. 
This demonstrates a much 'fuller' supplementary moment than that of 'avoiding 
adaptation constraining decisions.’ Instead, this is a positive account of building 
capacity: working together to ensure greater resources, noting the necessity of 
building a culture of cooperation that relies on trust.
4.3 Wider political implications
The supplement here might appear as nothing more than the representation of 
the on-going struggle between laissez-faire government and networked 
governance, typical of neo-liberalism's operation through advanced liberal 
governmentality, which attempts to deploy "pluricentric governance...to 'govern
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at a distance' by means of mobilizing a plurality of self-regulating actors and 
networks w ith in  an institutional framework that ensures conformity" (Torfing 
2010, p. 408). This would seem a fairly accurate account of UKCIP's mode of 
adaptation, yet Torfing warns against making the assumption that this renders 
those w ider networks as without political power in creating the overall rationale. 
Instead, he asserts that, in contrast to supposedly depoliticized managerialism 
(Swyngedouw 2010), this discourse hides its own, new terrain of power 
struggles which have the potential to become political (Torfing 2010) by 
redefining the problematization under which they operate.
This account, drawing on Foucault, challenges the somewhat abstract 
account of the political we explored through Ranciere -  not in terms of its 
substantive meaning, but in terms of the types and number of incidences that are 
labelled as political events. Rather than confining the political to a single, radical 
change, it  is seen as distributed throughout an order’s constituent relations not 
only in space but also in time as they are constantly being (re)instituted. To 
reverse Ranciere's brushing off of Foucault, the fact that power is everywhere 
means that freedom expressed through the political event is a potentiality that is 
also distributed 'everywhere,' yet which is contingent upon specific instances of 
power play.
Just as Torfing (2010) notes that the supplement of local governance 
undermines the logic of centralized, state government, we have found w ith 
UKCIP that the supplement of decentralized systems undermines the techno- 
scientific mode in its account of both space and time. Indeed both cases seems to 
be representative of a European and wider trend, where there is a common 
narrative of struggle between:
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"government [...] based on sovereignty, hierarchy and control, [and] 
governance [that is] based on plurality, interdependency and coordination. 
Whereas representative democracy is based on universal citizenship, 
competition and representation, democratic forms of governance are 
based on affectedness, deliberation and participation. To put it  graphically: 
whereas the parliamentary chain of government is basically a linear 
model, the local forms of governance introduces a complex non-linear 
model [...] not unlike what Deleuze and Guattari [1987] describe as a 
rhizome" (Torfing 2010, p. 413).
While these parallels are unmistakeable, the policing function of the 
supplement becomes very clear here: its role is to maintain the supplement of 
complexity w ith in the existing order of interests (expressed here as 
'parliament'), rather than effecting allowing the full democratic affective and 
emergent mode that would effect a political moment by interrupting the current 
order.
The specific difficulty with making the supplement of capacity and 
emergence overt is also related to this. In making the networks of disciplinary 
power/knowledge and biopolitical power relations clear it  would undermine 
that unique and useful duality of liberalism's 'non-interventionist'-interventions. 
In other words, the socio-contextual and socio-emergent supplementary 
moments that were useful in extending the reach of biopolitical governance 
when harnessed to a conservative political rationale become dangerous when 
overtly recognized and articulated into a political rationale of emergence. This 
brings us full circle to the analysis of 'discourse' and governmental regimes -  
clearly some practices of governance need to be not rendered overt linguistically
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i f  they are to function in particular ways, and in fact most biopolitical governance 
rests precisely on this implicit nature: governance is rendered as self-interest 
(just as consumption is rendered as desire), such that by being 'self-interested 
we serve the purpose of the existing order (Foucault 2008, Foucault 2009, Oels
2005). As such, whilst stakeholders tolerate UKCIP, UKCIP is also governed to be 
tolerant of these existing forms of life and the rationales they operate by.
The multiple locations of (re)institution means that the suppression of the 
supplement is by no means a simple process, but emerges on a myriad of 
frontiers, as this research has demonstrated: in policy through the experience of 
authors, word choice and content, and in verbal practices through specific 
lim itations and conciliations of the accounts of capacity, time, interactions and 
agendas. The significance of the semiotic lens therefore is to make evident these 
operations of the police and contestations of power in the relatively mundane 
operations of technical advice for stakeholder-based adaptation governance. 
Similarly it  also appears to be caught between the 'modern' and 'post-normal' 
accounts of science (Ferreyra 2006, Eden et al. 2006, O'Brien et al. 2007).
Discourse analysis, specifically through identifying the articulation of 
elements of ontology and epistemology into a political rationale, provides a 
precise inventory and explanation as to how it is that ‘post-political' 
managerialism is a production of a police order in Ranciere's sense, which works 
through ensuring a logic that keeps itself 'post-political' through the idealisation 
of science. In this, it is not just technocratic management that has "sutured the 
spaces of democratic politics” (Swyngedouw 2010, p. 214) but the trope of 
climate scenarios and risk-frameworks in acting as a code for that management
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and the regulation of the technocratic order. The significance of this, as 
Swyngedouw crucially points out, is that this shores up general de-politicisation.
However such de-politicization requires discursive policing that operates 
at this interface of consensus-managerialism and broader participation precisely 
because of its door to broad participation (Torfing, 2010}. If we bring this back 
to the discussion in Chapters 1 and 2 of the political and encounter w ith excess as 
necessary for ontological transformation (as the transformation of fundamental 
ethics and values], then the order of the police inherently disables the core 
political capacity essential to a transformative mode of adaptation (Park et al. 
2012, Pelling 2011], particularly in light of the ever increasing predictions of the 
extremity of climate change and impacts.
This reflects Latour's argument that the division of nature and society 
"paralyzes" democracy, particularly where it  corresponds to the separation of 
objective ‘facts' as the accounting of nature, and subjective 'values' as a property 
of society (Latour 2004]. Here facts are removed from their own origin in the 
social contingency of knowledge and their inherent political origins are elided, 
even as they overtly exclude supposedly more 'subjective' values from the 
calculation of the ordering of existence. We see precisely this operation in 
UKCIP's earlier discourse at an overt level w ith the rejection of social 
knowledges, and its implicit operation in its later discourse in the tension over 
ensuring adherence to the risk framework approach and the degree to which it 
could provide a robust basis for policy or strategy. Crucially, the later emergence 
of a supplementary discourse does tend towards what Latour designates a 
"matters of concern" approach that recognises contingency and avoids the desire
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for absolute claims (Latour, 2004). However, as we have seen, this was then 
curtailed by a series of policing discursive interventions.
In addition to preventing onto-political transformation, avoiding the 
critique of the extant order avoids genuinely engaging with the order of life that 
was responsible for producing (anthropogenic) climate change in the first place. 
In this regard the most basic transformative adaptation is one that seeks to end 
consumption based 'carboniferous capitalism' (Dalby 2002, Patterson and Dalby
2006). This is itself an onto-political transformation far beyond mitigation 
(particularly given the general failure of the latter). To do this, such a critique 
must engage w ith the central order of the contemporary world -  "the perceived 
inevitability of capitalism and a market economy" that is so entrenched that "[it] 
is easier to imagine the end of the world than to imagine the end of capitalism 
(Jameson, 2003, p, 73)" (Swyngedouw 2010, pp. 215-216).
Swyngedouw also points out the use of the apocalyptic to help secure the 
extant post-political order, the irony being that this prevents engagement w ith 
the cause of that fear (anthropogenic climate change) (Swyngedouw 2010). We 
have also witnessed this in the vivid imagery of threat occurring in climate 
scenario graphs and tables, extractable down to 25 and 5 square miles, and to 
daily and even hourly weather projections after 2009 (Defra 2012a). This 
produces fantasmatic idenfitication w ith UKCIP's discourse as the means of 
providing security, thereby reinstating the original order, or indeed changing 'us' 
to maintain 'it.' In this sense, techno-scientific resilience-based adaptation works 
to prevent transformation -  both in the sense of adaptation as socio-emergence 
and in the related radical sense Ranciere.
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The significance of this research then is to have charted not only the 
moments of irruption and suppression of the supplement, but the suggestion of 
an alternative logic of socio-emergence based on adaptive capacity as a 
transformative rationale which is not only fundamentally political in Ranciere's 
sense, but adopts this constant (re]politicization as a mode of adaptation. This 
poses an extreme challenge to the extant climate adaptation logic and in doing so 
moves beyond the lament that "poverty of political imagination pervades the 
precautionary principle” (Marieke de Goede and Samuel Randalls 2009, p. 874).
Here the attraction of the Human Security approach is most visible as an 
alternative problematization of adaptation that resonates w ith the supplement of 
socio-emergence. However, an interesting tension arises here if  human security 
as a discourse is taken as a proxy for the transformative adaptation of socio­
emergence: human security often presumes inalienable human rights to quality 
of life of some sort, and is also often associated w ith liberal governance [O'Brien 
and Leichenko 2007) which as we have seen, is already problematic if  we take 
into account its pervasive forms of power. Furthermore, socio-emergence, taken 
to its fullest, if  not most ethical, extent can also disaggregate the human and the 
social from any normative values -  including those of human security, even 
building emergent life through a basic re-conception of the 'human' at the 
molecular level [Dillon 2003). The critiques of such security problematizations 
offered already [See for example Dillon 1996, amonst others, Dillon 2002, Dillon 
2003, Campbell 1998, Marieke de Goede and Samuel Randalls 2009) offer some 
excellent examples of the modes for analysing 'human security' and socio­
emergence in ways more alert to their own unique problematizations, that is,
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inclusions and exclusions in the account of the world, subject or of 'life', and the 
associated political rationales.
However, despite these issues, any change to the existing account of 
adaptation would require fundamental discursive change in the wider UK 
political and business culture, as without such change current systems posit a 
clear lim it to the possibility of engaging w ith a socio-emergent problematization 
of adaptation. Therefore the fundamental ontological and epistemic basis of 
these problematizations of capacity and emergence call for a deconstructive 
engagement w ith the assumed 'objectives' of adaptation strategies of individual 
organisations and wider discourses, including that of UKCIP and the UK 
Government.
4.4 UKCIP and the possibility of a supplementary problematization in 2009
The identification of these supplementary moments w ith an alternative account 
of adaptation, connected most significantly to socio-emergent capacity and 
transition, demonstrates clearly the profound implications of the supplement 
and its ability to supplant the core. This is particularly the case where there is a 
theme that links many of the supplementary moments together, or where their 
increase over time means that in effect there are so many supplements that the 
original discourse becomes incoherent and unsustainable.
At the time field research was being carried out in 2009, it seemed that 
UKCIP was experiencing such an increase, and as such, had three options in 
terms of the development of their problematization of adaptation: first, to try  and 
maintain the position of the supplementary moments as they were; second, to 
explore the supplementary moments, their internal resonance and their links to a 
socio-emergent problematization of adaptation more directly; three, to explicitly
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detach themselves from such a supplementary account by overtly 'othering' it, 
thereby maintaining the in tegrity of the ir own problematization.
In 2009 there were only m inor indications that there would be any 
movement in the direction of the supplementary problematization: the 
supplements already discussed, and one staff member being asked to look into 
producing a report on the ir value, particularly regarding organizational change. 
However, this was a very recent decision at the time (UKCIP Interviewee B 2009] 
and as such the significance of such a report could not be established.
However, it  is fa ir to say that adopting the organizational approach would 
have constituted a major shift in UKCIP's and w ider UK policy on adaptation, and 
a substantial rupture between the extant problematization and its close link  to 
climate projection sciences and environmental management. All of this 
demonstrates that if  the supplementary problematization is to be developed at a 
UK government level, it needs to draw on a different power structure, either in 
terms of which agencies are tasked w ith  enabling adaptation, or in terms of 
internal expertise.
5.0 Lessons Lost? A postscript on the demise of UKCIP and wider 
implications for UK discourse
While the years after 2009 fall beyond the research period, there have been some
striking developments between then and the time of w riting, which make clear
that not only have the identified supplementary moments emerged further, but
that a supplementary problematization that links them has become an overt part
of UKCIP's discourse.
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The broad supplementary problematization identified above as socio- 
emergent was dramatically recognized, and much more thoroughly explored, by 
a UKCIP report for the Adaptation Sub-Committee published in April 2010 
entitled 'Attributes of Well-Adapting Organisations' (Lonsdale et al. 2010}. The 
report explores a broad range of academic and practical contributions that could 
all be described as fitting  w ith in  a socio-emergent problematization of 
adaptation as they all focus on improving adaptive capacity. Crucially the report 
also recognizes w ith in  this the difference between transition and transformation 
as the political rationales.
It is interesting in the context of the three possible directions for UKCIP's 
discourse highlighted above, that the 2010 report does not seek to place UKCIP's 
tools at the centre of their new discourse, but instead recommends that these 
alternative approaches, particularly PACT (Performance Acceleration through 
Capacity Building} be incorporated into the newly proposed national basis of 
adaptation at the time, the Climate Change Risk Assessment (CCRA} (Lonsdale et 
al. 2010}. It should be said however that the CCRA in itself was based on the 
UKCIP 2003 risk framework. As such, although UKCIP does not itself kn it these 
approaches together, it clearly introduces a broad supplementary 
problematization that is socio-emergent into the national discourse of 
adaptation. As such, this report clearly points to the need for further 
investigation of how this alternative problematization might be articulated into 
the CCRA, although as it does not do this work itself, it  is difficu lt to know if  and 
how this would be achieved for the problematization of adaptation.
This clear emergence of the supplement reflects both its emergence 
w ith in  UKCIP, its coincidental recruitment of new staff w ith  this form of
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expertise, and the changing discourse of adaptation across the UK and 
internationally which this report samples. However, the announcement in March 
2011 that from September the Environment Agency would take over from UKCIP 
in providing the Government's official adaptation programme may have 
undermined the power/knowledge basis of this trajectory, and reminds us 
dramatically that policy is never a "closed system... but is formulated w ith in  a 
social and political space” (Hansen 2006, p. 29].
It is interesting that, whilst UKCIP's loss of the Defra contract may have 
been to do w ith  the Conservative party's dislike of 'qangos' or a simple 
reorganization of policy provision, the adaptation portfo lio was then returned to 
its institutional origins in Defra and the Environment Agency. As such, there are 
clear questions to be pursued as to what impact these discursive and 
institutional events have had not only on UKCIP's discourse itself, but on the 
w ider UK Government discourse on adaptation.
In 2011, UKCIP published its last official report for the UK on its approach 
to adaptation (Brown et al. 2011). This marks out a distinction between 'top 
down' impacts and 'bottom up' vulnerability approach, and crucially re-evaluates 
the central place of the impacts approach, moving it  from a more linear 
predictive tool to instead functioning as an explorative tool, explicitly taking on 
the Dessai et al critique (2008) discussed above. This move clearly begins to 
reproblematize access to knowledge in favour of irreducible uncertainty, 
undermining the epistemic basis of the core problematization, and shifting 
UKCIP's problematization towards a more emergent account. It effected a 
codification of the wider use of the Local Climate Impacts Profile (LCLIP) 
approach that UKCIP had rolled out w ith  all its stakeholders, boosting the
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presence of vulnerability in the problematization (see, for details UK Climate 
Impacts Programme 2009].
However, although the report moves to vulnerability  as a better response 
to uncertainty, it sticks to a somewhat linear account of vulnerability itself as 
socio-contextual and historically based, and represents it  as being of lim ited use 
for long-term decisions, thus reinstating the ideal of prescient knowledge. It 
resolves this by connecting vulnerability back to the value of impacts or techno- 
scientific information for covering this gap, thus tying it  back to the core 
problematization w ith in  a somewhat linear predict and provide mode. As a 
result, although greater screen time is given to vulnerability, it  crucially uses its 
socio-contextual basis as a lim it point, linking it  back to the techno-scientific 
framing in a constant cycle. This move obscures the gap of irreducible 
uncertainty, rather than accepting it  and dealing w ith  it  through socio­
emergence.
An alternative solution does appear in the discussion of decision-making 
in the brie f mention given to resilience (Brown et al. 2011, p. 40), although 
w ithout any clear connection to the epistemic problem that arises w ith  the 
stronger presence of the vulnerability supplement. Importantly, this occurs after 
demonstrating the insufficiencies of the more fam iliar optim ization approach 
w ith  the result that resilience appears as the more appropriate approach. It is 
related explicitly to Holling and the IPCC definition, as: "'[the] ability of a social or 
ecological system to absorb disturbances while retaining the same basic 
structure and ways of functioning, the capacity for self-organisation, and the 
capacity to adapt to stress and change.' (IPCC, 2007a)" (Brown et al. 2011, p. 42)
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W hilst there is only a little  detail on this, they do note that one form of 
resilience recognizes irreducible uncertainty and requires learning -  including 
learning from mistakes, the capacity to absorb shocks, to be flexible, and 
reorganize. The second form of resilience is resilience to specific risks. They then 
focus in on the latter and use a building example that links to the concept of 
robustness (Brown et al. 2011, p. 42), which returns the problematization to a 
pre-emptive planning mode. W hilst a greater space for these supplements has 
appeared, including for the firs t time clear links to the entire alternative 
discourses of vulnerability and resilience, the single paragraph of detail on 
resilience as an emergent capacity and the longer page on vulnerability shows 
that UKCIP itself still places the onus on a linear model of identifying the threat 
firs t and response after, reinstating the core problematization, although in a 
weakened, more nuanced form.
The report ends w ith  the discussion of resilience and fails to tie all of 
these changes into a cohesive problematization or a approach, rather, they are 
le ft as if  they are simply 'options' rather than contrary problematizations, w ith  
the final articulation constructed through a 'key messages' box. In it, it  states 
that: "Resilience approaches aim to provide increased resilience either in general 
or in response to specific risks. They generally involve learning from experience. 
The options favoured in this approach tend to be ones considered to be robust 
against a range of uncertainties.” (Brown et al. 2011, p. 43) This linguistically ties 
resilience back into the core problematization and terminology of the 2003 
report, undermining the supplement whilst giving it more space. So even through 
this appropriately named ‘supplementary guidance' indeed extends the elements
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included as supplementary moments, it  is also re-establishes these as a lim it 
point, reinstating the core problematization.
In doing so, as an official supplement to UKCIP guidance, it  closes down 
the capacity and transformation options that were opened up in the 2010 report 
to the Adaptation Sub-Committee by UKCIP. However, despite being a massive 
reduction from the detail from their report in 2010, this is s till an increase from 
the 2003 report. This suggests that had UKCIP continued in the ir official role, 
they may have produced a more substantial shift beyond a socio-contextual 
problematization towards socio-emergence.
UKCIP's failure to substantially codify these socio-systemic supplements 
into their problematization has meant that they were not established in its 
technical documentation and only inform ally established w ith  stakeholders 
when UKCIP lost its position as the national provider of a framework for 
adaptation. As a result, it  is unclear whether there was much transference to the 
Environment Agency (EA) and the Climate Change Risk Assessment of its 
practice- based tacit knowledge of the need to include social, and particularly 
organizational elements in the problematization of adaptation.
There is clearly an opportunity in this transitional period to nonetheless 
explore the opening in the core problematization that the supplementary 
moments, and later the 2010 document in particular, reveal. Given the discussion 
in Chapter 4 of the Environment Agency's disciplinary biases a decade earlier, it  
w ill be interesting to see whether there has also been a further inclusion of 
vulnerability or organisational change expertise in the intervening years.
By contrast, what clearly did remain was UKCIP's core problematization 
based on risk, and a techno-scientific response. As a superficial indication of
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where an exploration of these issues might lie, it  should firs t be noted that UKCIP 
has not ceased to exist, and w ill continue adaptation research and information 
sharing [Defra Adapting to Climate Change Programme team 2012). However, its 
role as provider of adaptation support on behalf of the Government passed to the 
EA in April 2012, who are providing a renamed ‘Climate Ready Support Service' 
[Defra 2012b), under the Adapting to Climate Change national programme run 
by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [Defra). Defra still 
refers to adaptation in terms very sim ilar to those of the original 2003 report, 
stating that: adaptation “needs to be bu ilt into our normal planning and risk 
management procedures... That way we can make sustainable adaptation 
decisions at the right time to maximise the benefits and minimise costs" [Defra 
2012b). As such there do not appear to be any major changes at the time of 
w riting  in mid- 2012.
This is perhaps because the institutional form of the transition from 
UKCIP has been a phased one enabling the EA to “build on the work of UKCIP" 
and thereby maintain its problematization. In fact, the EA refers to adaptation 
directly terms of resilience [Environment Agency 2012). Interestingly however, 
the Climate Change Partnerships seem to have a renewed presence in this 
programme through a new coordinating company called Climate UK which is 
working together closely w ith  the EA [Environment Agency 2012). The network 
oriented coordination body seems to present an institutional infrastructure for 
enabling a socio-contextual response and potentia lity could facilitate a socio- 
emergent one.
However, it  w ill be interesting to see how these different aspects of the 
national programme are articulated together w ith  the much higher profile
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nation-wide Climate Change Risk Assessment (CCRA]. Crucially, the CCRA is 
based methodologically on the 2003 Risk Uncertainty and Decision-making 
framework (Brown et al. 2011]. This clearly reinstates the centrality of risk as a 
discourse, w ith  all the exclusions of encouraging a techno-scientific rather than 
socio-emergent approach discussed above. This problematization is made clear 
by the claim that the CCRA "fully accounts for uncertainties, provides a 
transparent comparison of risks, and cross-checks its results w ith  current 
climate vulnerability” and that in turn the National Adaptation Programme "sets 
adaptation outcomes and puts in place policies to enable the tim ely uptake of 
actions and robust long-term decision-making" (Adaptation Sub-Committee 
2011, p. 87]. However, it  should also be noted that the CCRA does link  up impacts 
by sector, and links the significance of these to a response at the local level, 
supported through the regional Climate Change Partnerships (Defra 2012c]. As 
such, there is clearly room here for an exploration of a socio-contextual response. 
The question is whether this w ill again be tied back to resilience, as seems likely 
w ith  a risk and resilience based problematization, or whether these networks in 
practice w ill generate a more socio-emergent problematization. As Torfing 
(2010] suggests, the potential for the emergence of the supplement is inherent in 
this structure, but the specifics of its articulation as a discursive order w ill play a 
large part in enabling or policing this potential.
In sum, it seems that UKCIP provided a thorough exploration of a 
supplementary problematization founded on a socio-emergent frame in 2010, 
but was not able to integrate this thoroughly before its government role ceased 
in 2011-2012. W ith UKCIPs removal from this central role, it  is unclear whether 
the supplementary elements that it did introduce have an institutional home in
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the network centred on Defra and the EA, although they would seem much more 
like ly to f it  w ith  the Climate UK organization, and the Climate Change 
Partnerships. Together, these bodies make up the institutional network of the 
new 'official' discourse on adaptation to climate change in the UK. As such it  is 
unclear whether the emergence of these more socio-contextual elements of 
vulnerability and transition, but particularly the ir conceptual extension to socio- 
emergent aspects of capacity and transformation w ill re-problematize adaptation 
in UK discourse on climate change. Given that they seem to be building on the 
risk-fram ework approach, it  seems certain that the ir problematization needs 
investigation to determine whether the socio-emergent supplementary 
problematization has made any impact whatsoever, and i f  so, what particular 
form of 'complementarity' might be being articulated in the ir problematization of 
adaptation in the UK.
6.0 Summary
This chapter has sought to marry the analysis of UKCIP's problematization of 
adaptation w ith  the techno-scientific, socio-contextual and socio-emergent 
framings of adaptation discussed in Chapter 1. More specifically, it  has noted the 
significance of their ontological and epistemic accounts of the subject and object 
of adaptation and how these know and act in space and time. How these 
moments are articulated into a political rationale and thus formed into a 
problematization as a whole has been discussed. We have found that UKCIP’s 
core problematization is techno-scientific, based on subjects who are discrete in 
time and space, while external objects are adapted. A pre-emptive planning
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account of agency is articulated into a rationale based on altering existing 
objectives.
This core problematization is supplemented by several elements 
associated w ith  a socio-contextual and even socio-emergent account of 
adaptation. Rather than being 'complimentary' in the sense of being equal, the 
way in which these are articulated ensure that they remain bounded by a 
fundamentally conservative 'resilience'-based political rationality. Section 4 finds 
that the d ifficu lty in articulating these supplementary elements in full is precisely 
because they threaten to 'supplant' the original terms of the core 
problematization. Their socio-emergent account of both threat and the political 
rationale that enables a solution also means that they demonstrate an alternative 
problematization, even if  this is not articulated in full. As such, in UKCIP's case 
they function as a ‘dangerous supplement' that extends the techno-scientific- 
resilience problematization but also demonstrates its inherent insufficiency, and 
as such conjure the image of an alternative, socio-emergent or transformative 
problematization of adaptation. The w ider political implications of the 
supplementary problematization are far reaching. However, in 2009 it was 
unclear whether this discursive emergence would be consolidated. Section 5 
discusses events between 2009 and 2012 when the supplementary 
problematization was recognized overtly and indeed was im plic itly  recognized 
as threatening to supplant UCKIP's problematization. It shows how this was 
responded to discursively by effectively closing down the supplement, firs t by 
othering it through naming it as outside of their remit, and later by recognising it, 
but rearticulating it to the core and lim iting its content.
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For both UKCIP and its observers, it  seems clear that the overt recognition 
of the socio-emergent supplement, either through discourse analysis, or through 
its emergence in practice, raises ethical questions about the contingency of their 
original problematization and how it accounted for adaptation, particularly in 
terms of the political rationale that it  enabled, and the rationale that it  disabled 
through articulating supplementary problematizations as supplementary 
moments and policing them as lim it points. In terms of the relevance for the UK 
as a whole, those questions now fall to Defra and the EA and the ir w ider network, 
as the tensions, inclusions and occlusions identified here w ill have an important 
bearing on how the ir problematization is critically understood.
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Chapter 8: Conclusion
1.0 Situation of the research and theoretical approach
UKCIP's discourse of adaptation emerged in the context of a w ider scramble in 
UK government and internationally to understand and deal w ith  adaptation to 
climate change from the late-1990s. As discussed in Chapter 5, the IPCC 
discussion of adaptation produced in 2001 was much broader than that adopted 
in UKCIP's 2003 framework, as it  included the additional elements of state- 
coordinated and legislated approaches as well as a vulnerability based framing of 
adaptation (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2001). These 
alternative conceptions were reflected differently by various branches of UK 
government depending on their traditional areas of concern and modes of 
governance. Three such bodies of government are mentioned now to situate and 
reflect on the unique contingency of UKCIP's problematization, which this thesis 
has identified.
W ith the ir core expertise in environmental management, the Department 
for Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), took from the IPCC the elements of its 
assessment-based approach that appeared most appropriate -  namely climate 
scenario information -  and translated them, through UKCIP, into a planned risk 
management approach. In doing so, UKCIP's early years of adaptation discourse 
conformed to the IPCC ‘linear model of expertise' (Beck 2011) even as it  sought 
to make this useful to stakeholders. By contrast, the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID) had as its concern the capacity and
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vulnerability of populations. Indeed the development o f the adaptive capacity 
concept in the IPCC 2001 report (Burton 2003, Beck 2011) had its origins in the 
development field. This meant DFID was more like ly and more able to adopt a 
capacity-building and vulnerability-reduction based approach more quickly than 
UKCIP did. W ith its greater affin ity for a political economy approach and socio­
economic processes as well as identifying the community and individual as its 
ontological 'exposure unit' (as opposed to the business practices of, for example, 
farmers) DFID was far more alert to these more social characteristics of 
adaptation (Nelson, Lamboll and Arendse 2008, Pelling and High 2005).
As we have seen in Chapters 5 and 6, UKCIP tended to occlude these 
aspects both epistemologically and ontologically. It seems unsurprising then that 
it  found that its approach tended to occlude charities w ith  an overtly 'social' 
focus who represented vulnerable sectors of the UK population (Tompkins et al. 
2010, West and Gawith 2005). The only apparent connection between Defra and 
UKCIP's domestic approach and DFID's international one appears to ride on the 
explicit distinction made at the IPCC, and picked up by the UKCIP 2003 report 
authors, that the approaches should be different because the level of adaptive 
capacity itself differed so markedly between developed and under-developed 
countries (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2001). However, both 
Defra and DFID im plic itly  adopted the long-term and gradual temporal framing 
of climate change implied in the in itia l scientific accounts of the IPCC. It may have 
been that the lack of futures representation in the IPCC reports (Nordlund 2008) 
also lim ited Defra and UKCIP's engagement w ith  an emergent account of climate 
change.
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The significant alternative discourse in this regard arose through the 
emergency-response resilience discourse in the UK, exemplified by the Civil 
Contingencies Secretariat which was established by the Cabinet Office. In 
contrast to the pre-emptive risk-management of UKCIP, or the adaptive capacity 
building and vulnerability reduction of DFID, this operated on a resilience basis 
w ith in  the time-frame of the event itself (Adey and Anderson 2011, Welsh 2013, 
Anderson 2010). Significantly, resilience as it is used here bears many of the 
hallmarks of socio-emergence for the duration of the event, although crucially 
this is lim ited to the duration of the 'emergency' and therefore assumed not to 
cause lasting change.
The lack of crossover in the early years of climate change adaptation 
between these three governmental centres and approaches demonstrates the 
power of the discursive framing of the threat. Although each dealt w ith  the same 
basic threat of climate change, their different accounts of that threat in time and 
space, as either the risk-manageable future, as immanent in social orderings, or 
as an exceptional irruption of excess, meant that they each saw themselves as 
responding to very different threats w ith  a very different set of solutions. There 
was accordingly almost no cooperation or overlap in the ir approaches to what 
might nonetheless be broadly labelled 'adaptation to climate change.'
This variety and the lim ited critical analysis of UKCIP's discourse meant 
that it  was necessary to explore how UKCIP’s specific account occurred and what 
it  included. The aim of this research was therefore to critically analyse UKCIP’s 
problematization of adaptation to climate change. This was pursued through a 
Foucaultian-based account of discourse, operationalized through discourse 
analysis and discourse theory techniques. In particular it  utilized Laclau and
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Mouffes' taxonomy of discourse as constituted by the articulation of elements as 
moments (Laclau and Mouffe 2001), and Foucault's account of a 
problematization as the political rationale that connects an ontology and 
epistemology of threat to a particular solution (Foucault 1998). Crucially 
Derrida's account of the 'supplement' (Derrida 1976), which was drawn into this 
analytical structure as the 'supplementary moment' allowed for the identification 
and investigation of elements that although articulated to the problematization 
in some way exceeded it. As such, they were articulated as supplements: 
subsidiary to the problematization, but by their presence also undermining its 
claim to wholeness, and thus threatening to supplant it. Together w ith  Foucault's 
account of genealogy as the contingent emergence of discourse through 
particular imbrications of power and knowledge (Foucault 1998, Hall 2001), 
these concepts allowed for the analysis of how UKCIP's problematization was 
created between 2003-2009 and its potential for discursive emergence after this 
date.
The first Chapter discussed the established tensions in the wider 
discourse of adaptation between hazards-, vulnerability- and nascent capacity- 
based accounts of adaptation demonstrated by Burton et al. (2002), Fussel 
(Fussel 2007, Fussel and Klein 2006) O'Brien et al. (2007). It then explored 
Pelling's three typologies of adaptation as resilience, transition and 
transformation, which demonstrate further tensions at the level of the 'intention 
and action' of an account of adaptation.
These different approaches provided the constitutive elements and 
political rationales of that were linked and summarized as three archetypes of 
adaptation problematization: techno-scientific, socio-contextual, and socio-
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emergent. These general problematizations were used in the analysis of UKCIP's 
own discourse through highlighting both what elements it  includes and excludes 
in its problematization and the political rationale that structures it.
This discussion of the content of a problematization recalls Fussel's 
comment that many climate change adaptation programmes, including UKCIP's, 
combine a hazards- and vulnerability-based approach. This research has sought 
not only to account for UKCIP's problematization of adaptation, but to 
problematize the assumption of complementarity through looking more deeply 
at how this development occurs at UKCIP, both genealogically w ith  
considerations of power/knowledge, and also at the level of the discourse itself, 
through its conceptual content and linguistic articulation.
This thesis has made clear that the use of elements from both frames does 
occur, but that they are not complementary in the sense of each retaining their 
comprehensive meaning, and moreover, that the tension over these 
contradictory meanings is resolved through articulating some elements as 
subsidiary and therefore limited, and excluding other aspects altogether, in order 
to achieve their relative coherence w ith in  a single problematization. These 
operations must constantly be (re)articulated, and as such always harbour 
'dangerous' potential for change even as it is the breadth that they offer which 
also gives the problematization a greater appearance of sufficiency. These 
findings w ill be related in relation to the specific aims and objectives of the thesis 
below.
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2.0 Research aims and objectives: summary of findings
2.1 The power/knowledge contingency of UKCIP's problematization of adaptation
This research has critically analysed UKCIP's problematization of adaptation. In 
its discussion of how adaptation is accounted for, several key findings have come 
to the fore which are discussed here in conjunction w ith  the core objectives. The 
firs t objective was to situate problematization in terms of the contingency of its 
emergence, in order to enable more critical engagement w ith  the conceptual 
content and form of this problematization. This was explored through the 
exploring the history of how UKCIP's core document was created and how it  was 
used over time. Chapter 4 in particular demonstrated the power/knowledge 
effects on the production of this discourse, specifically its institutional ties to the 
Environment Agency and Defra, and the background of UKCIP's own staff in 
environmental management, all of which resulted in in the strong influence of the 
disciplines of environmental risk assessment and risk management on UKCIP's 
problematization of adaptation.
The failure of the Socio-Economic Scenarios and the success of the climate 
scenarios also shaped the imaginary of what might be included in UKCIP's 2003 
account of adaptation itself, particularly in terms of the inclusion o f a product- 
oriented scientific account and the exclusion of a process-based social account of 
climate change as a problem. This combined w ith  a neoliberal political system 
and overt liberal values to produce a discourse that focused on the discrete 
decision-maker as the subject that adapts, pre-emptive planning as the preferred 
account of 'action,' and the exposure unit's interface w ith  biophysical climate as 
the object of adaptation. However the central place of risk and the tools of 
neoliberal environmental management globally and in New Labour's use of
311
partnerships also introduced contextual social aspects to both the ontological 
and epistemic bases of UKCIP's problematization of adaptation. These resulted in 
the lim ited presence of socio-contextual elements as supplementary moments 
w ith in  the core rationale. This conceptual contingency alerts us to the specificity 
of inclusion and exclusion of the conceptual content in UKCIP's problematization 
of adaptation, to the fact that it  is not 'objective,' and that it  plays into particular 
established discourses of 'orders'. These results are discussed in more detail 
under the remaining to objectives, in sections 2.2 and 2.3. The observation of this 
conceptual contingency also has w ider ramifications. First, as discussed in 
Chapter 7, it  alerts us to the need to analyse the contingency of the content of the 
emerging 'post-UKCIP' problematization. Second, i f  adaptation takes on a socio- 
emergent or transformative approach, part of this w ill require deliberately 
opening up the discourse of adaptation itself and that of the w ider order.
Also considered in terms of power/knowledge were the origins of the 
supplement as part of this discursive emergence and the potential for future 
change. Four principles of power/knowledge established by Foucault were used 
here to enable the critical analysis of discourse. However, it  should also be noted 
that they also act as techniques for enabling 'emergent' or 'transformational' 
adaptation itself through critique and awareness. These principles are: the rule of 
immanence, whereby power and knowledge im ply one another and neither are 
prior; continual variations that result from this imbrication, such that discourse 
is constantly being re-articulated, modulating perhaps only slightly but always 
w ith  potential to change; double conditioning, the use of the same 
problematization for different objectives, which can also reverse in the sense that 
the same subjects and strategies of power can appeal to very different discourses
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for the same ends: signifying the 'tactical polyvalence o f discourses' (Foucault 
1998).
A further power/knowledge effect arises in the fantasmatic function of 
appeal to extant identity of the subject or the search for certainty to cover over 
the lack (Glynos and Howarth 2007, Laclau and Mouffe 2001). I f  anything, 
UKCIP's conservative problematization and covering over of the uncertainty of 
climate change through increasingly techno-scientific means demonstrates how 
large a part this comforting technologisation of adaptation has played in the 
problematization to date, and perhaps why it has been quite happily left alone in 
a post-political box (Swyngedouw 2010).
This awareness of these power/knowledge functions helps us to unpick 
what a problematization really is and does but also demonstrates its fragmented 
nature which allows for change: multiple uses but also multiple moments of 
control and lim itation. These effects are not visible merely by a content analysis, 
or through the emic self-representation of adaptation actors, which is why 
power/knowledge considerations have added substantially to the depth of the 
semiotic approach adopted here.
2.2 UKCIP's problematization of adaptation: core and supplementary moments
The second aim of this thesis was to provide an account of UKCIP's 
problematization of adaptation in terms of its ontology and epistemology and 
how these are drawn together discursively as a political rationale. Addressing 
this aim through a semiotic lens in the first instance was an attempt to offer a 
detailed critical account of UKCIP's discourse in order to move beyond merely
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accepting and reporting on its content, or critiquing it  only on its own, existing 
terms.
This research found that the 2003 document was premised on the 
objective of making scientific knowledge useable by stakeholders and does this 
p rim arily  through the use of risk-based technologies. Its account of the 'threat' to 
which it  proffers a solution is that of biophysical climate change and knowledge 
of that change. Its core account of the solution is as a planned, pre-emptive 
decision which is assumed to be based on scientific information and existing 
objectives. The political rationale that binds these together is made up of the act 
of decision which is pre-emptive and couched in the technology of risk, as 'risk- 
based decision-making' that 'alters' existing decisions. This problematization is 
conservative in the sense of ensuring functional persistence of the present by 
excluding consideration of the social contingency of these objectives and 
excluding a w ider process of making and delivering decisions themselves. This 
lim its the account of adaptation to an essentially discrete moment both in space 
and time through its focus on outcomes and products. In sum, it  is founded 
squarely in a modernist, techno-scientific approach to adaptation which 
resonates w ith  the hazards and more lim ited resilience approach [Burton et al. 
2002, Pelling 2011).
However, there are a substantial number of elements of a socio-contextual 
and even socio-emergent account that are articulated as supplementary 
moments to the core problematization. These increase in number and depth 
between 2003 and 2009. These supplements nuance and extend the core 
problematization in terms of its content but are articulated as subsidiary, lim iting
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the depth of the ir content and thus the effect they have on the 'core/ specifically 
at the level of its political rationale.
Particular supplementary moments of UKCIP's discourse occur in the 
concepts of 'robust' and 'no-regret decisions,' 'flexible decisions' and 'keeping 
options open,' and 'avoiding knock-on effects.' Taken together, these create a 
political logic that responds to the assumption of irreducible uncertainty, which 
cannot be resolved through risk. This opens up the possibility of an emergent 
account of time and a sim ilarly emergent political rationale based on flexible 
capacity rather than prescient pre-emption. However, as supplements, these 
moments are articulated as subsidiary to the core, and therefore the ir full 
meaning is limited. Instead, they act as 'lim it points' of the problematization by 
extending it  slightly but through their articulation to the core actively shutting 
down alternative accounts of the problematization.
Specifically, while collective knowledge-making and other social forms of 
knowledge have come to be utilized in the opening stages of UKCIP's approach to 
adaptation, they are lim ited and non-explicit in the later stages of making a 
decision and performing it. As such, it  is not surprising that 'implementation', 
'monitoring' and 'review' are included in a lim ited fashion and situated as 
supplements through UKCIP's reluctance to develop these conceptually w ith in  its 
problematization. This is particularly notable w ith  regard to an overt 
engagement w ith  the character and process of decision-making w ith in  
stakeholder organisations. Such occlusions serve to reinforce the pre-emptive, 
non-flexible relation between the times of decision and the process of adaptation.
However, the articulation of these supplementary moments to the core 
must constantly be (re)made and is far from stable. This was made clear when
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the supplementary elements included also threatened to rupture the cohesion of 
the problematization by prompting alternative ways of knowing, specifically 
through responding to the irreducible uncertainty through shifting the object of 
knowledge from climate and technological risk outcomes to socio-contextual 
emergence and capacity.
The interviews make clear that after the 2003 report there is a gradual 
emergence of an account of adaptation as a process, signalling a shift from 
adaptation problematized as 'the' moment of decision to adaptation as practice 
and as process; in other words, how adaptation is done at a social and 
organizational level, rather than what decision is made, starts to become the 
focus. This is particularly the case in the Local Authority field under the rem it of 
National Indicator-188, and in the broader socio-contextual practice of risk 
assessment that is introduced through the Local Climate Impacts Profile [LCLIP] 
vulnerability-based approach. Both intimated an alternative problematization, 
where vulnerability accounted for the problem or threat as an internal 
characteristic and the capacity for organizational change became the account for 
the solution. Crucially, the result is that the 'subject' of adaptation is brought into 
the core problematization as the problem or 'object' of adaptation themselves, 
demonstrating the potential for an alternative problematization based on socio­
emergence, w ith  a rationale of transformation through ensuring social capacity 
to change.
These findings about UKCIP's problematization are significant for UK 
discourse because of what this reveals about what is visible and what is invisible 
and the practices and policies it  enabled or disabled as a result. This is true of as 
the Climate Change Risk Assessment and partnership approaches being
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undertaken by Defra and the EA from 2011, as these build on UKCIP's the risk 
framework and practices. Furthermore, as a fa irly  'standard' approach w ith in  the 
depoliticized environmental management mode of adaptation that was adopted 
by many developed countries, this discourse analysis hopes to demonstrate the 
contingency of onto-politics operational in this type of problematization, 
signalling the w ider need for ethical critique (Glynos and Howarth 2007, 
Howarth 2000).
Theoretically, this research has avoided the pitfa ll of many Foucaultian 
discourse analyses that fail to methodically engage w ith  the linguistic bases of 
the discourses that they claim to analyse. A t that level it  hopes to stand as an 
example of how productive the tools provided by critical discourse analysis, 
discourse analysis and discourse theory can be. However, the level of detail this 
required has created some trade-offs in the breadth and practice-orientation of 
the analysis, which are discussed further in section 3.0 below.
2.3 The reality of complementarity
The th ird  objective was to explore how the problematization relates to other 
discourses of adaptation established in the literature, and determine if, how, and 
w ith  what implications these function in a complimentary manner w ith in  
UKCIP's problematization. To do this effectively, a semiotic lens was required to 
assess the conceptual linkages and their weight w ith in  the discourse. The 
connections to the wider discourses of hazards, impacts, vulnerability, resilience, 
transition and transformation have already been noted through techno-scientific, 
socio-contextual and socio-emergent problematizations and supplements in the 
core problematization. Chapter 7 also demonstrated how socio-emergent
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supplementary moments could be developed into a fu ll supplementary 
problematization founded on the principles of adaptive capacity and 
transformation.
Crucially, the semiotic lens is also able to demonstrate how it is that the 
supplement polices the extant problematization and its social order even as its 
presence appears to extend or even explode it. This brings us the discussion of 
the 'complementary' use of hazards and vulnerability which was unpicked 
particularly in Chapter 7. This question is significant because, although it  was 
only a passing comment by Fussel, it  does recognize UKCIP's use of both accounts 
and the w ider assumption that these different approaches to adaptation can be 
used in a complimentary manner (O'Brien et al. 2007, O'Brien and Leichenko 
2007, Burton et al. 2002, Fussel 2007, Fussel and Klein 2006).
This thesis does not reject that hazards and vulnerability or techno­
science and socio-contextual accounts can be used together. However, it  
questions whether they are tru ly  complimentary by demonstrating that the 
specific ways in which they are combined is not only highly contingent, but that 
the manner of their articulation has crucial effects for how the ir content is used, 
the problematization that results, the real areas of (in )v is ib ility  that are 
produced, and the effects it has (or loses) as a result.
The key discursive term afforded by the semiotic lens that has helped in 
this analysis has been Derrida and Ranciere's account of the supplement, and the 
manner of its articulation as such, which demonstrates the dual and tense 
manner in which socio-contextual and particularly socio-emergent elements are 
articulated to UKCIP's problematization as subsidiary. This is particularly the 
case when they articulated to the epistemology of objective techno-science as a
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platform for policy and the basic rationale of functional persistence. In this way 
the supplement is lim ited in its meaning and prevented from exceeding or 
undermining the core problematization. In the former case, i t  is seen as adding 
subsidiary social knowledge to the prim ary scientific knowledge, while in the 
latter case, it  is prevented from creating a full socio-contextual problematization 
through the occlusion of a systemic account of the internal social nature of the 
stakeholder organizations. There is also a lim it placed on extending from the 
critique of the contingency of social relations to actively using them to enable 
adaptation through a socio-emergent account of adaptation as transformation 
through the capacity to change or emerge. As such, 'complimentary,' i f  read 
through the function of the supplement, demonstrates that this comes w ith  a 
price that prevents the equal or full representation of either account, and the 
huge areas of potential that this articulation of the supplement to the core 
problematization actually excludes.
Nonetheless, these supplements are inherently 'dangerous' as they can act 
as moments of discursive emergence that threaten the fundamentally 
conservative 'resilience' and 'transition' based political rationale in the techno- 
scientific problematization. This thesis has observed the emergence of such 
supplements at UKCIP and their subsequent re-articulation to the original 
problematization, albeit w ith  an extended account of the supplement included. In 
this regard, it  was the objective of this thesis to follow an ethical mode of 
critique: demonstrating the content and contingency of the extant discourse, and 
where its lim its lie as a result, w ithout positing a particular account as being 
somehow 'better.' For this reason, the identification of supplementary moments 
and their potentiality was lim ited to those that appeared w ith in  UKCIP's extant
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discourse. Nonetheless the nature of this [re)articulation of UKCIP's 
problematization of adaptation to climate change, could be understood as very 
nearly becoming 'political' in Ranciere's sense, but appears to have been 'policed' 
in terms of UKCIP's own problematization. It remains to be seen whether there 
were any political implications for the problematization of adaptation for the UK 
as those questions now fall to the Defra and EA-based provision of adaptation 
policy and support. As such, the inclusions and occlusions and the supplementary 
moments identified here w ill have im portant bearing on the contingent 
constitution of their 'new' problematization.
2.4 The wider political significance of the supplement and transformation: the 
poetics of adaptation
Chapter 2 established the theoretical foundation of this analysis on the post- 
foundationalist irreducib ility  of meaning [Marchart 2007, Ranciere 2007b, 
Derrida 1976). This 'anti'-ontology means that no single order can account for 
the incalculable and incommensurable number of parts [Hewlett 2007, Marchart 
2007, Ranciere 2007b), and therefore the claim to inclusion becomes itself the 
definition of the political as no universal law or order exists to describe social 
order and its emergence [Ranciere 1991, Ranciere 2007a). This lack of 
fundament undermines the valid ity of any order even as that lack is what enables 
an order to take place. Furthermore, this fundamental contingency dislodges the 
valid ity of all knowledges and 'experts' as not only particular to a given order but 
as by definition ill-equipped to deal w ith  the 'event' as the irruption of excess 
from beyond the order which designates them as expert. Crucially, these experts 
and the ir discourses -  indicated by Ranciere's critique of philosophers and
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teachers - also serve the role of policing and lim iting ‘originary equality' -  that is, 
the equal claim of an 'other' to a different order, based on the equal contingency 
of the other w ith  the self, or the supplement w ith  the order. In doing so, expertise 
in facts lim its learning, and the capacity for learning (Ranciere 2004, Ranciere 
1991) which for our purposes here can be extended to change, emergence or 
'transformation.'
Thus at an ontological level the tension between science and society, 
expert and lay, techno-scientific and socio-emergent is bound up in a more 
fundamental contradiction of the social order. This fundamental im possibility of 
'a' social order (Marchart 2007, Ranciere 2007b) comes to the fore when that 
society actively and overtly seeks to adapt. Here adaptation takes its fullest, most 
political sense as socio-emergence or transformation. However, in this context, 
the problem seems to be how to ensure that adaptation comes in the form of 
genuinely political interventions, particularly as, once enacted they become 
instituted as the police, and in doing so inevitably undermine the 
transform ability they originally sought.
Ranciere's account of the political demonstrates for us the fundamental 
significance of the supplement as the location of the political and the critique of 
an extant order as well as its gateway to change. UKCIP's policing of the 
supplement, in an attempt to render it  subsidiary, replicates the frequent 
response of liberal societies to the aporia of environmental 'problems,' by 
absorbing these at a semiotic level into the extant discursive order and thereby 
depriving them of their politically irruptive promise. This is particularly apparent 
in the UK (Swyngedouw 2010) where, as Chambers puts it "the prominence of 
'th ird  way' solutions, the emergence of consensus democracy and the rise of neo­
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liberalism all [seem to] diminish politics to mere bureaucratic engineering" 
[2010, p. 198).
In practical terms the disciplinary power/knowledge effects of the techno- 
scientific and liberal discourse of the police is reflected in UKCIP's practices of 
engagement w ith  stakeholders and the desire to institute a particular discourse 
o f responsibilization. This obscures the irruptive force of climate change itself as 
encounter w ith  excess. UKCIP does this im p lic itly  through stakeholder 
engagement and supporting regional and sectoral networks, and helping them 
secure 'their own' interests, so that the Government does not have to, and so that 
m itigation efforts also do not have to.
However, this practice generates a second supplement of socio-emergent 
supplementary moments, which are otherwise im plic it governance techniques of 
knowledge and order-ability. The desire to control all and know all that is 
inherent to the modern order necessitates that governance drive outwards in all 
directions and depths until the event horizon. However, on the basis of the post- 
foundational ontology posited here, such an agenda is seen as requiring 
continuous expansion as the more it  encompasses the further the horizon 
recedes. This is where the supplement of emergent time and space appears. 
However, the core techno-scientific and consensus liberal framing has to work 
hard to deny or obscure the presence of an outside or an excess, believing [or 
desiring) all ecological threats to be knowable in principle and all social interests 
to be present and established [Simons and Masschelein 2010). As such, any 
ontological excess that appears must be sutured as a discursive [subsidiary) 
supplement.
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This suture of the void through an established account of climate change 
and adaptation thus creates a foundation that justifies and enables action, but in 
doing so necessarily lim its the onto-political options that are available. This 
order of knowledge arises both in the epistemology of climate science and as a 
result of the 'existing objectives' or extant organisations as that which should be 
protected through the rationale of adaptation. It is significant then that any 
policy or ordering based on science, insofar as it  uses science as a foundational 
knowledge that claims to know a universal objective truth, is like ly to adopt this 
totalising approach that seeks to absorb all knowledges into a single logic.
Similarly 'existing objectives' speak a liberal language, but are absorbed 
into advanced liberalisms negotiated agreements w ith in  regional or sectoral 
interest groups. As Simons and Masschelein note, the "consensus police order 
assumes that there is no outside, and in its eagerness to see everywhere, and 
particularly behind every conflict, specific interests and identity, it  denies all 
manifestations of (political) surplus or lack (Simons and Masschelein 2010, p. 
598)." This clearly lim its critical engagement w ith  norms and values that cannot 
be absorbed w ith in  the w ider extant order and therefore lim its the possibilities 
for adaptation as transformation.
The lim iting effect that this 'consensus' approach has was observed in the 
contingent content of the 2003 technical report through the exclusions of 
alternative political rationales such as more pervasive engagement in 
organisational structure or mandatory m itigation or collectivised state-based 
prophylactic approaches. Consensus policing was also seen later in the practices 
of UKCIP staff on stakeholders and themselves as they tried to adhere to the 
2003 risk framework despite the increasing presence of a socio-emergent
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supplement, in order to maintain a consistent approach, or problematization. 
W hilst consistency for adaptation is almost an oxymoron in terms, but i t  becomes 
necessary in the context of the w ider consensus oriented, techno-scientifically 
based, policy.
This recalls Swyngedouw's (2010) argument, discussed earlier, that 
climate apocalypse obscures and ensures the continuity of capitalist production. 
It resonates w ith  Dillon (2008) and Welsh (2013) who note the modus operandi 
of capitalist discipline as resilience is to require us to transform ourselves in 
order to maintain the social order of neo-liberal capitalism. This constant 
violence against the self is transformative of the subject but not of the 
overarching problematization of capitalist society. In Pellings taxonomy 
'transformation' operates on precisely this principle, and becomes particularly 
invasive and apparently transformational as it  extends its reach into the account 
of the subject. The crucial lesson then for any account of adaptation is: what 
adapts, or perhaps more importantly: what, in all this adaptation, remains'P
The approach of identifying the problematization's core political rationale, 
rather than cataloguing changes can highlight the significance of this difference; 
that even if  the adaptations appear to be radical, as long as the political rationale 
or referent object does not change, this is merely resilience or transition. This 
can also help to demonstrate the degree of sacrifice made at the event horizon to 
secure an im plic it rationale. Swyngedouw demonstrates this well, and we see 
this also in UKCIP's governance work, albeit w ithout the level of intrusion that 
Dillon identifies in other neoliberal arenas (Dillon 2003). This adds to the 
supplement a concern for its actual political significance as opposed to its 
potential; where the supplement merely expands the extant order, but maintains
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its core rationale, then it  is not political in Ranceire's sense. Thus, w hilst the 
supplement is articulated to the core, its political effects are also held in check, as 
is its value for transformation.
However, the looseness of the supplement's articulation or relationship to 
the core discourse or order means that there is greater potential for it  to become 
re-activated as a political node for change (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, Marchart 
2007]. Ranciere's account of the political also lim its the imaginary of 
transformation thus: all orders are hierarchical orders, as such, the less 
hierarchical and the less policed the order, the greater the allowance for the 
originary equality the greater the possibility that true politics and equality w ill 
occur. Laclau's focus on the capacity to revise power relations echoes this, and 
both resonate w ith  complex adaptive systems thinking in that allowing flat, less 
hierarchical structures offers greater promise of transformation.
The value of discourse-based approach here has been to identify the 
strength of these articulations both semantically and in terms of power- 
knowledge relations. This has been explored as being open at certain moments 
and then policed at critical moments through UKCIP's history, usually in 
conjunction w ith  institutional and 'political' (in the usual sense] objectives of 
Defra and the UK Government as well as the institutional expertise of those 
involved in (recreating UKCIP's discourse. However, the implications of this 
theoretical account for adaptation itself are even greater: the looser the
structures of discursive ordering, the greater capacity there is for adaptation, 
moving on the sliding scale from resilience to transformation as fundamental 
onto-political change.
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Going back to the discussion of accounts of adaptation in Chapter 1, while 
resilience and transition maintain an order, transformation was refigured as 
transformability, that is, as the willingness to engage w ith  change and critique. 
Thus, in addition to occluding specifically socio-emergent supplements, 
modernity's liberal consensus and techno-scientific occlusion of the void or 
excess of being per se profoundly undermines the possibility of adaptation being 
problematized in a genuinely transformative manner. For post-foundational 
theorists such as Foucault and Ranciere, together w ith  Bataille, it  is in the 
recognition of the excess, the void or the divine, that transformation takes place, 
at transgression of the 'lim it.' This requires a more engaged account of the 
experience of the lim it and the space and time of the 'lim it' or the 'event horizon.' 
This is indicated in the supplementary problematization's emergence of space 
and time but barely explored. To engage w ith  the lim it productively requires 
poetic, aesthetic, deliberately experimental and experiential engagement w ith  
excess (Simons and Masschelein 2010, Dillon 2008, Kate 2000, Foucault 1992), 
and critically, avoiding the temptation to 'suture.'
In our discussion of the aporia of climate change impacts Ranciere offers a 
mode of engagement that assumes the excess, or the irreducib ility  of ignorance at 
its most profound level: the impossibility not only of knowing the future, but of 
knowing a 'solution' as all solutions are partial and impossible. This is accounted 
for in his (fitting ly named) work: The Ignorant Schoolmaster (Ranciere 1991), 
which is an exploration of the pedagogical response to the irreducib ility  of 
meaning to a given order, and hence the impossibility of teaching what cannot be 
known. As such, the response is to let the student, in their equality of 
contingency, teach themselves: "... one can teach what one doesn't know if  the
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student is emancipated... In short, the circle of emancipation must be begun" 
(Dillon 2005, quoting Ranciere 1991, pp. 15-16]. This crucially refuses to reify or 
order knowledge and refuses the accompanying institutionalisation of such 
knowledge (Dillon 2005]. For adaptation as transformation this enables the 
decentralization of the production of knowledge and the refusal to codify an 
order of practice or hierarchy of rule. Although this is an idealisation of sorts -  it  
offers a mode that attempts to ensure the openness of relations that allow 
complex adaptive systems to emerge, and transgression or transformation.
Crucially, however, Dillon notes that, for all its emancipatory value, 
Ranciere's account of equality “too quickly closes down the complex political and 
ethical issues raised by the messianic and in particular the violence implied by it" 
(Dillon 2005, p. 435]. The constant irruption of the political in any order and the 
foundationlessness of any order mean that change is not only inevitable but also 
infinite. Furthermore, if  the political act is understood as the expression of 
freedom, emancipation becomes a driving code, that, although it  posits no order, 
nonetheless "poses its own art, its own dispositions, and compositions," (Dillon 
2005, p. 444]. Furthermore "the play of this moment...its continuous 
inexhaustible advent, as well as the madness of decision that characterizes 
it...recalls, at least in part, Derrida's messianism w ithout a messiah" (Dillon 2005, 
p. 446]. The 'mad' arbitrariness of any decision, an order amidst irreducible 
excess, or in climate change parlance, irreducible uncertainty of the most 
profound kind to be encountered by an in fin ite ly malleable social body, is at once 
emancipatory and in its destructive eruption, also necessarily violent. This is a 
'sacrificial' violence that trades one equality for another because only the act of 
trading is important, not the goods themselves. Thus for Dillon, the question then
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shifts from a concern w ith  emancipation to the necessary question of "what 
violence attends [emancipation]? And how is that violence to be addressed?" 
[D illon 2005, p. 447]
After all, in the context of ecological systems and climate change, the 
ecological orders established over millennia may have been achieved violently, 
through events and change, and have been policed (also violently, as Foucault is 
at pains to point out], yet whereas for Ranciere the sum of parts exceeds a given 
ordering, in ecology the converse has also proven productive, rather than merely 
destructive: the sum is greater than the parts -  the order does more than any of 
the parts could do on the ir own. Parallel to this, climate change is itself a political 
irrup tion  of the extant order, and whilst it  ushers in a new order, it  does so w ith  a 
colossal amount of violence. Is that excess which is destructive as valuable as that 
which is destroyed? 'Valuable' is also a deliberate term rather than 'equal' -  while 
both are equal in the ir contingency per se, does it  fo llow  that the emancipatory 
assertion of the excluded and the excess is a better or w ider selection of 'parts'?
This brings us back to the critique levelled against Norgaard that all 
coevolutions are equal. In fact, in reserving judgement on validity, as Ranciere 
does, they are very sim ilar approaches. However, in celebrating originary 
equality, the concern of other post structuralist theorists for the mode of being 
that opens up to emergence (rather than emerging regardless of the crushing of 
other equalities] is lost. Hanging in the balance is not the concern for care of the 
self (Foucault 1990, Foucault 1992] but concern for care of the other, as explored 
by Derrida, for example (Stamp 2009]. In care of the other, the appreciation of 
the equality of contingency can become a celebration of what is produced as well 
as the desire for production and also builds openness as a positive tra it and
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practice rather than as a mere in terruption or eruption w ithout temporal 
substance (Dillon 2005, Dillon 2008).
There is no solution, order or code for the undecidable decision at the 
lim it point of an order, but it  adds a layer to the messianic interval that the 
political operates w ith in, and marks it  w ith  a capacity for thought, for turning 
about, for exploration w ithout destruction that expands the ethical and practical 
boundaries of response as well as the time of formulating that response. It is this 
that broadens the basis of transformation away from mere an-archy to trans- 
fo rm -ation, where form and order are possible, even desirable, so long as they 
are relatively flat and therefore open to change.
However, that excess needs to be presented: it  needs to be given a form in 
order to 'count' and in order to achieve transformation. As such, the crucial 
nature of the supplement identified in UKCIP's discourse not only marks the 
space of excess, but a particular element of excess, which in being articulated to 
the core begins to be designated, and to have a 'proper name' such that it  is called 
into the 'account' (Ranciere 2001, Ranciere and Panagia 2000). This happens in 
terms of the phrase 'stakeholders' but crucially, through the emerging inclusion 
of a new named subject (such as naming a ‘representative selection' or 'crucial 
nodes' or indeed 'all' of the workforce, consumers, or range of individuals 
responding to impacts) and the lim ited inclusion of techniques such as various 
modes of communication and deliberation and social scenario or futures 
visioning. Critically, w ithout naming and describing an alternative future, we are 
presented w ith  no alternative to the current order and therefore have no basis 
for transformation. The central importance of encounter and agonism, and jumps 
into unknown experimentation therefore cannot be underestimated. Nor can the
329
colossal distance between this mode of engagement w ith  the excess and that o f 
techno-scientific rationality in radically lim iting  the breadth and depth of 
adaptation.
In sum, i f  transformation as the most extensive account of adaptation is to 
be engaged w ith  both in terms of harnessing the productiv ity of originary 
equality and celebrating the productions of order, the mode of engaging w ith  the 
supplement at this sacral boundary must be developed itself, in addition to 
engagement w ith  the particular supplement presented here, which just so 
happens to speak to this ontology of contingency and originary equality as well. 
Just as the ignorant schoolmaster allowed his students to teach themselves, the 
supplement presented here of open-dialogue and decision-making across time 
and space opens up the moment of transformation to all points of (re)institution, 
but it  also does so w ith  an awareness of the productive nature of the ir relations 
as both contingency and capacity.
3.0 Limitations and Future directions
There are several lim itations to this research that have been recognized 
throughout the thesis and which w ill be repeated here w ith  a view to introducing 
avenues for improvement and future research. Most significant of these were, 
first, that there was a lim itation in data selection in the sense of not carrying out 
a thorough review of the Local Climate Impacts Profile and how this was itself 
introduced to UKCIP's discourse and how it functioned w ith in  the framework of 
the risk-analysis more precisely. This would be an im portant area for the 
extension of this research.
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More fundamentally however, while the linguistic approach to the 
analysis of discourse is incredibly productive, it  is also an incredibly labour- 
intensive and slow process, resulting in a high resolution but a lim ited purview of 
UKCIP's fu ll discourse. A fu ller account would include a much w ider range of 
discourse events, but particularly im portant are those established through 
practices of governance such as UKCIP's 'tools'. The risk-framework discussed 
here is one such tool, but it  takes a much more effective and disciplinary 
power/knowledge form through the technologies and 'rituals' or procedure of 
UKCIPs meetings, spread-sheets and computer-program interfaces such as the 
Adaptation Wizard and the Weather Generator. Each of these could be analysed 
at the level provided by critical discourse analysis, and all of them combine into 
an account of UKCIP's discourse, which properly construed as a problematization 
includes practices of governance. This demonstrates a clear direction for further 
research, as well as a broadened research strategy, as well as being able to draw 
on UKCIP's now quite expansive range of case studies.
The discussion in the previous section and in Chapter 7 also makes clear 
that the legacy of UKCIP's problematization still continues in the UK, and as such 
the real implications of this research are to be found not only in the stakeholder 
engagements already undertaken, but in those currently emerging through the 
national Climate Change Risk Assessment and related Defra and Environment 
Agency adaptation practices. Therefore tracking the emergence of the discourse 
through these new institutional nodes would be crucial to any account of the 
w ider problematization of adaptation in the UK after 2012.
331
Appendix 1: List of Observations of UKCIP stakeholder 
meetings and supporting documentation
Observation title and description Data Collected (analysis method)
“Stakeholder A,”second meeting with UKCIP, 
basic risk assessment, 2009
Minutes from first meeting in written 
form provided by UKCIP (background 
information)
Vulnerability assessment spread sheet 
provided by UKCIP (background 
information)
Observation and audio recording. 
(Observation notes combined with 
transcript subjected to discourse 
analysis and coding)
Follow-up interview with UKCIP 
Interviewee E (transcript subjected to 
discourse analysis and coding) 
Follow-up interview with UKCIP 
Interviewee G (transcript subjected to 
discourse analysis and coding)
"Stakeholder B,"first meeting with UKCIP, 
background to climate adaptation and basic 
risk assessment, 2009
Audio recording provided by UKCIP of 
first and second meeting. 
(Transcribed, with discourse analysis 
and coding)
Agenda and notes from UKCIP about 
the meeting plan (background 
information)
Copy of UKCIP notes from post-event 
assessment for both meetings 
(background information)
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UKCIP presentation to Emergency Planning 
Society (EPS), 2009
Value of event: Interesting because this was 
the first official engagement between UKCIP 
and the EPS. Also selected because it appeared 
the most likely to directly confront the issue of 
different conceptualisations of adaptation as 
resilience, and different temporal 
understandings.
Observation, audio recording and
transcript, analysed using discourse
analysis and coding
Copy of power-point presentation
given my UKCIP representative
Follow-up interview with UKCIP
representative
UKCP'09 Oxford Launch, 2009 Observed to see if  this connected to 
any changes to the risk framework, 
LCLIP and general presentation of 
adaptation. Audio recorded. (No major 
changes, so used as background only]
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Appendix 2: Interview Schedule
Interviewee and Position Explanation of relation to other discourse 
events
[Interview name removed in final copy 
for anonymity purposes]
Lead author of the Climate Adaptation: risk, 
uncertainty and decision-making report
[Interview name removed in final copy 
for anonymity purposes]
Co-author at UKCIP of the Climate Adaptation: 
risk, uncertainty and decision-making report
[Interview name removed in final copy 
for anonymity purposes]
Long-term head of the Science Team at UKCIP
[Interview name removed in final copy 
for anonymity purposes]
Long-term staff at UKCIP, and involved in 
Stakeholder B case-study
[Interview name removed in final copy 
for anonymity purposes]
This was a 'snowball' interview, recommended 
someone who presented an 'alternative' take 
on UKCIP's current and potential discourse, 
also involved in stakeholder work
[Interview name removed in final copy 
for anonymity purposes]
Stakeholder work with Stakeholder A case- 
study
[Interview name removed in 
final copy for anonymity purposes]
Also worked with Stakeholder A.
[Interview name removed in 
final copy for anonymity purposes]
Stakeholder work, mostly with Local 
Authorities, also presented to the professional 
organisation the Emergency Planning Society
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